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Abstract
This thesis is divided into two distinct parts. The first part of this thesis studies non-
interactive key exchange schemes in two different settings: the public key setting and
the identity-based setting. Loosely speaking, a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)
scheme allows two users to compute a unique shared key without any interaction.
Our work is motivated by the scant attention that this primitive has received since
the major contribution in the ground-breaking paper of Diffie and Hellman.
In the public key setting, we assume that any user can compute a public/private
key pair and the public keys are registered with a Certification Authority (CA). A
user A can compute a shared key with user B by using its own private key skA
and B’s public key pkB, along with some public parameters. We provide different
security models for NIKE and explore the relationships between them. Our models
consider the challenging setting where an adversary can introduce arbitrary public
keys in the system. We give constructions for secure NIKE, with respect to those
security models, in the random oracle model based on the hardness of factoring, and
in the standard model based on the hardness of a variant of the Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman problem for asymmetric pairings. We also study the relationship
between NIKE and public key encryption (PKE), showing that a secure NIKE can
be generically converted into an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme.
In the identity-based setting, there is a Trusted Authority (TA) who holds a mas-
ter secret key and a master public key. The public key of a user is some unique
information that identifies a user, called the identity. The private key for each user
is computed by the TA, who uses its master secret key and master public key to-
gether with the user identity to derive the user’s private key. Using multilinear
maps, we obtain the first identity-based non-interactive key exchange scheme (ID-
NIKE) secure in the standard model. The scheme is a standard-model version of
the Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara ID-NIKE scheme. In addition, we derive a fully-secure
hierarchical version of our ID-NIKE scheme. Our hierarchical ID-NIKE scheme is
the first such scheme with full security in either the random oracle model or the
standard model.
The second part of this thesis is concerned with the construction of hierarchical key
assignment schemes. Such schemes can be used to enforce access control policies by
cryptographic means. We present new, enhanced security models for hierarchical
key assignment schemes and give simple, efficient and strongly key indistinguishable
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secure constructions that can be used for arbitrary hierarchies. Our constructions
use pseudorandom functions and forward-secure pseudorandom generators as build-
ing blocks. We compare instantiations of our constructions with state-of-the-art
hierarchical key assignment schemes, demonstrating that our new schemes possess
an attractive trade-off between storage requirements and efficiency of key derivation.
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Notation
We include here a list of symbols and notations that might be useful for reference.
All other symbols and notations will be introduced at their first use.
Z,N,R sets of integers, non-negative integers and real numbers
k ∈ N security parameter (also denoted by 1k, the string of k ones)
Zn set of all integers modulo n
Z∗n subset of Zn formed by all elements which are relatively prime to n
{0, 1}n set of all binary strings of length n
{0, 1}∗ set of all binary strings of unspecified length
x||y concatenation of strings x and y
x⊕ y exlusive-or (XOR) of strings x and y
a | b integer a divides integer b
|X| number of elements in a set X, or order of group if X is a group
||x|| length of bit string x
|a| absolute value of an element a
ord(a) multiplicative order of element a in a specified group
φ : N→ N Euler’s totient function
[n] set of integers 1, . . . , n
bxc largest integer not greater than x
{ni}i∈[q] the set {n1, . . . , nq}
s← S process of selecting s uniformly at random from a set/group S
y ← A(x) process of running an algorithm A on input x and assigning y
the result
x← y process of assigning the value y to a variable x
AF an adversary A with oracle access to F
⊥ error/rejection symbol
¬,∧,∨ negation, logical conjunction, logical disjunction
:= assignment symbol
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Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Thesis Structure and Summary of Contributions . . . . 18
In this chapter, we give some motivation for our research and present the overall
structure of this thesis with a summary of our contributions.
1.1 Motivation
This thesis addresses two distinct topics in cryptography: non-interactive key ex-
change and hierarchical key assignment schemes.
Part I of this thesis deals with the study of non-interactive key exchange schemes in
two different settings: the public key setting and the identity-based setting.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman in their ground-breaking paper “New directions in cryp-
tography” [53], proposed a “public key distribution system”. This system, famously
known as the Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol, is frequently seen as an interactive key
exchange scheme; it allows two users to establish a shared key via communication
over an insecure channel. Loosely, in this view, the DH protocol works as follows.
We assume the existence of a group G of prime order p and with generator g. In
order to agree on a shared key, user Alice randomly chooses an integer a from Zp as
her private key and user Bob similarly chooses a random integer b from Zp. Now,
Alice computes her public key ga (mod p), which she sends to Bob, and Bob com-
putes gb (mod p), which he sends to Alice. After receiving each other’s public keys,
Alice and Bob compute their shared key KAB = g
ab (mod p), which Alice computes
as KAB = (g
b)
a
(mod p) and Bob computes as KAB = (g
a)b (mod p). The idea
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behind this protocol is that, unless one can efficiently compute discrete logarithms
in G, it should be computationally infeasible for a potential adversary eavesdrop-
ping the communication between Alice and Bob to compute their shared key KAB.
However, it is well known that the DH protocol has a major shortcoming. Namely,
it is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack; an eavesdropper intercepts Alice’s
public key and sends its own public key to Bob. When Bob sends his public key, the
eavesdropper now intercepts that communication and substitutes Bob’s public key
with its own public key. Alice and Bob, instead of agreeing on a shared key between
themselves, will thus unknowingly each agree on a shared key with the eavesdropper.
Although frequently seen as an interactive key exchange scheme, the DH protocol
was in fact originally proposed as a, what we call, non-interactive key exchange
scheme (NIKE) in the public key setting; users (instead of exchanging public keys)
store their public keys (along with their respective identities) in a public file, or in
more practical terms, they register their public keys with a Certification Authority
(CA). In order to compute a shared key with Bob, Alice first retrieves Bob’s public
key from the public file, while Bob retrieves Alice’s public key. Alice and Bob
compute a shared key as before, but no interaction between them is required. The
DH protocol seen in this way suffers from a similar security problem as before, if we
allow an adversary to register arbitrary public keys against users of its choice. So
for example, the adversary “steals” Bob’s public key and registers it as the public
key of a third, corrupt, user. Now, we see that the shared key between Alice and the
corrupt user, KAC , is identical to KAB. Thus, the adversary can obtain the shared
key between two honest users, Alice and Bob, by simply stealing KAC = KAB.
This security issue can be avoided if Alice and Bob hash that key along with their
identities. In this case we say the scheme is secure in the random oracle model (see
Section 2.2.3 for the random oracle model).
Interestingly, since its appearance in the Diffie-Hellman paper [53], the NIKE prim-
itive has not received much attention. In the public key setting, to the best of our
knowledge, the first work that provided a formal security model for non-interactive
key exchange was a paper due to Cash et al., in 2008 [40]. Then the questions
that arise are: How realistic is this security model? What other options for security
models can we have? Does there exist any NIKE scheme which is secure in the stan-
dard model with respect to a security model that allows an adversary to arbitrarily
register public keys against users of its choice? (One has to consider that in practice
16
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it is common that CAs do not operate so rigorously and might, for example: not
properly check the identity of a user who wants to register a public key; not require
proof of possession of corresponding private keys; or even not check validity of public
keys.) In this thesis, we systematically study NIKE, addressing all these questions.
On the other hand, as far as we are aware, the first and only efficient and secure
non-interactive key exchange scheme in the identity-based setting (ID-NIKE), was
due to Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara, in 2000 [122]. (In the identity-based setting,
publicly known strings identifying users are used as their public keys, and users’
private keys are computed and distributed to the corresponding users by a Trusted
Authority (TA).) The SOK scheme has been proven secure in a security model by
Dupont and Enge [57] and subsequently in a stronger security model by Paterson
and Srinivasan [112]. However, security for the SOK scheme is only achieved in the
random oracle model. In this respect, the goal of this thesis is to provide the first
ID-NIKE scheme with security in the standard model. We go further and examine
the ID-NIKE primitive in the hierarchical setting, i.e. where users are organized in
a hierarchy and every user can derive private keys for all its descendants in the
hierarchy; as before, any user in the system should be able to securely and non-
interactively agree on a shared key with any other user in the system.
Part II of this thesis is devoted to the study of hierarchical key assignment schemes
(HKASs). Such schemes are methods for implementing access control policies by
assigning encryption keys and private information to each class in a hierarchy in
such a way that the private information assigned to a class, along with some public
information, can be used to derive encryption keys to all the descendant classes in the
hierarchy. Our main concern is that previous HKASs either lack any formal security
analysis or have security based on not so realistic security models. Hierarchical key
assignment schemes were first formalized by Akl and Taylor in 1983 [5], but work
to formally analyse the security of such schemes only started in 2005 with Atallah
et al. [8], who proposed two different security models. We argue that their security
models do not capture the broadest range of realistic attacks; they do not allow an
adversary, whose goal is to either compute the encryption key of a target class of its
choice or distinguish that key from random, to gain access to keys for ancestors of
the target class. This is a weakness in their security models as these keys might leak
through usage, and their compromise need not trivially enable the computation of
key for the target class. Therefore, in this thesis we address the issue of constructing
17
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provably secure schemes with respect to stronger security models, which provide that
additional compromise capability to the adversary.
Another contribution that we make in Part II of this thesis is to construct secure
hierarchical key assignment schemes for arbitrary hierarchies in a simple manner.
Recently, Crampton et al. [48] proposed an intriguing approach to constructing
HKASs for arbitrary hierarchies using chain partitions. In this approach an arbitrary
hierarchy is partitioned into a collection of chains and the scheme for the arbitrary
hierarchy is built by combining, in a particular way, the schemes for each of the
chains. However, that construction came with no formal security analysis. In this
thesis we analyse the chain partition construction of [48], showing that the security
of the scheme for a single chain implies the security of the scheme for an arbitrary
hierarchy, enabling us to focus on the construction of simple schemes for single
chains. We show how to construct such single chain schemes using pseudorandom
functions and forward-secure pseudorandom generators.
1.2 Thesis Structure and Summary of Contributions
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2: This chapter provides some background material relevant for the un-
derstanding of the subsequent chapters of this thesis. In particular, it gives
an overview of the mathematics and cryptographic primitives required in the
constructions of our cryptographic schemes presented in Parts I and II of this
thesis. As this thesis follows the provable security paradigm, we also provide
in this chapter an introduction to the topic of provable security and its proof
techniques.
The main contributions of this thesis are organized in two separate parts: Part I,
which consists of Chapters 3 and 4, focuses on the study of the non-interactive key
exchange primitive; Part II, which consists of Chapter 5, is concerned with the study
of hierarchical key assignment schemes. We expand on the contributions presented
on each of these chapters next.
Chapter 3: This chapter is on NIKE in the public key setting. We start our contri-
butions in this topic by exploring different security models for NIKE and their
18
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relationships. Our default security models minimize the assumptions about
the Certification Authority (CA), allowing the adversary to register arbitrary
public keys in the system. We prove that all these models are polynomially
equivalent, enabling us to analyse NIKE schemes in the simplest of the se-
curity models. We then provide two provably secure constructions for NIKE
schemes: the first is based on pairings and is provably secure in the stan-
dard model, while the second is an adaptation of the hashed DH protocol to
the group of signed quadratic residues and has security in the random oracle
model. We continue our contributions on NIKE, showing how to construct an
IND-CCA secure public key encryption scheme from a secure NIKE scheme.
The work presented in this chapter appears in the following publication.
• Eduarda S. V. Freire, Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz, and Kenneth G. Pa-
terson. Non-interactive key exchange. In Kaoru Kurosawa and Goichiro
Hanaoka, editors, Public Key Cryptography, volume 7778 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 254–271. Springer, 2013
In this thesis the proof of equivalence between the NIKE security models is
given in a single theorem (Theorem 3.1) as opposed to three separate theorems
as in [63] (the publication above).
Chapter 4: This chapter presents the first ever provably secure ID-NIKE scheme
with security in the standard model. Our scheme is based on multilinear
maps; we use multilinear maps to construct a new variant of programmable
hash functions (PHFs), which we call multilinear PHFs (MPHFs), and then
use such an MPHF to construct our standard model secure ID-NIKE scheme.
Using MPHFs once again, we construct the first ever hierarchical ID-NIKE
(H-ID-NIKE) scheme to achieve full security either in the random oracle model
or in the standard model.
Most of the results of this chapter were published and presented at CRYPTO
2013 :
• Eduarda S. V. Freire, Dennis Hofheinz, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Christoph
Striecks. Programmable hash functions in the multilinear setting. In Ran
Canetti and Juan A. Garay, editors, CRYPTO (1), volume 8042 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 513–530. Springer, 2013
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Section 4.4 contains a construction towards a standard model secure ID-NIKE
scheme, which is more efficient than the one introduced in the above publi-
cation – it needs only pairings instead of multilinear maps – but only offers
security in a model where the adversary is restricted to make a bounded num-
ber of queries. This part of Chapter 4 is joint work with Dennis Hofheinz.
We now describe our contributions on hierarchical key assignment schemes.
Chapter 5: We start off this chapter by proposing new and stronger security mod-
els for HKASs than the ones proposed by Atallah et al. [8]. We call them S-KR
and S-KI, for strong key-recovery security and strong key-indistinguishability
security, respectively. We give two simple and efficient constructions for HKAS
which we prove secure in our S-KI security model: the first construction
is based on pseudorandom functions (PRFs), while the second is based on
forward-secure pseudorandom generators (FS-PRGs). Both of our construc-
tions are designed for totally ordered hierarchies and can be combined with
the chain partition construction of Crampton et al. [48], which we formally
analyse in this chapter, to produce HKASs for arbitrary hierarchies. In this
chapter, we also provide a comparison between our constructions and some
provably secure HKASs from the literature.
Most of the work presented in this chapter appears in the following publication.
• Eduarda S. V. Freire, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Bertram Poettering. Sim-
ple, efficient and strongly KI-secure hierarchical key assignment schemes.
In Ed Dawson, editor, CT-RSA, volume 7779 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 101–114. Springer, 2013
The latter publication is in turn an extension of the publication below.
• Eduarda S. V. Freire and Kenneth G. Paterson. Provably secure key
assignment schemes from factoring. In Udaya Parampalli and Philip
Hawkes, editors, ACISP, volume 6812 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 292–309. Springer, 2011
Chapter 6: This is the concluding chapter. We summarize the overall contributions
of this thesis and discuss a number of open problems and possible extensions
of our work.
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In this chapter we give an overview of some relevant concepts and background ma-
terial that help in understanding the remainder of this thesis, making it as self-
contained as possible.
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2.1 Mathematical Background
2.1.1 Computational Complexity Theory
Computational complexity theory is the field of study that classifies computational
problems according to the resources required to solve them. The resources may
include, for example, time, storage space and randomness, with time usually being
the main focus. Typically, computational complexity theory examines how those
resources scale with the size of the problem, say k. For example, the time required
to solve a problem may increase with some polynomial function of k or it may scale
with some exponential function of k. This section provides some basic terminology
and definitions used in this thesis.
An algorithm is a computational procedure that takes a variable input and produces
an output. A deterministic algorithm is an algorithm which, for a given input,
follows the same execution path every time it is executed – hence, for a given input,
the algorithm will always produce the same output (the output is predefined). An
algorithm is said to be probabilistic or randomized if its execution path depends not
only on its input, but also on some random bits – hence, for the same input, the
output of a probabilistic algorithm may differ each time it is executed.
In this thesis we use the term cryptographic primitives, or simply primitives, to
denote basic cryptographic algorithms used in the construction of a more complex
set of algorithms, referred to as a cryptographic scheme, or simply a scheme. So the
term cryptographic primitives will be used when we refer to the basic building blocks
of a cryptographic scheme. Note that the distinction between those two terms is
quite arbitrary; they are often interchangeable in the literature.
The running time of an algorithm on a particular input is the number of “steps”
executed by the algorithm before it terminates. A step is usually interpreted as a bit
operation, but it might also be convenient to see a step as a basic operation such as
an addition, a multiplication, a comparison, a machine clock cycle, etc. The worst-
case running time of an algorithm is an upper bound on its running time for any
input. In contrast, the expected running time of an algorithm is the average running
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time over all inputs of a fixed size. Both worst-case and expected running times are
expressed as functions of the input size. However, these functions are often highly
dependent on the low-level details of the basic operations and thus it is difficult to
calculate the exact running time of an algorithm. To help us simplify the calculation,
we often rely on approximations of the running time. A very useful and well known
notation in this regard is the big-O notation, which is used to express an asymptotic
upper bound (usually in terms of some known function, such as a polynomial, an
exponential function, or a logarithmic function) for a certain function.
Definition 2.1 (Big-O notation). Let f and g be two functions from the positive
integers to the real numbers, then f(k) = O(g(k)) if there is a positive constant c
and a positive integer k0 such that 0 ≤ f(k) ≤ cg(k) for all k ≥ k0.
Definition 2.2 (Polynomial-time algorithm). A polynomial-time algorithm is an
algorithm whose worst-case running time function is of the form O(kc), where k is
the input size and c is a constant.
Any algorithm whose running time is not of the formO(kc) is called a superpolynomial-
time algorithm. This includes exponential-time algorithms, which are algorithms
whose worst-case runnning time functions are of the form O(2kc).
Some other useful notations in the framework of complexity theory are the notions
of a negligible function, a noticeable function and an overwhelming function.
Informally, a negligible function is a function that grows slower than any inverse
polynomial.
Definition 2.3 (Negligible function). A function (k) is negligible in the parameter
k if for every positive constant c, there exists an integer k0 such that (k) ≤ k−c for
all k ≥ k0.
Definition 2.4 (Overwhelming function). A function τ(k) is overwhelming in the
parameter k if 1− τ(k) is negligible.
Definition 2.5 (Noticeable function). A function µ(k) is noticeable in the parame-
ter k if for every positive constant c, there exists an integer k0 such that µ(k) ≥ k−c
for all k ≥ k0.
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In cryptography, it is a common approach to view the complexity of algorithms as
well as their probability of success as functions of the size of the problem, called the
security parameter. The security parameter, k, is usually expressed in unary repre-
sentation 1k (meaning a k-long string of 1’s). Then the notion of efficient algorithms
is equivalent to polynomial-time algorithms, while exponential-time algorithms are
regarded as inefficient algorithms. A problem that cannot be solved in polynomial-
time is called intractable or infeasible. Furthermore, the notion of small success
probability of an algorithm is substituted by negligible probability of success.
Definition 2.6 (Statistically close distributions). Given two distributions D1, D2,
the statistical distance between them is defined as
∆(D1, D2) :=
1
2
∑
x
|Pr[D1 = x]− Pr[D2 = x]|,
where Pr[Di = x] means the probability that a draw from Di lands in x (for i ∈
{1, 2}). We say that D1, D2 are statistically -close if ∆(D1, D2) ≤ . If  is
negligible, we simply say that D1, D2 are statistically close.
2.1.2 Abstract Algebra and Some Special Groups
Throughout this thesis we make free use of basic concepts of abstract algebra. For
completeness, we recapitulate here some of these concepts. Further information can
be found in [107, 133].
We denote the set of natural numbers by N, the set of integers by Z and the set of
integers modulo n by Zn. The subset of Zn formed by the elements of Zn which are
relatively prime to n is denoted by Z∗n, that is, Z∗n = {a ∈ Zn | gcd(a, n) = 1}. For
an integer n ≥ 1, the number of integers in the interval {1, . . . , n} that are relatively
prime to n is denoted by φ(n), where the function φ is called the Euler phi function.
We let G denote a group, i.e. G consists of a set with a binary operation satisfying
the group axioms: closure, associativity, identity and invertibility. Henceforth we
will adopt the multiplicative group notation for the group operation.
Definition 2.7 (Order of a group). The order of a group G is the number of
elements in the group, denoted by |G|. A group G is finite if |G| is finite.
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Definition 2.8 (Cyclic group). A group G is cyclic if there is an element g ∈ G
such that for each a ∈ G there is an integer i with a = gi. Such an element g is
called a generator of G. We write G = 〈g〉 = {gi | i ∈ Z}.
We say that a non-empty subset H of a group G is a subgroup of G if H also
forms a group under the operation of G. If G is cyclic, so is any of its subgroups
H. Furthermore, for an element a ∈ G the set of all powers of a forms a cyclic
subgroup of G, denoted by 〈a〉. We say that the order of a, denoted ord(a), is
equal to the order of the cyclic subgroup generated by a, |〈a〉|. Note then that the
order of a generator g of G (if it exists) is equal to the order of the group, that is
ord(g) = |〈g〉| = |G|.
Theorem 2.1 (Lagrange). For any finite group G, the order of every subgroup H of
G divides the order of G. That is, |H| divides |G|. Hence, for any element a ∈ G,
|〈a〉| divides |G|.
Theorem 2.2. Let G be a group. If |G| is prime, then G is cyclic. Moreover, every
element g ∈ G, other than the identity, is a generator of G.
Theorem 2.2 is a direct consequence of Lagrange’s theorem.
Definition 2.9 (Abelian group). An abelian group, also called a commutative
group, is a group that satisfies the axiom of commutativity. That is, for all a, b ∈ G,
we have a · b = b · a.
Proposition 2.1. Every cyclic group is abelian.
An example of an important group used in cryptography is the group Z∗n under the
operation of multiplication modulo n. This group has order φ(n). Moreover, if n is
prime, then Z∗n is cyclic with order φ(n) = n− 1.
Theorem 2.3 (Chinese remainder theorem (CRT)). Let the integers {ni}i∈[λ] be
pairwise relatively prime and let {ai}i∈[λ] be arbitrary integers. Then the system of
simultaneous congruences
a = ai (mod ni) (i = 1, . . . , λ)
has a unique solution modulo n =
∏λ
i=1 ni.
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Let n∗i = n/ni. Now define ti = (n
∗
i )
−1 (mod ni) and ei = n∗i ti. (Note that since
gcd(ni, n
∗
i ) = 1, we can compute ti.) We see that ei = 1 (mod ni), while for j 6= i,
ni | n∗j and so ej = 0 (mod ni). Thus, we can obtain the unique solution modulo n
as
a =
λ∑
i=1
aiei (mod n).
Definition 2.10 (Quadratic residues). Let a ∈ Z∗n. The element a is said to be a
quadratic residue modulo n if it is congruent to a square modulo n, i.e. if there is
an x ∈ Z∗n such that x2 = a (mod n). (The element x is called a square root of a
modulo n.) If no such x exists, a is called a quadratic non-residue modulo n. We
denote the set of all quadratic residues modulo n by QRn and the set of quadratic
non-residues by QRn.
Note that when n is prime, half of the elements of Z∗n are quadratic residues and
the other half quadratic non-residues. Hence, |QRn| = |QRn| = φ(n)/2 = (n −
1)/2. Furthermore, for n prime, we can determine whether an element a ∈ Z∗n is a
quadratic residue modulo n by using Euler’s criterion.
Theorem 2.4 (Euler’s criterion). Let p be an odd prime and a an integer such that
gcd(a, p) = 1. Then
a
p−1
2 =
{
1 (mod p) if there is x ∈ Z such that x2 = a (mod p),
−1 (mod p) if there is no such integer.
In order to simplify the notation of the computation for Euler’s criterion, we use
the symbol
(
a
p
)
, introduded by Adrien-Marie Legendre. This symbol, called the
Legendre symbol, comes with a number of useful properties which can be used to
speed up the calculations for determining whether an integer is a quadratic-residue
or a quadratic non-residue modulo a prime number.
Definition 2.11 (The Legendre symbol). Let p be an odd prime and a an integer.
The Legendre symbol
(
a
p
)
is defined as
(a
p
)
=

0 if p | a,
1 if a ∈ QRp,
−1 if a ∈ QRp.
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Note that by Definition 2.10, 0 6∈ Z∗p and so 0 6∈ QRp and 0 6∈ QRp.
A useful generalization of the Legendre symbol to odd composite numbers is the
Jacobi symbol. Like the Legendre symbol, the Jacobi symbol also comes with useful
properties, which we omit here.
Definition 2.12 (The Jacobi symbol). Let n be an odd integer with prime factor-
ization n = p1
e1p2
e2 . . . pλ
eλ and a an integer. The Jacobi symbol
(
a
n
)
is defined
as (a
n
)
=
( a
p1
)e1( a
p2
)e2
. . .
( a
pλ
)eλ
.
We stress that
(
a
n
)
can be efficiently computed even without knowing the prime
factorization of n. This can be done by using properties of the Jacobi symbol. By
Jn we denote the subgroup of all elements of Z
∗
n having Jacobi symbol 1.
An important observation is that when n is a product of two distinct odd primes,
p and q, then an element a ∈ Z∗n is a quadratic residue modulo n if and only if
a ∈ QRp and a ∈ QRq. It follows that |QRn| = |QRp||QRq| = (p− 1)(q − 1)/4 =
φ(n)/4 and |QRn| = 3φ(n)/4. Also, note that a has Jacobi symbol 1 if and only if(
a
p
)
=
(
a
q
)
= 1 or
(
a
p
)
=
(
a
q
)
= −1. This means that |Jn| = φ(n)/2.
Definition 2.13 (Blum integers and safe primes). A composite integer of the form
N = PQ is called a Blum integer if P and Q are distinct primes, each congruent to
3 modulo 4. A special type of Blum integer is when both (P − 1)/2 and (Q − 1)/2
are primes. In this case P and Q are called safe primes.
For a Blum integer N , and an element a ∈ QRN , a has precisely four square roots
modulo N . Moreover, exactly one of these square roots is in QRN .
Let us now recall the definition of the group of signed quadratic residues QR+N from
[87] (see also [60, 80]).
Definition 2.14 (Signed quadratic residues). Let N = PQ be a k-bit Blum integer.
The group of signed quadratic residues, QR+N , is defined as the group QR
+
N = {|x| :
x ∈ QRN}, where |x| is the absolute value when representing elements of ZN as the
set {−(N−1)/2, . . . , (N−1)/2}. For g, h ∈ QR+N , the group operation is g◦h = |g ·h
(mod N)|.
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For simplicity of notation we will omit the group operation “◦” when it is obvious
by context which group operation is being used. As an example of the group QR+N ,
let P = 3 and Q = 7. Then Z∗N = {1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20} and QRN =
{1, 4, 16}. If we represent the elements of ZN as the set {−(N−1)/2, . . . , (N−1)/2},
we have QRN = {1, 4,−5}. Thus, our set of signed quadratic residues modulo
N = PQ is QR+N = {1, 4, 5}.
Theorem 2.5 ([87], Lemma 1). Let N be a Blum integer. Then (QR+N , ◦) is a
group of order φ(N)/4 and is efficiently recognizable given only N , since QR+N =
J+N = JN ∩ [(N − 1)/2], where J+N denotes {|x| : x ∈ JN}. Moreover, if QRN is
cyclic, so is QR+N .
Ensuring that JN is cyclic. In order to ensure that the group JN is cyclic, and
consequently QRN is cyclic, we will require henceforth that all prime factors of
φ(N)/4 are pairwise distinct. Note that when N = PQ is a Blum integer we can
write P = 2p′ + 1 and Q = 2q′ + 1, where p′ and q′ are odd integers. Under the
assumption that all prime factors of φ(N)/4 are pairwise distinct, this implies that
φ(N)/4 = p′q′, which is odd, and gcd(P−1, Q−1) = gcd(2p′, 2q′) = 2. Now consider
generators gP and gQ of the cyclic groups Z
∗
P and Z
∗
Q, respectively. By the Chinese
Remainder Theorem, since gP has order P − 1 in Z∗P and gQ has order Q− 1 in Z∗Q,
the unique element g ∈ Z∗N with gP = g (mod P ) and gQ = g (mod Q) has order
lcm(P − 1, Q− 1) = (P − 1)(Q− 1)/ gcd(P − 1, Q− 1) = (P − 1)(Q− 1)/2 = 2p′q′
in Z∗N . Furthermore, it is easy to see that
(
gP
P
)
=
(
gQ
Q
)
= −1. This means that(
g
P
)
=
(
g
Q
)
= −1 and
(
g
N
)
= 1. Thus, g ∈ JN . As ord(g) = 2p′q′ = φ(N)/2 =
|JN |, g is a generator of JN .
Sampling a generator of QRN . Let N = PQ be a k–bit Blum integer. As
before we write P = 2p′ + 1 and Q = 2q′ + 1, for odd primes p′ and q′. Assume
that the prime factors of φ(N)/4 are pairwise distinct and additionally that they
are at least k′-bit integers, where k′ = δk for some fixed 0 ≤ δ < 1/2. We know
that |QRN | = φ(N)/4 = p′q′. A random generator g of QRN can be obtained,
with overwhelming probability, by simply squaring a random element in Z∗N . We
justify this as follows. Note that any generator g has four square roots in Z∗N
and has order ord(g) = p′q′. Furthermore, the number of generators of QRN is
φ(p′q′). Thus, the probability of picking a random element from Z∗N such that its
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square is a generator of QRN is 4φ(p
′q′)/|Z∗N | = 4φ(p′q′)/4p′q′ = 1−O(2−k
′
). The
distribution of generators of QRN obtained this way is statistically close to uniform.
Furthermore, because QRN is cyclic, |g| is a generator of QR+N .
Generating random elements in QR+N . In some of the constructions in this
thesis we will need to generate random elements in the groupQR+N . It is obvious how
to do this when we know the order ofQR+N , φ(N)/4 (i.e. we know the factorization of
N): uniformly select an integer a ∈ {1, . . . , φ(N)/4} and set A = ga (mod N), where
g is a generator of QR+N . However, when the factorization of N is not known, we
have to use an approximation: choose a ∈ {1, . . . , bN/4c} and set A = ga (mod N).
Note that if the prime factors of φ(N)/4 have approximately the same size, then
the uniform distributions over {1, . . . , φ(N)/4} and {1, . . . , bN/4c} are statistically
close. The same argument applies for the generation of random elements in QRN .
2.1.3 Bilinear Maps
Bilinear maps have been widely used in the construction of cryptographic schemes
since the work of Joux [93], where he used bilinear maps to construct a one-round
tripartite key exchange scheme. Two other main contributions to the rapid increase
of interest in bilinear maps were the identity-based non-interactive key exchange
(ID-NIKE) scheme by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [122], and the identity-based
encryption (IBE) scheme by Boneh and Franklin [32]. When using bilinear maps
to construct cryptographic schemes, a commonly used approach is to treat them
as “black-boxes”. In this approach, the mathematical details of how the bilinear
maps are selected or implemented are ignored; bilinear maps are treated as abstract
mappings. This is the approach used in this thesis. We now give a basic introduction
to this topic.
Let G1,G2 and GT be three (multiplicatively-written) cyclic groups of the same
order p. A bilinear map from G1 ×G2 to GT is a function
e : G1 ×G2 → GT
satisfying a special property:
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Bilinearity. ∀g, g′ ∈ G1, h, h′ ∈ G2, we have
e(g · g′, h) = e(g, h) · e(g′, h) and e(g, h · h′) = e(g, h) · e(g, h′).
Consequently, for any a, b ∈ Z: e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab = e(gb, ha).
Bilinear maps are also called pairings, as they associate pairs of elements in G1×G2
with an element in GT . To be of practical use in cryptography, we also require the
map to satisfy two additional properties:
Non-Degeneracy. For G1 = 〈g1〉,G2 = 〈g2〉, we have that GT = 〈e(g1, g2)〉.
Efficiently Computable. There exists an efficient algorithm that computes the
map e for any pair of inputs in G1 ×G2.
We say the map e is an admissible bilinear map if it satisfies the three aforementioned
properties. Henceforth we implicitly mean admissible bilinear map when we say
bilinear map or pairing.
Pairings can be classified into four different types, based on the concrete structures
of the underlying groups [44, 68].
Type 1. G1 = G2 (symmetric pairings).
Type 2. G1 6= G2 and there is an efficiently-computable homomorphism ψ : G2 →
G1. In this situation there is no known way to efficiently hash bit strings
into G2.
Type 3. G1 6= G2 and no efficiently-computable homomorphism is known between
G1 and G2. However here, it is usually possible to hash into G2.
Type 4. G1 6= G2 (exception). This is a new type of pairings where G2 is a
non-cyclic group and it is possible to hash into G2. Furthermore, there is an
efficiently-computable homomorphism ψ : G2 → G1.
Note that for none of Type 2, Type 3 or Type 4 pairings (asymmetric pairings)
does there exist an efficiently-computable homomorphism from G1 to G2. The
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situation where G1 6= G2 and there is an efficiently-computable homomorphism in
both directions (G2 → G1 and G1 → G2) can also be interpreted as Type 1.
The use of symmetric pairings in cryptographic schemes allows relatively simpler
description of the schemes and of their security proofs, when compared to the use of
asymmetric pairings. However, as indicated by [68], Type 1 pairings are expected to
be less efficient as the security parameter grows. Type 2 and Type 3 pairings seem
to be better choices if we take into consideration efficiency of their implementations.
Type 3 is more efficient than Type 2 since the former provides faster pairing compu-
tation, shorter representation for elements in G2, less complex group operations in
G2 and a more efficient membership test in G2. Nevertheless, as mentioned before,
no efficiently-computable homomorphism is known between G1 and G2 for Type 3
pairings. Thus, for schemes that require an homomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 in the
scheme itself or in its security proof, Type 2 pairings seem to be the best choice.
Type 4 pairings, introduced in [125], are an option for schemes that require both
hashing into G2 and the homomorphism ψ. However, the hashing into G2 is not so
cheap. (Though in [43] a new and cheaper method for hashing into G2 is proposed.)
More importantly, with some small probability, the pairing might not satisfy the
non-degeneracy property.
Known examples of pairings are the Weil and Tate pairings [66, 139], which are
derived from elliptic curves over finite fields. An elliptic curve is a set of pairs (x, y)
satisfying a finite field equation of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b, where a and b are
parameters of the curve. Supersingular elliptic curves are a special class of elliptic
curves with some additional algebraic structure. Symmetric pairings are derived
from supersingular elliptic curves whereas asymmetric pairings can be derived from
ordinary elliptic curves. For further details on pairings and elliptic curves we refer
to [67, 68].
Pairing Parameter Generator. A Type i pairing parameter generator, denoted
by Gi, is a polynomial time algorithm that on input a security parameter 1k, returns
the description of three (multiplicatively-written) cyclic groups G1,G2 and GT of
the same order p, generators g1, g2 (for G1,G2, respectively), and an admissible
pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT . Depending on the type of pairing (1, 2, 3 or 4), Gi(1k)
also outputs the description of an efficiently computable homomorphism ψ : G2 →
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G1, with g1 = ψ(g2). We write PGi = (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, p, e, ψ) ← Gi(1k). For
symmetric pairings (Type 1 pairings) e : G ×G → GT we can simply write PG =
(G,GT , g, p, e)← G(1k), where G is a group of order p generated by g.
2.1.4 Multilinear Maps
Multilinear maps and their applications to cryptography were first put forward by
Boneh and Silverberg in [33]. They studied the problem of finding efficiently com-
putable, non-degenerate `-linear maps e : G`1 → GT , where G1 and GT are groups
of the same prime order and computing the discrete logarithm in G1 is hard. In
[33] the authors motivated the construction of such multilinear maps by discussing
several potential applications to cryptography, such as one-round (` + 1)-user key
exchange schemes (an extension of Joux’s scheme [94]) and efficient broadcast en-
cryption schemes. Asymmetric multilinear maps e : G1 × . . . × G` → GT , for
different groups Gi, were considered by Rothblum in [121], where he considered the
problem of circular security of bit encryption.
In this thesis our framework of multilinear maps is defined so that a user can
run a group generator MG`(1k) to obtain a sequence of leveled multilinear groups
G1, . . . ,G` each of prime order p and a set of bilinear maps {ei,j : Gi×Gj → Gi+j |
i, j ≥ 1, i + j ≤ `}. This can be seen as implementing multilinear maps. We give
more details next.
Multilinear maps. An `-group system consists of ` cyclic groups G1, . . . ,G` of
prime order p, along with bilinear maps ei,j : Gi ×Gj → Gi+j for all i, j ≥ 1 with
i+j ≤ `. Let gi be a canonical generator of Gi (included in the group’s description).
The map ei,j satisfies
ei,j(g
a
i , g
b
j) = g
ab
i+j : ∀a, b ∈ Zp.
When i, j are clear, we will simply write e instead of ei,j . It will also be convenient
to abbreviate e(h1, . . . , hj) := e(h1, e(h2, . . . , e(hj−1, hj) . . . )) for hj ∈ Gij and i =
(i1 + i2 + . . . + ij) ≤ `. By induction, it is easy to see that this map is j-linear.
Additionally, we define e(g) := g. Finally, it can also be useful to define the group
G0 = Z|G1| of exponents to which this pairing family naturally extends; then, we
also consider maps e0,j and ei,0, for i, j ≤ `. We will assume that `-group systems
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MPG` = {{Gi}i∈[`], p, {ei,j}i,j≥1,i+j≤`} can be generated by a multilinear maps
parameter generator MG`, on input a security parameter 1k.
The GGH candidate. We currently do not have multilinear maps between groups
with cryptographically hard problems. However, as we will see in Section 4.2.1,
Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [72] (henceforth GGH) suggest a concrete candidate for
an “approximation” of multilinear maps, named graded encoding systems. For this
chapter, we consider only the framework of multilinear maps described above.
2.1.5 Computational Hardness Assumptions
We describe here the computational assumptions which form the basis of security
of the cryptographic schemes presented in this thesis. For completeness, we also
include some basic related assumptions.
Number Theoretic Assumptions
Factoring Assumption. The most established hardness assumption is the fac-
toring assumption. Informally, it states that given a composite integer N , it is
infeasible to find its factorization N = pq, where p and q are distinct large primes.
The difficulty of finding the prime factors will depend on properties of these num-
bers, like size or special form. Thus, to formalize the factoring assumption, we need
to consider an instance generator of the composite number N .
Definition 2.15. Let n(k) be a function of the security parameter k. We define
RSAgen as a polynomial-time algorithm that on input 1k outputs (N, p, q) such that
N = pq is an n-bit integer, with p and q distinct primes, possibly with additional
constraints (to be specified).
Definition 2.16 (Factoring assumption). For an algorithm A we define its factoring
advantage as
AdvfacA,RSAgen(k) = Pr[{p, q} ← A(N) : (N, p, q)← RSAgen(1k)].
The factoring assumption with respect to RSAgen is that AdvfacA,RSAgen(k) is negligible
for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms A.
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The Quadratic Residuosity (QR) Assumption. This assumption states that
given an odd composite integer N and a uniformly random element a ∈ JN , it is
infeasible to decide whether or not a ∈ QRN . The QR assumption is believed to be
valid, for example, when N is a Blum integer. In other words, for Blum integers N ,
the group QRN is believed not to be efficiently reconizable. Another important fact
is that computing square roots in this group is equivalent to factoring the modulus
N , as proved by Rabin in [114].
The Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption. The security of many crypto-
graphic constructions relies on hardness assumptions related to the discrete loga-
rithm assumption. Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group. The DL problem is: given h ∈ G,
find the discrete logarithm of h to the base g, denoted dloggh. The DL assumption
states that it is infeasible to solve the DL problem. Formally, we consider a discrete
logarithm parameter generator DLgen.
Definition 2.17. We define a discrete logarithm parameter generator as a polynomial-
time algorithm DLgen which on input a security parameter 1k, generates an integer
p along with the description of a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of order p.
Definition 2.18 (The DL assumption). Consider the following experiment associ-
ated with algorithm A.
Experiment ExpDLA,DLgen(1
k)
(G, g, p)← DLgen(1k)
a← Zp
a′ ← A(1k,G, p, g, ga)
If a = a′ then return 1 else return 0
The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
AdvDLA,DLgen(k) =
∣∣∣Pr [ExpDLA,DLgen(1k) = 1]∣∣∣ .
The DL assumption with respect to DLgen is that AdvDLA,DLgen(k) is negligible for all
PPT algorithms A.
Some examples of groups in which the DL problem is believed to be intractable are:
Z∗p for some large prime p, where p − 1 has at least one large prime factor; cyclic
subgroups H ⊂ Z∗p of prime order q; some elliptic curve groups.
The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption. The CDH prob-
lem with respect to DLgen is: given a random instance (g, ga, gb), for a, b ← Zp,
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compute gab. The CDH assumption states that it is infeasible to solve the CDH
problem.
Definition 2.19 (The CDH assumption). Consider the following experiment asso-
ciated with algorithm A.
Experiment ExpCDHA,DLgen(1
k)
(G, g, p)← DLgen(1k)
a, b← Zp
Z ← A(1k,G, p, g, ga, gb)
If Z = gab then return 1 else return 0
The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
AdvCDHA,DLgen(k) =
∣∣∣Pr [ExpCDHA,DLgen(1k) = 1]∣∣∣ .
The CDH assumption with respect to DLgen is that AdvCDHA,DLgen(k) is negligible for
all PPT algorithms A.
This assumption is closely related to the DL assumption; if the DL assumption does
not hold, the CDH problem can be efficiently solved as follows: given (g, ga, gb), solve
the DL problem for ga, finding a, and then compute (gb)
a
. The CDH assumption
only states that gab cannot be efficiently computed, but this does not mean that it
is also infeasible to get some information about gab (e.g. its most significant bit),
given the problem instance.
Shmuely [128] and McCurley [106] proved that over the group of quadratic residues
QRN , where N = PQ is the product of two large primes, the CDH problem is at
least as hard as factoring N .
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption. This is a stronger as-
sumption than the CDH assumption. Roughly, it states that given two distributions
(g, ga, gb, gab) and (g, ga, gb, gc), for a, b, c← Zp, it is infeasible for any algorithm to
tell them apart. This means that now it is infeasible to get any information about
gab, given (g, ga, gb).
Definition 2.20 (The DDH assumption). Consider the following experiment asso-
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ciated with algorithm A.
Experiment ExpDDH,βA,DLgen(1
k)
(G, g, p)← DLgen(1k)
a, b, c← Zp
If β = 1 then T = gab else T = gc
β′ ← A(1k,G, p, g, ga, gb, T )
Return β′
The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
AdvDDHA,DLgen(k) = 2
∣∣∣Pr [ExpDDH,βA,DLgen(1k) = β : β ← {0, 1}]− 1/2∣∣∣ ,
which can also be written as
AdvDDHA,DLgen(k) =
∣∣∣Pr [ExpDDH,1A,DLgen(1k) = 1]− Pr [ExpDDH,0A,DLgen(1k) = 1]∣∣∣ .
The DDH assumption with respect to DLgen is that AdvDDHA,DLgen(k) is negligible for
all PPT algorithms A.
It is easy to see that solving the CDH problem enables one to solve the DDH problem.
However, there are groups for which the DDH problem is easy while the CDH prob-
lem is believed to be hard. Groups for which solving the distinguishability problem
is easy but solving the computational problem is hard are called gap groups.
Note for example, that the DDH problem is easy in the group Z∗p, where p is a prime:
given ga, gb, T , a PPT algorithm A can compute
(
ga
p
)
and
(
gb
p
)
and then predict(
gab
p
)
= s. Now A checks whether or not
(
T
p
)
= s. If so it outputs 1, otherwise
0. The advantage of A in solving the DDH problem is |1 − 1/2| = 1/2. However,
DDH is believed to be intractable, e.g. in subgroups of Z∗p of prime order (such as
the subgroup of quadratic residues QRp in Z
∗
p for a safe prime p); in the cyclic
subgroup QRN in Z
∗
N , where N is a product of safe primes and its factorization is
unknown; in some elliptic curve groups.
The Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) Assumption. The SDH assumption [1] is
that there is no PPT algorithm having non-negligible advantage in solving the CDH
problem on input (g,A,B) when given access to a DDH oracle for fixed g and A,
denoted by DDHg,A(·, ·). Here g is a randomly selected generator of a cyclic group
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G (with order not necessarily known), A and B are uniformly selected from G, and
the solution to the CDH problem is defined as g(dloggA)(dloggB). The DDH oracle
DDHg,A(Bˆ, Cˆ) returns 1 if Bˆ
dloggA = Cˆ and 0 otherwise, where (Bˆ, Cˆ) ∈ G×G.
We consider in more detail the definition of the SDH assumption for the group of
signed quadratic residues QR+N . Since the group is efficiently recognizable, we do
not permit access to the oracle DDHg,A(Bˆ, Cˆ) for (Bˆ, Cˆ) 6∈ QR+N × QR+N . We
specify an instance generator RSAgen as follows.
Let n(k) be a function and δ a constant with 0 ≤ δ < 1/2. RSAgen(1k) generates
elements (N,P,Q) such that N = PQ is an n-bit Blum integer and all prime factors
of φ(N)/4 are pairwise distinct and have at least δn bits. As we saw in Section 2.1.2,
these conditions ensure that JN is cyclic and that the square g of a random element
in Z∗N generates QRN (i.e. 〈g〉 = QRN ) with high probability 1−O(2−δn(k)).
Definition 2.21 (The SDH assumption). Consider the following experiment asso-
ciated with algorithm A.
Experiment ExpSDHA,RSAgen(1
k)
(N,P,Q)← RSAgen(1k)
g ← QR+N , where 〈g〉 = QR+N
A,B ← QR+N
Z ← ADDHg,A(·,·)(1k, N, g,A,B)
If Z = g(dloggA)(dloggB) then return 1 else return 0
The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
AdvSDHA,RSAgen(k) =
∣∣∣Pr [ExpSDHA,RSAgen(1k) = 1]∣∣∣ .
The SDH assumption with respect to RSAgen is that AdvSDHA,RSAgen(k) is negligible for
all PPT algorithms A.
Theorem 2.6 (Breaking SDH ⇒ Factoring [87]). If the factoring assumption holds
relative to RSAgen, then the SDH assumption holds in the group of signed quadratic
residues QR+N relative to RSAgen. In particular for every algorithm A solving the
SDH problem, there exists a factoring algorithm B (with roughly the same running
time as A) such that
AdvSDHA,RSAgen(k) ≤ AdvfacB,RSAgen(k) +O(2−δn(k)).
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Note that the proof of Theorem 2.6 is not valid in the group of quadratic residues
QRN . This is because in the reduction, the factoring algorithm B has to simulate
a DDH oracle and hence has to be able to determine membership in QRN , which
is believed to be infeasible in this group.
The Double-Strong Diffie-Hellman (DSDH) Assumption. We define a vari-
ant of the SDH assumption, where instead of having one DDH oracle, DDHg,A(·, ·)
(for fixed g,A), we also have a second DDH oracle, DDHg,B(·, ·) (for fixed g,B).
Theorem 2.7 (Breaking DSDH ⇒ Factoring). If the factoring assumption holds
relative to RSAgen, then the DSDH assumption also holds in the group of signed
quadratic residues QR+N relative to RSAgen. In particular, for every algorithm A
solving the DSDH problem, there exists a factoring algorithm B (with roughly the
same running time as A) such that
AdvDSDHA,RSAgen(k) ≤ AdvfacB,RSAgen(k) +O(2−δn(k)).
Proof. The original proof of Theorem 2.6 in [87] shows how to handle a single DDH
oracle DDHg,A(·, ·). By symmetry of the set-up used in the proof, the same procedure
can also be used to (simultaneously) handle the oracle DDHg,B(·, ·).
Hardness Assumptions based on Bilinear and Multilinear Maps
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption (Informal). Let PG =
(G,GT , g, p, e) be the output of a symmetric pairing parameter generator, G. The
BDH problem is as follows: Given (g, ga, gb, gc) for a, b, c← Zp and g ∈ G, compute
e(g, g)abc ∈ GT . The BDH assumption states that it is infeasible to solve the BDH
problem.
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption for Sym-
metric Pairings. The DBDH assumption is the decisional counterpart of the
BDH assumption. It states that given two distributions (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) and
(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z), for a, b, c, z ← Zp and g ∈ G it is infeasible for any algorithm
to tell them apart.
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Definition 2.22 (The DBDH assumption). Consider the following experiment as-
sociated with algorithm A and pairing parameter generator G.
Experiment ExpDBDH,βA,G (1
k)
PG ← G(1k)
a, b, c, z ← Zp
If β = 1 then T ← e(g, g)abc else T ← e(g, g)z
β′ ← A(1k,PG, ga, gb, gc, T )
Return β′
The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
AdvDBDHA,G (k) = 2
∣∣∣Pr [ExpDBDH,βA,G (1k) = β : β ← {0, 1}]− 1/2∣∣∣ .
We say that the DBDH assumption relative to G holds if AdvDBDHA,G (k) is negligible
for all PPT algorithms A.
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption for Type 2 Pairings
(DBDH-2). Let PG2 = (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, p, e, ψ) be the output of a Type 2
pairing parameter generator, G2. In this thesis we consider the following version of
the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem for Type 2 pairings, as introduced
by Galindo in [69]: Given (g2, g
a
2 , g
b
2, g
c
1, T ) ∈ G32 ×G1 ×GT as input, the problem
is to decide whether or not T = e(g1, g2)
abc.
Definition 2.23 (The DBDH-2 assumption). Consider the following experiment
associated with algorithm A and pairing parameter generator G2.
Experiment ExpDBDH-2,βA,G2 (1
k)
PG2 ← G2(1k)
a, b, c, z ← Zp
If β = 1 then T ← e(g1, g2)abc else T ← e(g1, g2)z
β′ ← A(1k,PG2, ga2 , gb2, gc1, T )
Return β′
The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
AdvDBDH-2A,G2 (k) = 2
∣∣∣Pr [ExpDBDH-2,βA,G2 (1k) = β : β ← {0, 1}]− 1/2∣∣∣ .
We say that the DBDH-2 assumption relative to G2 holds if AdvDBDH-2A,G2 (k) is negli-
gible for all PPT algorithms A.
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Some implications of bilinear maps. The existence of the bilinear map e :
G1 ×G2 → GT as presented in Section 2.1.3 has direct implications for the groups
G1 and G2:
• The MOV reduction [108] – given groups G1, G2 and a pairing e : G1×G2 →
GT , the DL problem in Gi (i ∈ {1, 2}) is not harder than the DL problem in
GT . Suppose we have g1 ∈ G1 and want to calculate the discrete logarithm
of ga1 ∈ G1. If e(g1, g2) = gT ∈ GT then e(ga1 , g2) = e(g1, g2)a = gaT . So we can
find a by calculating the discrete logarithm of gaT ∈ GT . The same argument
is valid for calculating the discrete logarithm of ga2 ∈ G2.
• Given a group G1 equipped with a Type 1 pairing e : G1 ×G1 → GT , DDH
is easy in G1 (pointed out by Joux and Nguyen in [95]). To see this note
that given (g1, g1
a, g1
b, g1
c) ∈ G41 we have that c = ab (mod p) if and only if
e(g1
a, g1
b) = e(g1, g1
c).
• Given groups G1,G2 and a Type 2 pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT , DDH is easy
in G2. This follows because of the existence of the efficiently computable
homomorphism ψ : G2 → G1. Given (g2, g2a, g2b, T ) ∈ G42, one can decide
whether T = g2
ab or T = g2
c, for a uniform c← Zp, by testing whether or not
e(ψ(T ), g2) = e(ψ(g
a
2), g
b
2).
The `-Multilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (`-MDDH) Assumption.
Let MPG` = {{Gi}i∈[`], p, {ei,j}i,j≥1,i+j≤`} be an `-group system output by a mul-
tilinear maps parameter generator, MG`, on input a security parameter 1k. The
`-MDDH assumption states that given (g, gx1 , . . . , gx`+1) (for g ← G1 and uniform
exponents xi), the element e(g
x1 , . . . , gx`)x`+1 ∈ G` is computationally indistinguish-
able from a uniform G`-element.
Definition 2.24 (The `-MDDH assumption). Consider the following experiment
associated with algorithm A and pairing parameter generator MG`.
Experiment Exp`-MDDH,βA,MG` (1
k)
MPG` ←MG`(1k)
x1, . . . , x`+1 ← Zp ; g ← G1
If β = 1 then T ← e(gx1 , . . . , gx`)x`+1 ∈ G` else T ← G`
β′ ← A(1k,MPG`, g, gx1 , . . . , gx`+1 , T )
Return β′
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The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
Adv`-MDDHA,MG` (k) = 2
∣∣∣Pr [Exp`-MDDH,βA,MG` (1k) = β : β ← {0, 1}]− 1/2∣∣∣ .
We say that the `-MDDH assumption relative to MG` holds if Adv`-MDDHA,MG` (k) is
negligible for all PPT algorithms A.
The (` + 1)-Power Assumption. Let MPG` = {{Gi}i∈[`], p, {ei,j}i,j≥1,i+j≤`}
be an `-group system output by a multilinear maps parameter generator, MG`, on
input a security parameter 1k. The (`+1)-power assumption states that given (g, gx)
(for g ← G1 and uniform x), the element e(gx, . . . , gx︸ ︷︷ ︸
` times
)x ∈ G` is computationally
indistinguishable from a uniform G`-element.
Definition 2.25 (The (`+1)-power assumption). Consider the following experiment
associated with algorithm A and pairing parameter generator MG`.
Experiment Exp
(`+ 1)-power,β
A,MG` (1
k)
MPG` ←MG`(1k)
x← Zp ; g ← G1
If β = 1 then T ← e(gx, . . . , gx)x ∈ G` else T ← G`
β′ ← A(1k,MPG`, g, gx, T )
Return β′
The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
Adv
(`+ 1)-power
A,MG` (k) = 2
∣∣∣Pr [Exp(`+ 1)-power,βA,MG` (1k) = β : β ← {0, 1}]− 1/2∣∣∣ .
We say that the (`+1)-power assumption relative toMG` holds if Adv(`+ 1)-powerA,MG` (k)
is negligible for all PPT algorithms A.
2.2 Provable Security
2.2.1 History
For many years, cryptographic schemes were designed in an ad hoc way. A crypto-
graphic goal would be recognized and then a solution would be offered. The scheme
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would be considered secure if no attacks against it were found. This means that
cryptographic schemes offered very little security guarantees – security only against
known attacks. If a new attack was found, the scheme would be either repaired
or discarded. If repaired, the scheme would still be subject to possible unknown
attacks.
In 1949, Claude Shannon published a paper entitled “Communication Theory of Se-
crecy Systems” [126], which had a great influence on the rigorous study of cryptogra-
phy. He proved that the one-time pad encryption scheme is information-theoretically
secure as long as the message is encrypted with a randomly generated one-time key
which is as long as the message. However, the practicality of the one-time pad is in
general ruled out given the key management issues.
Provable security is a part of modern cryptography that came to tackle the security
issues where an adversary exploits vulnerabilities overlooked by the scheme designer
in order to break the cryptographic scheme. It provides a rigorous mathematical
framework in which schemes can be designed and their security against compu-
tationally bounded adversaries can be analysed. Essentially, in the framework of
provable security we prove that a reduction exists between the difficulty of breaking
(with respect to a specified adversarial model) the designed scheme and the difficulty
of solving a hard problem (such as factoring large composite integers) or breaking
the security of an underlying cryptographic primitive. The security of the scheme,
the hard problem and possible underlying cryptographic primitives, are parameter-
ized in terms of a security parameter and adversaries are modelled by probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machines. The latter means that adversaries can be seen
as abstract computational devices that use randomness (for more “efficient” com-
putation) and their running times are bounded by some polynomial in the security
parameter.
As already pointed out by Bellare [15], the term provable security is misleading as
one does not actually prove security of a scheme, but actually provides a reduction
of the security of the scheme to the security of a mathematical hard problem or an
underlying primitive. Hence, a more appropriate term for this genre of work would
be reductionist security.
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The first result in the direction of provable security arose soon after the earliest
papers [53, 119] on public-key cryptography. In 1979 Rabin [114] introduced a
signature scheme with security based on the hardness of finding square roots modulo
a composite number N , and formally related the difficulty of breaking that scheme
to the difficulty of factoring N . Basically, Rabin showed that the ability to extract
square roots modulo N allows one to factor N in polynomial time. The drawback
of Rabin’s signature scheme is that it is insecure against a type of attack called
chosen-message attack [79, 140]. Namely, the adversary could fool the signer into
signing messages of its own choice and then forge a signature. It is true that this
issue was noticed by Rabin and he suggested a way of overcoming this problem, but
then the security reduction to factoring no longer works for the modified scheme.
Provable security emerged in the 1980s when researchers decided to develop precise
definitions for cryptographic schemes and specify appropriate security models for
them. In [77, 78] Goldwasser and Micali formally introduced the notion of a prob-
abilistic public key encryption scheme, along with two strong notions of security
that they called polynomial security and semantic security. Informally speaking,
the former means that no polynomially bounded adversary can find two messages
m1 and m2 whose encryptions are distinguishable. The latter means that whatever
an adversary can compute about the plaintext given the corresponding ciphertext,
it could also compute without the ciphertext. Goldwasser and Micali proved that
every polynomially secure scheme is semantically secure and then reduced the secu-
rity of their scheme, which they proved to be polynomially secure, to the problem
of deciding whether a number is a quadratic residue modulo a composite integer.
The powerful idea of using reduction arguments to “prove” security of cryptographic
primitives is very well known and has become standard in most cryptographic re-
search. In the following we describe in more detail the provable security approach
and discuss its limitations.
2.2.2 The Approach
The provable security paradigm is as follows:
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• Define a cryptographic scheme. It is important to formally define the
functionality of the scheme, specifying the behaviour of each component al-
gorithm: Are the algorithms probabilistic or deterministc? What values are
taken as inputs and what are the outputs? What are the correctness require-
ments?
• Specify a security model. A security model defines what a computationally
bounded adversary is allowed to do and when, and what it means to break
the scheme. The capabilities of an adversary will usually depend on a typical
practical use of the cryptographic scheme and so different security models may
be specified for different security goals for the same scheme. A very common
approach when specifying security models is to use game-based definitions.
Here security models can take the form of a game between an adversary A
and a challenger C, where C answers oracle queries to A, or the form of an
experiment. Experiments are pseudocodes that model what inputs are given
to the adversary and how they are generated. They return 0 or 1 depending
on the output of the adversary. The security of a cryptographic scheme with
respect to a specific security model is measured in terms of the advantage of an
adversary in achieving the security goal specified by the game or experiment.
An alternative approach for specifying security models is to use simulation-
based approaches such as the Universal Composability (UC) framework [36].
Concisely, a cryptographic task is specified through an ideal functionality. A
scheme is said to securely realize the ideal functionality if no environment (an
entity who generates inputs to users, observes their outputs, and is allowed to
interact with an adversary against the scheme) can distinguish the execution of
the real scheme with an adversary and the execution of the ideal functionality
with an ideal adversary (the simulator). The benefit of this framework is that
it guarantees security of the scheme even when it is run concurrently with
other schemes.
• Provide a construction satisfying the formal definition of the cryptographic
scheme.
• Show a reduction from the construction to an underlying primitive or a
computational hardness assumption. This step consists of showing that the
only way the adversary can break the scheme, with respect to a specific security
model, is by breaking the underlying primitive or the hardness assumption.
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In the context of security reductions, there are a few issues that need to be taken
into consideration. The first one is that there exists two approaches used to provide
security reductions: the asymptotic approach and the concrete approach. Tradition-
ally, provable security is asymptotic. It views the running time of the adversary as
well as its advantage as functions of a security parameter k. The notion of efficient
algorithms is equivalent to probabilistic algorithms running in time polynomial in k.
The notion of small advantage is substituted by negligible advantage, meaning that
the advantage is smaller than any inverse polynomial in k. A security reduction is
stated by saying: Assume assumption A holds, then scheme B is secure. We note
that this approach gives no information about the quality of the reduction.
A more practical approach to handling these issues is the concrete approach, or
practice-oriented approach [15]. In this approach we make the parameters of the
reduction explicit, making it clear how good the reduction is in terms of the ad-
vantages and running times of adversaries. Here the reduction is stated by saying:
Assume there exists an algorithm B which can break the security of scheme B with
advantage  and running time t. Then we can construct an algorithm A that breaks
the hard problem A with advantage ′ and running time t′. The relation of ′ and 
(or t′ and t) may depend for example on the number of queries that the adversaries
make. We say the reduction is tight if (′, t′) is approximately equal to (, t). A
non-tight reduction means that the cryptographic scheme may need larger key sizes
in order to achieve the same level of security as the underlying assumption.
The second issue concerns on which assumption one bases the security of a crypto-
graphic scheme. There are many mathematical assumptions; some are weaker than
others (for example, the factoring assumption is weaker than the RSA assumption
as factoring allows one to break RSA1). When designing a cryptographic scheme, it
is desirable to base its security on the weakest possible assumption. This is because
if the assumption is shown to be wrong, then the proof is meaningless.
Succinctly, when providing security reductions, one should aim for tight reductions
of the cryptographic scheme to as weak as possible assumptions. Moreover, in order
not to have the security of the scheme compromised, it is important to choose
1Informally, the RSA assumption states that it is hard to compute e-th roots of an arbitrary
integer modulo a composite N which is the product of two unknown large primes.
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an appropriate security model for the practical application in which the scheme is
intended to be used, which might not be an easy task. In [15], Bellare provides a
detailed concrete treatment of security reductions.
We must also be aware that although very useful in providing security guarantees for
complex cryptographic schemes, the provable security approach has its limitations.
Usually it does not cover a class of practical attacks where an adversary can attack
the physical implementation of the cryptographic scheme. This type of attack is
called a side-channel attack. The adversary exploits leakage of information during
or after the execution of the scheme. The information can be gained, for example,
via measurements of power consumption [100], timing of execution [99] or electro-
magnetic radiation [3, 124], or even via cold-boot attacks [82]. The latter exploits
the fact that memory contents of a computer remain readable for several seconds
or minutes after power has been removed. Another type of attack considered as a
side-channel attack is the case where an adversary gets side-information from error-
messages coming from a decryption oracle [25, 135]. Certainly, counter-measures
against side-channel attacks should be taken and so work in the direction of ex-
tending the field of provable security to overcome these attacks has already begun
[4, 7, 58, 97, 110, 111].
This thesis follows the standard (meaning not capturing side-channel attacks) prov-
able security paradigm and endeavours to attain the above desired qualities in our
security reductions. We use game-based security models and our reductions are
quantified in terms of the types and number of queries that adversaries against a
cryptographic scheme or hard assumption can make.
2.2.3 Standard Model versus Random Oracle Model
As mentioned earlier, security models are commonly stated in terms of a game
between an adversary and a challenger. A security reduction then works as follows:
Let B be an adversary against a cryptographic scheme that can break the security
notion specified in a security model, then one can construct a simulator that can
break a hard problem. Usually the simulator will be the adversary, A, against the
hard problem and it must be able to simulate B’s challenger behaviour consistently.
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This means that A must be able to answer B’s queries correctly. Such a reduction,
without any additional assumptions, is said to be a proof in the standard model.
Designing cryptographic schemes which are secure in the standard model is not
easy. Particularly, what makes it difficult to achieve standard model security is
the problem of answering the adversary’s queries correctly. In order to overcome
this difficulty and to simplify the analyses of cryptographic schemes, Bellare and
Rogoway [18] introduced the random oracle model (ROM).2 This model assumes
the existence of a public random oracle H, which is an oracle function, or a “black-
box”, that responds to queries with values chosen uniformly at random from its
output domain, except that for any specific query the oracle always responds with
the same value every time it receives that query. For an input x, the only way to
get H(x) is to explicitly ask the oracle. Furthermore, the inputs x to the oracle are
private, meaning that no adversary can see the inputs x queried by a user.
In practice, the random oracles assumed in security proofs of cryptographic schemes
are instantiated with hash functions. This seems intuitive since it would be desirable
that the outputs of a well-designed hash function appear to be completely indepent
even for related inputs.
The random oracle methodology has been widely employed to prove security of
efficient cryptographic schemes. However, the problem with this methodology is
that, as shown by Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi [38, 39], a scheme proven secure
in the ROM is not necessarily secure when the random oracle is instantiated with
any hash function. But then the question is: why are people still using the ROM
methodology? The point is that proving security in the ROM is better than having
no security proof at all and if there is an attack exploiting some specific properties
of the chosen hash function, the same scheme can still be used by instantiating the
random oracle with a different hash function. Moreover, there is a class of attacks
called generic attacks where the adversary does not exploit any particular structural
property of the hash function. Arguably, in this situation the ROM proofs apply and
do bring some security guarantees. In addition, the best schemes provably secure in
the ROM tend to be more efficient than the best standard model secure schemes.
2The random oracle model was earlier used, but without naming it so, by Fiat and Shamir [59].
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Despite some practicality offered by random oracles, they do not offer security in
general and so proofs in the standard model (i.e. without random oracles) are prefer-
able to proofs in the ROM. Finally, it is important to stress here that not all schemes
that use cryptographic hash functions require random oracles. There are schemes
that require only some properties of the hash functions, such as collision resistance
(see Section 2.3.1), and that can often be proven secure in the standard model. This
will be the case in some of the constructions provided in this thesis.
2.2.4 Proof Techniques
A useful method for proving security of cryptographic schemes is to use game hop-
ping proofs [51, 132]. A game hopping proof is structured as a sequence of games,
instead of a single game. This approach has been extensively used to prove security
of complex cryptographic schemes. In many circumstances it makes proofs clearer
and less error-prone. In this thesis we also make use of this very useful technique in
most of our proofs, and hence we recall it here.
Typically, in a game hopping proof we consider a sequence of games G0, G1, . . . , Gλ
all defined over the same underlying probability space. Depending on the type
of security goal we want to achieve, computational security or indistinguishability,
the games will take different shape. Let us assume for now we want to prove an
indistinguishability-based security notion. Commonly, in this case a challenger uni-
formly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} which the adversary has to guess. We start with
G0, the actual adversarial game. Then we make successive transitions, in such a
way that the adversary’s view is indistinguishable among successive games, until we
reach game Gλ for which the adversary’s probability of success in outputting the
correct bit b is clearly 1/2. Here the adversary’s advantage is the absolute value of
the difference between its success probability in game G0 and 1/2. Note that, as we
will see in security proofs provided in this thesis, this is not the only way to define
a sequence of games.
In the case of a computational-based security goal, G0 is simply the original ad-
versarial game described in the security model. We make slight modifications to
successive games, starting from G0, until we reach game Gλ, where the adversary’s
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success probability can easily be computed.
The transitions between successive games are frequently limited to the following
types. Let Pr[Sι] be the success probability of the adversary in game Gι.
• Transitions based on indistinguishability. The idea here is that if an
adversary can identify the small change between two successive games, then
it is possible to construct an adversary that tells apart two distributions that
were assumed to be indistinguishable.
• Transitions based on small failure events. Two successive games Gι−1, Gι
are identical unless a certain “failure” event F occurs. This leads to the Dif-
ference Lemma [132]: “Let Sι−1, Sι be the events that an adversary is suc-
cessful in games Gι−1, Gι, respectively, and let F be a failure event such that
Sι−1∧¬F⇔ Sι∧¬F. Then |Pr[Sι−1]−Pr[Sι]| ≤ Pr[F].” So if Pr[F] is small (i.e.
negligible), the two games Gι−1 and Gι are computationally indistinguishable.
• Bridging steps. These steps are used to help the next transition so that the
proof is easier to follow. The change made is entirely conceptual and so the
adversary’s success probability remains the same.
• Transitions based on large failure events. This type of transition is
similar to the one based on small failure events, but here it is assumed that
the probability that a failure event F occurs is large (but not overwhelming) and
that F is independent of Sι−1. Is is also assumed that ¬F is non-negligible. The
two types of security goal, computational security and indistinguishability, are
considered separately. For the former case the goal is to directly relate Pr[Sι−1]
and Pr[Sι], in which case the relation Pr[Sι] = Pr[¬F] Pr[Sι−1] can be obtained.
For the latter case, the goal is to show that |Pr[Sι] − 1/2| is negligible if and
only if |Pr[Sι−1] − 1/2| is negligible, which can be demonstrated by showing
that |Pr[Sι]− 1/2| = Pr[¬F]|Pr[Sι−1]− 1/2|.
The first three possible types of transitions were identified by Shoup [132] and the
fourth by Dent [51].
Hybrid arguments. A special type of game-hopping proof is when the proof con-
sists of a sequence of transitions based on indistinguishability. It is commonly called
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a hybrid argument, as the computational indistinguishability of the two extreme
games is proven based on the indistinguishability property of successive hybrids
(modifications of the original games). The distinguishability gap of the extreme
games (also called extreme hybrids) is inversely proportional to the total number of
games. Thus, it is essential that the number of hybrids is small (i.e. polynomial).
We will see an example of a hybrid argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
2.3 Cryptographic Primitives
We now review and formally define the cryptographic primitives used in the schemes
presented in this thesis.
2.3.1 Hash Functions
In general, hash functions are polynomial-time functions that take as input strings of
arbitrary length and compress them into shorter strings. Formally, we will deal with
a family of hash functions indexed by a key. So the hash function will be a two-input
function that takes as input a key in the key domain and an arbitrary-length string,
and outputs a hash value. (In practice, hash functions have a maximum input size
and they are non-keyed. The concept of keyed hash functions was introduced to
help the formalization of security properties of hash functions [49].) There are many
different types of hash functions with different security properties. Here we recall
the ones that we will consider in this thesis.
Collision Resistant Hash Functions. Let CRF : F ×M → Y be a family of
keyed hash functions and let AH be an adversary. (For each key f ∈ F , there is a
hash function CRFf : M→ Y.) Here M is the domain, F is the key space and Y
is the range of CRF. For m ∈ M and f ∈ F we write CRFf (m) = CRF(f,m). CRF
is said to be collision resistant if, for a hash function CRFf ∈ CRF (where the hash
key f is chosen at random from F), it is infeasible for any adversary AH to find two
distinct values m and m′ such that CRFf (m) = CRFf (m′). More formally, following
[120], we define
AdvcollAH,CRF(k) = |Pr[f ← F ; (m,m′)← AH(f) : (m 6= m′)∧(CRFf (m) = CRFf (m′))]|.
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The hash function family is said to be collision resistant if AdvcollAH,CRF(k) is negligible
for any polynomial-time adversary AH.
Target Collision Resistant Hash Functions. The difference between a target
collision resistant hash function TCRf and a collision resistant hash function CRFf
is that, in the former case, it is infeasible for any adversary, given a value m, to find
a distinct value m′ such that TCRf (m) = TCRf (m′). More formally, we define
AdvTCRAH,TCR(k) =
∣∣Pr [f ← F ,m←M; m′ ← AH(f,m) :
(m 6= m′) ∧ (TCRf (m) = TCRf (m′))
]∣∣ .
The hash function family TCR is said to be target collision resistant if AdvTCRAH,TCR(k)
is negligible for any polynomial-time adversary AH.
Chameleon Hash Functions. Chameleon hash functions [102] can be thought of
as collision resistant hash functions with a trapdoor for finding collisions. Let k be
a security parameter. A chameleon hash function ChamH : D ×RCham → I, where
D is the domain, RCham the randomness space and I the range, is associated with a
pair of public and private keys (the latter called a trapdoor). These keys are denoted
respectively by hk and ck and are generated by a PPT algorithm Cham.KeyGen(1k).
The public key hk defines a chameleon hash function, denoted ChamHhk (·, ·). On
input a message m ∈ D and a random string r ∈ RCham, this function generates a
hash value ChamHhk (m, r) which satisfies the following properties:
Collision resistance. There is no efficient algorithm that on input the public key
hk can find pairs (m1, r1) and (m2, r2) where m1 6= m2 such that we have
ChamHhk (m1, r1) = ChamHhk (m2, r2), except with some probability that is
negligible in k.
Trapdoor collisions. There is an efficient algorithm Cham.Trap that on input the
private key ck , any pair (m1, r1) and any additional message m2, finds a value
r2 such that ChamHhk (m1, r1) = ChamHhk (m2, r2). Also, for uniformly and
independently chosen m1, r1 and m2, the value of r2 is independently and uni-
formly distributed over RCham.
Uniformity. All mesages m induce the same probability distribution on the output
of ChamHhk (m, r) for r chosen uniformly at random. This property prevents a
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third party, examining the hash value, from deducing any information about
the hashed message.
More formally, we define the advantage of an adversary ACH against ChamH as
AdvcollACH,ChamH(k) =
∣∣∣Pr [hk ← Cham.KeyGen(1k); (m1, r1,m2, r2)← ACH(hk) :
(m1 6= m2) ∧ (ChamHhk (m1, r1) = ChamHhk (m2, r2))]| .
The composition of a chameleon hash function and a (regular) collision resistant
hash function (where the latter is applied first) results in a chameleon hash func-
tion. In [102], there are chameleon hash function constructions based on standard
assumptions like the DL assumption and the factoring assumption.
2.3.2 Programmable Hash Functions
Programmable hash functions (PHFs) were proposed by Hofheinz and Kiltz [86] as
an abstraction of random oracles that can also be instantiated in the standard model.
In a nutshell, a PHF H is a keyed group hash function that maps a bitstring X (e.g.
a message to be signed) to a group element H(X). The fundamental property of H
is that it can behave in two indistinguishable ways. If the standard key generation
algorithm is used, a key κ is produced and the hash function normally hashes its
inputs into group elements; however, if an alternative trapdoor key generation algo-
rithm is used, then a key κ′ (which is indistinguishable from κ) and a trapdoor t
are generated. This special trapdoor allows H(X) to be decomposed in the form
cαXhβX for previously chosen c, h. In a larger proof, c will usually be a “challenge
element” (e.g. a part of a given Diffie-Hellman challenge), so that H(X) contains a
challenge component if and only if αX 6= 0.
PHFs can be used to employ partitioning strategies: during a security proof a sim-
ulator can, with some non-negligible probability, partition the set of all PHF inputs
into two disjoint sets: the set of inputs for which it hopes to embed the challenge
and the set of inputs for which it hopes to be able to consistently answer adversarial
queries. For example, Waters’ CDH-based signature scheme [138] (implicitly) uses a
PHF to partition the set of all messages into “signable” and “unsignable” messages.
(In his case, a message X is signable if and only if αX 6= 0.) During the proof of
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unforgeability, we hope that all messages for which an adversary requests a signature
are signable, while the adversary’s forgery corresponds to an unsignable message.
Let us now recall the formal definition of PHFs from [86]. Let k be a security
parameter, `(·) a polynomial and GPgen a group generator. A group hash func-
tion H : {0, 1}`(k) → G, with G ← GPgen(1k), consists of two polynomial-time
algorithms: PHF.Gen and PHF.Eval. The key generation algorithm PHF.Gen is
probabilistic and, on input the security parameter, generates a hash key κ. The
evaluation algorithm PHF.Eval is deterministic and uses κ to evaluate H on input a
string X ∈ {0, 1}`(k); we write Hκ(X) := PHF.Eval(κ,X) ∈ G.
Definition 2.26 (PHF). A group hash function H = (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval) is said to
be (m,n, γ, δ)-programmable if there is a probabilistic polynomial-time trapdoor key
generation algorithm PHF.TrapGen and a deterministic polynomial-time trapdoor
evaluation algorithm PHF.TrapEval with the following properties:
Syntatics. For group elements c, h ∈ G, (κ′, t) ← PHF.TrapGen(1k, c, h). More-
over, on input X ∈ {0, 1}`(k), (αX , βX)← PHF.TrapEval(t,X) with αX , βX ∈ Z.
Correctness. For all generators c, h ∈ G and all possible pair of hash key and trap-
door information (κ′, t) output by PHF.TrapGen(1k, c, h), and for all X ∈ {0, 1}`(k)
and the corresponding pairs of integers (αX , βX) output by PHF.TrapEval(t,X), the
evaluation algorithm satisfies
Hκ′(X) = PHF.Eval(κ
′, X) = cαXhβX .
Statistically close trapdoor keys. For all generators c, h ∈ G, the keys κ ←
PHF.Gen(1k) and κ′ ← PHF.TrapGen(1k, c, h) are statistically γ–close: κ γ≡ κ′.
Well-distributed logarithms. For all generators c, h ∈ G and all possible (κ′, t)
output by PHF.TrapGen(1k, c, h), for all X1, . . . , Xm, Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}`(k) with
Xi 6= Zj, and for the corresponding integers (αXi , βXi) ← PHF.TrapEval(t,Xi) and
(αZj , βZj )← PHF.TrapEval(t, Zj), we have
Pr [αX1 = . . . = αXm = 0 ∧ αZ1 , . . . , αZn 6= 0] ≥ δ,
where the probability is over the trapdoor t that was produced along with κ′.
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If γ is negligible and δ is noticeable, H is simply called (m,n)-programmable. Fur-
thermore, H is said to be (m,poly)-programmable if it is (m, q)-programmable for
every polynomial q = q(k). Respectively, H is (poly, n)-programmable if the analo-
gous condition holds.
Note that, in the above definition, c and h need not be generators and G need
not be cyclic. However, we also want to be able to substitute PHFs with random
oracles, as we will see in Section 4.5.2. In such an analysis, the images of H should
appear uniformly and independently distributed to an adversary who sees only public
information. This is then guaranteed if G is cyclic and c, h are generators.
A useful variant of the standard definition of a PHF is the concept of a weak
(m,n, γ, δ)-PHF [89], which is essentially an (m,n, γ, δ)-PHF according to Defini-
tion 2.26, except that in the former case the trapdoor key generation algorithm
PHF.TrapGen receives as additional input a list of strings X1, . . . , Xm ∈ {0, 1}`(k),
and the well-distributed logarithms property holds only with respect to this list of
Xi (i ∈ [m]) and any set of strings Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}`(k). Weak programmable
hash functions are usually more efficient than standard PHFs and are very useful
to prove cryptographic schemes to be weakly secure (i.e. when the adversary has to
commit to a list of values to be queried before seeing the public key). Full security
(i.e. when the adversary is fully adaptive) can often be achieved by using weak PHFs
together with chameleon hashes.
Definition 2.27 (Weak PHF). A group hash function H is called a weak (m,n, γ, δ)-
programmable hash function if it is a PHF in the sense of Definition 2.26, but with
the following differences:
• For group elements c, h ∈ G and set of strings X1, . . . , Xm ∈ {0, 1}`(k),
(κ′, t)← PHF.TrapGen(1k, c, h,X1, . . . , Xm).
• The well-distributed logarithms property from Definition 2.26 holds only for the
given set of strings X1, . . . , Xm ∈ {0, 1}`(k) (and any Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}`(k),
with Zj 6= Xi).
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Example of a weak (2,poly)-PHF. 3 Let G ← GPgen(1k) be a group of prime
order p. Define Hweak = (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval) as follows.
• PHF.Gen(1k) returns κ = (u0, u1, u2)← G.
• On input X ∈ {0, 1}`(k), PHF.Eval(κ,X) returns PHF.Eval(κ,X) = u0uX1 uX
2
2 .
(Here the `(k)-bit string X is interpreted as an integer.)
To see that Hweak is a weak (2, poly)-PHF consider the following algorithms:
• PHF.TrapGen(1k, c, h,X1, X2) samples random integers q0, q1, q2 ← Zp and
then computes the coefficients p0, p1, p2 ∈ Zp of the polynomial
p(t) = p0 + p1t+ p2t
2 = (t−X1)(t−X2).
It then sets u′i = c
pihqi (i = 0, 1, 2) and outputs κ′ = (u′0, u′1, u′2) and t =
(p0, p1, p2, q0, q1, q2).
• PHF.TrapEval(t,X) outputs (αX = p(X), βX = q(X)), where q(X) = q0 +
q1X + q2X
2.
Syntactics and correctness are obviously satisfied. Now note that since qi ← Zp,
we have ui ← G. This implies γ = 0. Furthermore from the construction of
PHF.TrapGen we see that αX = 0 if and only if X ∈ {X1, X2} and therefore m = 2,
n = poly(k) and δ = 1.
2.3.3 Pseudorandom Functions
Let F : K × D → R be a function family. Here K is the set of keys, D the domain,
and R the range of F. For all κ ∈ K and x ∈ D we also write Fκ(x) = F(κ, x) and
call Fκ : D → R an instance of F. Informally, a function family F is said to be a
pseudorandom function (PRF) [75, 76] if the input-output behaviour of a random
instance of the family, Fκ, is computationally indistinguishable from that of a truly
random function with the same domain and range. This means that it is infeasible
3This is the same weak-PHF (for m = 2) as the one given in [89, Definition 8]. There the
authors prove Hweak to be a weak (m, 1)-PHF. We stress that a PHF can be programmed with
different parameters.
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for anyone with only black-box access to a function (where no information is gained
about the function, other than its output value for any arbitrarily chosen argument)
to tell Fκ and a truly random function apart.
The term “truly random function” means that the function is chosen at random from
the set of all functions mapping D to R, which we denote Rand(D,R). Note that
if we let D = {0, 1}` and R = {0, 1}L, the cardinality of Rand(D,R) is 2L2` . Thus,
we would need L2` bits to specify a function in Rand(D,R), which is impractical. A
more intuitive way to think of a black-box access to a random function f0 : D → R
is to think that each time the box is given an input x ∈ D, it returns a random
element of R with the constraint that it always returns the same value for the same
input x.
We now provide a formal definition of a PRF.
Definition 2.28 (PRF). Let F : K×D → R be a function family and let AF be an
algorithm that has oracle access to a function fβ : D → R as defined in the following
experiment.4
Experiment ExpPRF,βAF,F (1
k)
f0 ← Rand(D,R);κ← K, f1 ← Fκ
β′ ← AfβF (1k)
Return β′
The advantage of AF in the above experiment is defined as
AdvPRFAF,F(k) =
∣∣∣Pr [ExpPRF,1AF,F (1k) = 1]− Pr [ExpPRF,0AF,F (1k) = 1]∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the random choices made in the experiment.
We say that F is a PRF if AdvPRFAF,F(k) is negligible for every polynomial-time adver-
sary AF.
It should be noted that the function family F is public; anyone who knows a key
κ ∈ K can compute Fκ(x) for some x ∈ D – obviously the key κ in the above
experiment is not known to the adversaryAF. Furthermore, F is a family of efficiently
computable functions.
4More precisely, we assume that K,D,R are families of finite sets, indexed by a security pa-
rameter k. That is, we require K = (Kk)k∈N, and similarly for D and R. For the sake of a cleaner
exposition, however, we do not write down the security parameter explicitly.
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2.3.4 Pseudorandom Generators
A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a deterministic algorithm that stretches a truly
random binary sequence, called the seed, into a longer (polynomially-bounded) bi-
nary sequence that “looks” random, called the pseudorandom sequence.5 We for-
malize this notion in the following definition.
Definition 2.29 (PRG). Let G : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}p(k) be a deterministic polynomial-
time function and let D be an algorithm. Consider the following experiment.
Experiment ExpPRG,βD,G (1
k)
T0 ← {0, 1}p(k);x← {0, 1}k, T1 ← G(x)
β′ ← D(Tβ)
Return β′
We define D’s advantage in the above experiment as
AdvPRGD,G (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [ExpPRG,1D,G (1k) = 1]− Pr [ExpPRG,0D,G (1k) = 1]∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over all choices of x and the random choices made
by the distinguisher D. We say G is a pseudorandom generator (PRG) if p(k) > k
and AdvPRGD,G (k) is negligible for every polynomial-time distinguisher D. Then for
random x ∈ {0, 1}k, G(x) ∈ {0, 1}p(k) is said to be a pseudorandom sequence. By
definition, G(x) is computationally indistinguishable from a random bit sequence of
length p(k).
We now define a particular pseudorandom generator, introduced by Blum, Blum
and Shub [26].
Definition 2.30 (The BBS pseudorandom generator). Let N be a Blum integer,
i.e. N = PQ where P , Q are distinct primes with P = Q = 3 (mod 4). Let x
be a quadratic residue modulo N , i.e. x ∈ QRN . (For consistency with Definition
2.29, we assume that elements in QRN can be viewed as bit strings of length k.)
We establish the following notation: LSBN (x) = (x (mod N)) (mod 2) (the least
significant bit of x (mod N)). The BBS pseudorandom generator BBS applied to x
and modulus N is defined to have output:
BBSN (x) = (LSBN (x), LSBN (x
2), . . . , LSBN (x
2`−1)) ∈ {0, 1}`,
5We remark that PRGs are often called PRNGs (pseudorandom number generators) or PRBGs
(pseudorandom bit generators).
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where ` = `(k) > k.
The result below, proved in [88] and based on results from [6, 26, 28] states that any
BBS-distinguisher can be used to factor Blum integers.
Theorem 2.8 (BBS-distinguisher ⇒ factoring algorithm). Let RSAgen be a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input a security parameter 1k generates
a Blum integer N . Let BBS be the BBS generator as in Definition 2.30. For every
PPT algorithm D that succeeds in breaking BBS with advantage AdvPRGD,BBS(k) run-
ning in time tBBS, there exists a PPT algorithm A that factors N with advantage
AdvfacA,RSAgen(k)/`, where ` is the size of the BBS generator’s output. Algorithm A
runs in time tfac ≈ k4tBBS/(AdvPRGD,BBS(k))
2
. This reduction holds even if the modulus
N and the 2`-th power x2
`
of the BBS seed x are published.
We note that the security of the BBS generator still holds if it simultaneously outputs
up to log2 log2N least significant bits of each x
2i (mod N) instead of only the least
significant bit [6, 136]. The downside of this approach is that the tightness of the
concrete security reduction in [6, 136] is compromised.
We stress that Theorem 2.8 is valid not only when inputs for the BBS generator
are taken from QRN as shown in [88], but also when the inputs are taken from the
group QR+N as shown in [90] (the journal version of [88]).
Forward-secure PRG. A stronger notion of security for PRGs is the notion of
forward security. Forward-secure PRGs (FS-PRGs), introduced by Bellare and Yee
in [19], are stateful/iterated PRGs that deterministically derive sequences of fixed-
length bit strings from an initial (random) seed. More precisely, in each iteration
they output a string of bits, update their internal state, and securely erase the
old state. Like in regular PRGs, the output sequences are required to be indistin-
guishable from sequences of random strings. The pivotal property of FS-PRGs is
forward security, i.e. the adversary has the ability to eventually corrupt the gener-
ator’s internal state, but indistinguishability of output strings is guaranteed to still
hold up to that point. Different constructions of FS-PRGs were proposed in [19],
including highly efficient ones based on symmetric building blocks like block ciphers
or HMAC [20], and also a construction based on a number-theoretic assumption
(specifically, on the Blum-Blum-Shub PRG [26]).
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We recall here the definition and security notion of FS-PRGs. Observe that we
slightly weaken the model from [19] (considering static adversaries instead of adap-
tive ones). The FS-PRG constructions proposed and proved secure in [19] naturally
remain secure in our adapted model.
Definition 2.31 (FS-PRG). Let GFS = (GFS.Setup,GFS.Key,GFS.Next) be a set of
efficient algorithms such that GFS.Setup is a probabilistic algorithm that, on input
a security parameter 1k, outputs a set of system parameters ‘params’; GFS.Key is
a probabilistic key generation algorithm that takes ‘params’ as input and outputs
an initial state St0 ∈ {0, 1}k (the initial seed); and GFS.Next : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}p(k) is a deterministic algorithm that turns state Sti−1 ∈ {0, 1}k (the ‘seed’ at
iteration i) into a pair (Sti, Outi), where Sti ∈ {0, 1}k is the updated state, and Outi
is a p(k)-bit string.
Let D be an adversary against GFS. The adversary D is fed with a number of output
blocks, Out1, Out2, . . . , Outi, each of length p(k), and is given the then current state
of the generator, Sti. Its job is to decide whether these blocks are the real output of
the generator, or just a sequence of random bits. To formalize this, we consider the
following experiment.
Experiment ExpFS-PRG,βD,GFS (1
k)
i← D
params ← GFS.Setup(1k)
St0 ← GFS.Key(params)
i′ ← 0
Repeat
i′ ← i′ + 1
(Sti′ , Outi′)← GFS.Next(Sti′−1)
If β = 0, Outi′ ← {0, 1}p(k)
Until i′ = i
Out← Out1, Out2, . . . , Outi
β′ ← D(Sti, Out)
Return β′
The advantage of D is defined as
AdvFS-PRGD,GFS (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [ExpFS-PRG,1D,GFS (1k) = 1]− Pr [ExpFS-PRG,0D,GFS (1k) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We say that GFS is an FS-PRG if Adv
FS-PRG
D,GFS (k) is negligible for every polynomial-
time adversary D.
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The BBS generator as an FS-PRG. In [19], Bellare and Yee show that number-
theoretic PRGs like the BBS can be modified to be seen as forward secure – in accor-
dance with our FS-PRG definition, GFS.Setup(1
k) would generate a Blum integer N;
the random seed x0 ∈ QRN (initial state) would be generated by GFS.Key(N); and
GFS.Next on input a state Sti−1 = x would output the next state Sti = x2 (mod N)
and Outi = LSBN (x). If ` output blocks are produced, this construction gives us
the standard BBS PRG from Definition 2.30.6 We remark that in order to output
larger output blocks, one can adapt this construction in the following way:
Construction 2.1. The algorithms of a forward secure BBS pseudorandom gener-
ator BBS = (GFS.Setup,GFS.Key,GFS.Next) which outputs ` bits per block are as
follows: GFS.Setup(1
k) generates a Blum integer N ; GFS.Key(N) outputs a seed
x0 ∈ QRN ; on input a state Sti−1 = x, algorithm GFS.Next(x) outputs the next state
Sti = x
2` (mod N) and an `–bit block Outi = BBSN (x) = (LSBN (x), LSBN (x
2), . . . ,
LSBN (x
2`−1)).
From Theorem 2.8 it is easy to see that Construction 2.1 is actually an FS-PRG if
factoring Blum integers is hard.
2.3.5 Key Encapsulation Mechanism
A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is a cryptographic scheme that produces a
symmetric key K and an asymmetric encryption of that key, C. The symmetric key
K can then be used in a symmetric encryption scheme, also called a data encapsula-
tion mechanism (DEM), to encrypt and transmit long messages. This combination
of asymmetric and symmetric encryption is called hybrid encryption and is often
referred to as the KEM-DEM paradigm, first formalized by Cramer and Shoup [46].
In [130], Shoup showed that by combining a CCA-secure KEM (see Definition 2.33)
and a CCA-secure DEM (see [46], Section 7), a hybrid CCA-secure public key en-
cryption scheme (PKE) can be generically obtained. Since CCA-secure DEMs can
be efficiently designed [46], when constructing such hybrid encryption schemes focus
is placed on the construction of CCA-secure KEMs.
6The forward-security property of the BBS generator was first used by Blum and Goldwasser
in [27].
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Definition 2.32 (KEM). A key encapsulation mechanism KEM consists of three
algorithms:
• KEM.KG, a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on
input a security parameter 1k, outputs a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk).
• KEM.Enc, a probabilistic polynomial-time encapsulation algorithm that takes
as input a public key pk and outputs a symmetric key K ∈ K, where K is the
symmetric key space of the KEM, and an encapsulation (also called cipher-
text) C.
• KEM.Dec, a deterministic polynomial-time decapsulation algorithm that takes
as input a private key sk and an encapsulation C, and outputs either a key
K ∈ K or a special symbol ⊥, indicating a failure of decapsulation.
For correctness we require that for all k ∈ N and all (K,C) ← KEM.Enc(pk), we
have
Pr [KEM.Dec(sk, C) = K] = 1.
We see that a KEM allows a sender to generate a symmetric key K which is encap-
sulated under the receiver’s public key pk. The encapsulation, C, is then sent to
the receiver, who can recover K by using its private key sk. This can of course be
achieved with a public key encryption scheme, but KEMs can be constructed also
in different ways.
Chosen-ciphertext security for a KEM is defined in terms of the following IND-CCA
experiment (from [88]7), where an adversary A is allowed to adaptively query a
decapsulation oracle with encapsulations of its choice and obtain the corresponding
keys.
Definition 2.33 (IND-CCA security of a KEM). Let KEM = (KEM.KG,KEM.Enc,
KEM.Dec) be a key encapsulation mechanism. For any PPT algorithm A, we define
7The original definition of IND-CCA security of a KEM is in fact due to [46].
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the following experiments:
Experiment ExpCCA-realA,KEM (1
k) Experiment ExpCCA-randA,KEM (1
k)
(pk, sk)← KEM.KG(1k) (pk, sk)← KEM.KG(1k)
K ← K
(K∗, C∗)← KEM.Enc(pk) (K∗, C∗)← KEM.Enc(pk)
Return AKEM.Dec(sk,·)(pk,K∗, C∗) Return AKEM.Dec(sk,·)(pk,K,C∗)
In the above experiment, the decapsulation oracle KEM.Dec(sk, ·), when queried
with an encapsulation C 6= C∗, returns either a failure symbol ⊥ or a key K ←
KEM.Dec(sk, C); (KEM.Dec(sk, ·) ignores queries C = C∗). The advantage of A in
breaking the IND-CCA security of KEM is defined as
AdvCCAA,KEM(k) =
∣∣∣Pr[ExpCCA-realA,KEM (1k) = 1]− Pr[ExpCCA-randA,KEM (1k) = 1]∣∣∣ .
A KEM scheme is said to be IND-CCA secure if AdvCCAA,KEM(k) is negligible for all
polynomial-time adversaries A.
2.3.6 Signature Schemes
Definition 2.34 (Signature schemes). A signature scheme SIG consists of three
algorithms:
• SIG.KG, a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input
1k, outputs a verification/signing key pair (vk , sigk).
• SIG.Sign, a probabilistic polynomial-time signing algorithm that on input a
signing key sigk and a message m, outputs a signature σ.
• SIG.Vfy, a deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that takes as
input a verification key vk, a message m and a signature σ, and outputs either
reject or accept.
For correctness we require that for all k ∈ N, all (vk , sigk) ← SIG.KG(1k), all
messages m, and all σ ← SIG.Sign(sigk ,m), we have
Pr [SIG.Vfy(vk ,m, σ) = accept] = 1.
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The standard notion of security for a signature scheme is called existential unforge-
ability under adaptively chosen message attacks (or unforgeability for short) [79],
which is defined in terms of the following experiment.
Definition 2.35 (Unforgeability). Let SIG = (SIG.KG,SIG.Sign, SIG.Vfy) be a sig-
nature scheme. For any PPT algorithm A, we define the following experiment:
Experiment ExpforgeA,SIG(1
k)
(vk , sigk)← SIG.KG(1k)
(m∗, σ∗)← ASIG.Sign(sigk ,·)(vk)
If (SIG.Vfy(vk ,m∗, σ∗) = accept ∧m∗ 6= mi) return 1 else return 0.
In the above experiment A adaptively issues a polynomial number of queries, q, to a
signing oracle SIG.Sign(sigk , ·). That is, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ q), A chooses a message
mi, and obtains a signature σi on that message (i.e. σi = SIG.Sign(sigk ,mi)). A
restriction in that experiment is that the forging message m∗ must be new and has
not been signed (i.e. m∗ 6= mi). The advantage of A in breaking SIG’s unforgeability
security is defined as
AdvforgeA,SIG(k) = Pr
[
ExpforgeA,SIG(1
k) = 1
]
.
A signature scheme is said to be unforgeable if AdvforgeA,SIG(k) is negligible for all
polynomial-time adversaries A.
A stronger definition of unforgeability can be obtained if we relax Definition 2.35
by allowing the adversary A, in the security experiment, to output a new valid
signature on a message that could have been signed before. That is, A wins the
security experiment if it outputs a pair (m∗, σ∗) such that SIG.Vfy(vk ,m∗, σ∗) =
accept ∧ (m∗, σ∗) 6= (mi, σi)). This notion is called strong existential unforgeability
under adaptively chosen message attacks (or strong unforgeability for short).
In this thesis, one of the cryptographic primitives we use is a strong one-time sig-
nature (strong-OTS) scheme [109]. Informally, a strong-OTS scheme is a signature
scheme that requires each signing key to be used only once for each message to be
signed. The security experiment is just like the one for strong unforgeability, except
that for strong-OTS, given a verification key, the adversary is only allowed to issue
at most one query to the signing oracle before producing a forgery on a message that
could have been signed by the signing oracle. More formally, consider the following
definition.
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Definition 2.36 (Strong-OTS). Let OTS = (OTS.KG,OTS.Sign,OTS.Vfy) be a sig-
nature scheme. For any PPT algorithm A, we define the following experiment:
Experiment ExpS-OTSA,OTS(1
k)
(vk , sigk)← OTS.KG(1k)
(m∗, σ∗)← AOTS.Sign(sigk ,·)(vk)
If (OTS.Vfy(vk ,m∗, σ∗) = accept ∧ (m∗, σ∗) 6= (m,σ)) return 1 else return 0.
In the above experiment A is allowed to issue at most one query to a signing oracle
SIG.Sign(sigk , ·). That is, A can choose a message m, and obtain a signature σ on
that message. Note that A is successful in the above experiment even if the forging
message m∗ that it outputs is the same as the message m that it may have queried
to the signing oracle OTS.Sign(sigk , ·), as long as σ∗ 6= σ. The advantage of A in
breaking OTS’s strong one-time security is defined as
AdvS-OTSA,OTS(k) = Pr
[
ExpS-OTSA,OTS(1
k) = 1
]
.
A signature scheme is said to be strongly one-time secure if AdvS-OTSA,OTS(k) is negligible
for all polynomial-time adversaries A.
Similarly, a regular one-time signature (rather than strong) scheme can be defined
by restricting the adversary A in the above definition to output a signature forgery
on a message different from the one (possibly) queried to the signing oracle.
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In this chapter we systematically study non-interactive key exchange schemes in
the public key setting (NIKE). We provide different security models for this cryp-
tographic primitive and explore the relationships between them. We then give con-
structions for secure NIKE in the standard model and in the random oracle model.
Furthermore, we also study the relationship between NIKE and public key encryp-
tion (PKE), showing that a secure NIKE scheme can be generically converted into an
IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. Most of the content of this chapter appears in [63],
which is joint work with Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz and Kenneth G. Paterson.
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3.1 Introduction
Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a cryptographic primitive which enables
two users, who know each others’ public keys, to agree on a symmetric shared key
without requiring any interaction. The canonical example of a NIKE scheme can be
found in the seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman [53]: let G be a group of prime
order p with generator g, and assume Alice has public key gx ∈ G and private key
x ∈ Zp, while Bob has public key gy ∈ G and private key y ∈ Zp. Then Alice and
Bob can both compute the value gxy ∈ G without exchanging any messages. More
properly, Alice and Bob should hash this key together with their identities in order
to derive a symmetric key H(Alice, Bob, gxy).
This example encapsulates in a nutshell all the basic features required of a NIKE
scheme: users should agree on some common parameters (p, G and g here), then
create their key pairs. Once these are computed and the public keys distributed,
any pair of users can set up a shared key without further exchange of messages. The
security properties desired of NIKE are, informally at least, clear: compromise of
one user’s private key should not affect the security of shared keys between pairs of
uncorrupted users; compromise of a shared key between a pair of users should not
undermine the security of shared keys between other pairs of users. In practice, the
public keys will be certified, and consideration needs to be given to modelling the
key registration process.
NIKE has real-world applications. In wireless and sensor networks, conserving bat-
tery power is a prime concern, and so the energy cost of communication must be
minimised. Thus using key establishment methods that minimise the number of
bits that need to be transmitted is of fundamental importance. In particular, when
faced with a jamming adversary, reducing the total number of rounds of interaction
needed to establish a key is particularly helpful. NIKE is an excellent option in
solving this problem, since a key can be established with minimal communication
and interaction: assuming the public keys are pre-distributed, all that is needed is
an exchange of identifiers for those keys, and often this exchange must take place
anyway, in order to establish communications. A recent paper [42] gives a detailed
evaluation of the energy costs of interactive and non-interactive key exchange pro-
tocols in the ID-based and public-key settings for wireless communications with a
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jamming adversary, demonstrating that significant energy savings can be made by
adopting a non-interactive approach to key establishment. Its non-interactive nature
makes NIKE an abstract building block that is qualitatively different from interac-
tive key exchange: e.g. to achieve deniable authentication, [56] explicitly requires
a non-interactive key exchange. But NIKE can also be used as a basis for inter-
active key exhange [13, 34, 117]: for example, in [34] the authors use the shared
key in a MAC to authenticate an exchange of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values. The
TLS Handshake Protocol [52], which is the de facto protocol of choice for secure
communication on the Internet, allows as an option a Diffie-Hellman key derived
from static, long-term public keys to be used as its pre-master-secret, from which
all other keys in the protocol are derived.1 Finally, NIKE can be used to build
very simple non-interactive designated verifier signature schemes [91], again using
the shared key in a MAC to authenticate messages. Thus NIKE appears in various
guises throughout the literature.
Despite its appearing in the very first paper on public key cryptography, the NIKE
primitive has so far received scant attention as a cryptographic primitive in its own
right. Bernstein [22] proposed an efficient NIKE scheme in the elliptic-curve setting
and sketched a security model for NIKE. Cash, Kiltz and Shoup (CKS) [40] provided
a formal security model for NIKE and analysed the Diffie-Hellman-based scheme
above, as well as a twinned variant of it, in the Random Oracle Model (ROM). In
the ID-based setting, Dupont and Enge [57] introduced a security model for NIKE
and analysed the Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara (SOK) scheme [122] in this model. In
a follow-up work, Paterson and Srinivasan [112] provided a more refined security
model and explored the connections between ID-based NIKE and Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE). Gennaro et al. [73] developed NIKE protocols for the hierarchical
ID-based setting. All of these papers use the ROM.
3.1.1 Our Contributions
This chapter is dedicated to a systematic study of NIKE in the public key setting. We
provide: security models for NIKE and their relationships; constructions for secure
1However, the long-term public keys are actually exchanged during the protocol, so strictly
speaking the protocol is interactive even though the key can be seen as arising from a non-interactive
exchange.
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NIKE in the random oracle model and in the standard model in the challenging
setting where the adversary can introduce arbitrary public keys into the system;
and a construction for IND-CCA secure public key encryption (PKE) from any
secure NIKE. Let us expand on each of these contributions in turn.
Models: It would seem that definitions and security models for interactive key
exchange (e.g. [17, 21, 37, 129]) could provide a natural starting point for formalising
NIKE. However, here we take the CKS definition [40] for NIKE as our starting point.
One reason for using a case-tailored NIKE definition is simplicity: existing security
models for interactive key exchange give considerable attention to properties which
are irrelevant in the NIKE setting. (For instance, forward security, multiple sessions,
and in particular the pairing of sessions play no role in a non-interactive setting.)
Another reason for a case-tailored NIKE definition is that we can focus on adversarial
key registration queries; these are usually only implicitly [37] (or not at all [17, 21])
considered in the standard models for interactive key exchange.2 However, in our
setting, adversarial key registration poses the main technical obstacle to achieve
NIKE security, as we will explain below.
The CKS security model for NIKE uses an indistinguishability and game-based ap-
proach to define security, with the adversary being required to distinguish real from
random keys in responses to its test queries. The model does allow the adversary
to register public keys of its choice in the system and then to make queries for
the shared keys between these “corrupted” users and honest (non-adversarially con-
trolled) users, so-called corrupt reveal queries. This translates in the real world
to minimising the assumptions made about certification procedures followed by the
Certification Authority (CA) in the PKI supporting the NIKE: it means that the
CA is not assumed to check that a public key submitted for certification has not
been submitted before, and does not check that the user submitting the public key
knows the corresponding private key. The model for NIKE in [40] is similar to, and
presumably inspired by, the early work of Shoup [129] on interactive key exchange,
where capturing so-called PKI attacks, also known as rogue-key attacks, was intrin-
sic to the security modelling. This modelling approach is referred to elsewhere in
the literature as the plain setting (see [16, 118] and the references therein) or the
2We mention that some security analyses (e.g. [101]) and Shoup’s security model [129] do ex-
plicitly consider adversarial key registration queries.
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bare PKI setting [56]. The CKS model is certainly more challenging than settings
where proofs of knowledge or proofs of possession of private keys are assumed to be
given during registration, or where the adversary must reveal its private key directly
(as with the knowledge of private key assumption used in [30, 103]). However, the
CKS model has some shortcomings: the adversary is not allowed to directly query
for the shared keys held between pairs of honest users, but instead only gets to see
real or random values for these via test queries. Moreover the model does not allow
an adversary to query for the private keys of honestly registered users.
Therefore, as a necessary precursor to the further development of NIKE, we start
by exploring different models for NIKE and their relationships (Section 3.2). In
summary, we introduce three new security models for NIKE and show that they are
all polynomially equivalent to one another and to the original CKS model from [40].
One of our models, the m-CKS-heavy model, augments the CKS model and effec-
tively allows all conceivable queries, without allowing the adversary to win trivially.
Another of our models, CKS-light, allows only two honest users, no corruption of
honest users, and a single test query. Thus it is particularly simple and easy to
use when analysing specific NIKE schemes; moreover our results showing equiva-
lence between the models ensure that security in this model implies security in the
stronger m-CKS-heavy model.
We stress that all these models allow the adversary to register public keys of its
choice in the system, so are in the plain setting, or dishonest key registration (DKR)
setting. However, for completeness, we also briefly consider the honest key regis-
tration (HKR) setting in which the adversary cannot register keys on its own. It
is easy to see that the HKR setting provides strictly weaker security guarantees
than our default security setting with dishonest key registration. For instance, the
already mentioned Diffie-Hellman NIKE scheme without hashing (such that shared
keys are of the form gxy) can be shown secure in the HKR setting under the Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman assumption, but is easily seen to be completely insecure in our
default setting.3
3Concretely, since shared keys do not depend on user identities in the unhashed DH-NIKE, an
adversary A can (a) register the key gx of an honest user Alice as its own key, and (b) ask for
the shared key between A and another honest user Bob with key gy. This immediately yields the
shared key gxy between Alice and Bob. Because of the homomorphic properties of the DH-NIKE,
a simple modification of this attack also works if A is not allowed to register keys of existing users.
A similar attack applies to the scheme in [22].
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Constructions for NIKE: In Section 3.3, we give two concrete constructions
for NIKE schemes meeting our CKS-light security definition, and hence secure in
our stronger m-CKS-heavy model (with dishonest key registration). Our first NIKE
scheme is provably secure in the standard model and combines a specific weak Pro-
grammable Hash Function [89] (see also Section 2.3.2), whose output lies in a pairing
group, and a Chameleon hash function. This enables the simulation in our security
proof for the scheme to handle the tricky queries for shared keys involving an hon-
estly generated public key and an adversarially chosen public key. We also make
use of the pairing to provide a means of checking that public keys coming from the
adversary are in some sense well-formed. We work with asymmetric pairings for
efficiency at high security levels (and because it does not add any real complexity
to the description of our scheme). The scheme’s security relies on a natural variant
of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption for the asymmetric
setting.
Our second scheme is provably secure under the factoring assumption in the Random
Oracle Model (ROM) and uses ideas from [87] to analyse the hashed Diffie-Hellman
scheme, where keys are of the form H(Alice, Bob, gxy), in the group of signed
quadratic residues (see Definition 2.14). We note that closely related schemes were
analysed in [40], but in different groups and under different assumptions. Specifi-
cally, a twinned version of the scheme was proved secure under the CDH assumption,
while it is stated that the hashed Diffie-Hellman scheme is secure under the SDH
assumption. We remark that the latter claim of [40] is problematic. Concretely, the
SDH assumption is not (directly) sufficient to show that the basic Diffie-Hellman
scheme is secure. Namely, the corresponding security reduction requires two DDH
oracles – one for each of the two users sharing the key on which the adversary wants
to be challenged – while the SDH assumption supplies only one. Certainly this prob-
lem could be solved instead by appealing to a suitable gap-DH assumption. We show
how to overcome this problem in the group of signed quadratic residues without the
need to rely on a gap assumption.
From NIKE to PKE: In Section 3.4, we explore the connections between NIKE
and public key encryption (PKE). That such connections exist should not be too
much of a surprise: it is folklore that the ElGamal encryption scheme [71] can be
seen as arising from the Diffie-Hellman NIKE scheme by making the sender’s key
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pair (gx, x) ephemeral and using the receiver’s public key gy to create the basis for
a shared key gxy. In fact, a simple transformation shows that every NIKE that
is secure in the simpler HKR setting can be turned into a public key encryption
scheme that is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA secure). Similar
connections were explored in the ID-based setting in [112].
In our default setting with dishonest key registration (the DKR setting), we provide
a simple, generic construction for PKE from NIKE that is also in the spirit of the
original Diffie-Hellman–to–ElGamal conversion. The construction takes a NIKE
scheme that is secure in our CKS-light model (with dishonest key registration) and
a strongly one-time secure signature scheme as inputs, and produces from these
components a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) that we prove to be IND-CCA
secure. A secure PKE from such a KEM can be obtained using standard results.
At a high level, the key pair for the KEM is a randomly generated key pair (pk , sk)
from the NIKE scheme, ciphertexts are also randomly generated public keys pk ′
from the NIKE scheme (together with a one-time signature that binds the public
key to an identity), while the encapsulated key is the shared key computed from sk ′
and pk ; the receiver computes the same key from sk and pk ′, assuming the one-time
signature verifies. In order to prove the KEM to be IND-CCA secure, we exploit the
presence of corrupt reveal queries in the NIKE security model in an essential way
to handle certain decapsulation queries. The resulting KEM is almost as efficient as
the underlying NIKE scheme. In the HKR setting, the same transformation (only
without one-time signatures) shows that CKS-light security of the NIKE scheme
implies IND-CPA security of the resulting PKE scheme.
In Section 3.5, we provide a closely-related conversion that starts with a secure NIKE
scheme satisfying a simplified definition (basically, it omits all consideration of iden-
tities) and produces an IND-CCA secure KEM without using one-time signatures.
This results in more efficient KEMs. We can apply the conversion with a simpli-
fied version of the concrete NIKE scheme from Section 3.3.1 to obtain an attractive
KEM that is IND-CCA secure in the standard model under our asymmetric variant
of the DBDH assumption. This KEM is comparable in performance to the scheme
proposed in [35] and neatly illustrates the utility of NIKE as a primitive, as well as
its connections with other classical public key primitives.
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The fact that secure NIKE implies IND-CCA-secure PKE, one of the most important
primitives in cryptography, illustrates the fundamental role and utility of NIKE. We
believe that this connection should encourage further research on the topic.
3.2 Non-Interactive Key Exchange
Following [40], we formally define a Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) scheme
in the public key setting, NIKE, as a collection of three algorithms: NIKE.Setup,
NIKE.KeyGen and NIKE.SharedKey, together with an identity space ID and a shared
key space SHK. Note that identities in the scheme and security model are merely
used to track which public keys are associated with which users.
• NIKE.Setup: On input 1k, outputs params, a set of system parameters.
• NIKE.KeyGen: On input params and an identity id ∈ ID, outputs a pub-
lic key/private key pair (pk , sk). This algorithm is probabilistic and can be
executed by any user.
• NIKE.SharedKey: On input an identity id1 ∈ ID and a public key pk1 along
with another identity id2 ∈ ID and a private key sk2, outputs either a shared
key in SHK for the two identities, or a failure symbol ⊥. This algorithm is
assumed to always output ⊥ if id1 = id2.
For correctness, we require that, for any pair of identities id1, id2, and correspond-
ing key pairs (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2), algorithm NIKE.SharedKey satisfies the con-
straint:
NIKE.SharedKey(id1, pk1, id2, sk2) = NIKE.SharedKey(id2, pk2, id1, sk1).
3.2.1 Definitions of Security for NIKE
Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [40] proposed a security model for NIKE schemes in the
public key setting, denoted here by the CKS model. This model abstracts away all
considerations concerning certification and PKI in a particularly nice way. It allows
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an adversary to obtain honestly generated public keys, but also to then associate
such public keys with other identities, and to register dishonestly generated public
keys (for which the adversary need not know the corresponding private keys). This
dishonest key registration (DKR) setting models a PKI where minimal assumptions
are made about the actions of the Certification Authority (CA): the CA is not
assumed to check that a public key has not been previously registered to another
user, and does not demand a proof of knowledge or possession of the private key
when issuing a certificate on a public key. This conservative approach to modelling
is fully appropriate given the great diversity of how CAs operate in the real world.
The model can be seen as a natural adaptation of the approach of Shoup [129] for
modelling interactive key exchange to the NIKE setting and is analogous to the plain
setting studied in [16, 118].
However, there are some obvious omissions from the model in [40], including the
ability of an adversary to learn private keys associated with honestly generated public
keys and the ability of a user to directly learn the key shared between two honest
users in the system (which could be possible, for example, because of cryptanalysis of
a scheme making use of the shared key). Equivalent queries in the ID-based setting
were permitted in the model introduced in [112].
For this reason, we augment the original CKS model with the “missing” queries,
introducing the m-CKS-heavy model. We also introduce two further models, the
CKS-heavy and CKS-light models. These differ from m-CKS-heavy and the original
CKS model only in the numbers and types of query that the adversary is allowed
to make. Next we present in detail the m-CKS-heavy model. Then in Table 3.1 we
summarize the differences between these security models in the DKR setting.
The m-CKS-heavy model: Our model is stated in terms of a game between an
adversary A and a challenger C. In this game, C takes as input the security param-
eter 1k, runs algorithm NIKE.Setup of the NIKE scheme and gives A params. The
challenger takes a random bit b and answers oracle queries for A until A outputs a
bit bˆ. The challenger answers the following types of queries for A:
• register honest user: A supplies an identity id ∈ ID. The challenger
C first obtains a pair of public key and private key by running (pk , sk) ←
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NIKE.KeyGen(params, id). It then records the tuple (honest , id , pk , sk) and
returns pk to A.
• register corrupt user: In this type of query, A supplies both an iden-
tity id ∈ ID and a public key pk . The challenger C records the tuple
(corrupt , id , pk ,⊥). We stress that A may make multiple “register corrupt
user” queries for the same id during the experiment. In that case, only the
most recent (corrupt , id , pk ,⊥) entry is kept.
• extract: Here A supplies an identity id that was registered as an honest user.
The challenger looks for a tuple (honest , id , pk , sk) containing id and returns
sk to A.
• reveal: Here A supplies a pair of registered identities id1, id2, subject only to
the restriction that at least one of the two identities was registered as honest.
Without loss of generality, assume id1 was registered as honest. The challenger
C runs NIKE.SharedKey(id2, pk2, id1, sk1) and returns the result to A. Note
that here the adversary is allowed to make reveal queries between two users
that were originally registered as honest users. We denote by honest reveal
the queries involving two honest users and by corrupt reveal the queries
involving an honest user and a corrupt user.
• test: A supplies two distinct identities id1, id2 that were both registered as
honest. The challenger returns ⊥ if id1 = id2. Otherwise, it uses the bit b to
answer the queries. If b = 1, the challenger runs NIKE.SharedKey(id1, pk1, id2,
sk2) and returns the result to A. If b = 0, the challenger generates a random
key from SHK, records it for later, and returns that key to the adversary. In
this case, to keep things consistent, the challenger returns the same random
key for the pair id1, id2 every time A queries for their shared key.
A’s queries may be made adaptively and are arbitrary in number. To prevent trivial
wins for the adversary, no query to the reveal oracle is allowed on any pair of
identities selected for test queries (in either order), and no extract query is allowed
on any of the identities involved in test queries. Also, we demand that no identity
registered as corrupt can later be the subject of a register honest user query,
and vice versa.
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Model
register register
extract
honest corrupt
test
honest corrupt reveal reveal
CKS-light 2 X 7 7 X 1
CKS X X 7 7 X X
CKS-heavy X X X X X 1
m-CKS-heavy X X X X X X
Table 3.1: Types of queries for different security models in the dishonest key regis-
tration (DKR) PKI model (aka plain/bare model). Notation: Xmeans that an ad-
versary is allowed to make an arbitrary number of queries; 7 means that no queries
can be made; integers represent the number of queries allowed to an adversary.
When the adversary finally outputs bˆ, it wins the game if bˆ = b. For an adversary
A, we define its advantage in this security game as:
Advm-CKS-heavyA,NIKE (k, qH , qC , qE , qHR, qCR, qT ) = 2 |Pr[bˆ = b]− 1/2|,
where qH , qC , qE , qHR, qCR and qT are, respectively, the numbers of register
honest user, register corrupt user, extract, honest reveal, corrupt reveal
and test queries made byA. We say that a NIKE scheme is (t, , qH , qC , qE , qHR, qCR,
qT )-secure in the m-CKS-heavy model if there is no adversary with advantage at
least  that runs in time t and makes at most qH register honest user queries,
etc. Informally, we say that a NIKE scheme is m-CKS-heavy secure if there is no
efficient adversary having non-negligible advantage in k, where efficient means that
the running time and numbers of queries made by the adversary are bounded by
polynomials in k. For simplicity we may also use Advm-CKS-heavyA,NIKE (k) to denote the
advantage of A, in the m-CKS-heavy model, against a NIKE scheme NIKE.
Comparing the models: Table 3.1 outlines the properties of all our security
models in the DKR setting, and the CKS model, in terms of restrictions on the
queries that can be made by the adversary. It is apparent that the m-CKS-heavy
model is the strongest model in that table. It differs from the CKS-heavy model only
in allowing multiple test queries. The m-CKS-heavy model represents a strength-
ening of the original CKS model by allowing extract and honest reveal queries,
whereas the CKS model only allows the adversary to gain information about hon-
estly generated shared keys via test queries. The CKS-light model is the simplest
of all, involving only two honestly registered identities, removing the extract and
honest reveal queries, and allowing only a single test query.
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In Theorem 3.1 we prove our strongest model, the m-CKS-heavy model, to be poly-
nomially equivalent to our weakest model, the CKS-light model. Then, it follows that
all security models are also polynomially equivalent. Thus, while the m-CKS-heavy
is our preferred model, it suffices to analyse schemes in the CKS-light model if one is
not overly concerned about concrete security. (Note that the security reductions are
not tight. It is an interesting open problem to either prove tighter relations between
the models, or to prove that such results are not possible.)
Theorem 3.1 (m-CKS-heavy ⇔ CKS-light). The m-CKS-heavy and CKS-light
security models are polynomially equivalent. More specifically, for any NIKE scheme
NIKE, we have that:
• for any adversary B against NIKE in the CKS-light game, there is an adversary
A that breaks NIKE in the m-CKS-heavy game with
Advm-CKS-heavyA,NIKE (k, 2, qC , 0, 0, qCR, 1) = Adv
CKS-light
B,NIKE (k, qC , qCR),
• for any adversary A against NIKE in the m-CKS-heavy game, there is an
adversary B that breaks NIKE in the CKS-light game with
AdvCKS-lightB,NIKE (k, qC , q
′
CR) ≥ (2/qT q2H)·Advm-CKS-heavyA,NIKE (k, qH , qC , qE , qHR, qCR, qT ),
where q′CR ≤ qCR.
Proof. Clearly, security in the sense of the m-CKS-heavy model implies security in
the sense of the CKS-light model, since the latter model is a limited case of the
former.
Here we prove the second reduction, namely that if a NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in
the CKS-light model, then it is also secure in the m-CKS-heavy model. We assume
that there is an adversary A that breaks a NIKE scheme in the m-CKS-heavy model
with advantage Advm-CKS-heavyA,NIKE (k, qH , qC , qE , qHR, qCR, qT ).
The hybrid argument technique. We consider a sequence of games G0, G1, . . . , GqT ,
all defined over the same probability space. Starting with the actual adversarial
game G0, with respect to an adversary A in the m-CKS-heavy model when b = 0,
we make slight modifications between successive games, in such a way that A’s view
is indistinguishable among the games.
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Game G0: actual adversarial game when b = 0. This is the original game as
defined in the m-CKS-heavy model when b = 0. All test queries will be answered
with randomly chosen values from the shared key space SHK.
Game Gι (1 ≤ ι ≤ qT −1): hybrid games. This game is identical to game Gι−1,
except that the ι-th test query, say on a pair of honest users id i, id j , is answered
with the actual real shared key, Kidi,idj , between those users.
Game GqT : actual adversarial game when b = 1. This is the original game as
defined in the m-CKS-heavy model when b = 1. All test queries will be answered
with the real shared keys (computed via the NIKE.SharedKey algorithm) associated
with the two users involved in each query.
Let A(Gι) denote adversary A playing game Gι. We see that A can distinguish
games G0 and GqT with advantage
Advm-CKS-heavyA,NIKE (k, qH , qC , qE , qHR, qCR, qT )
= |Pr[A(GqT ) = 1]− Pr[A(G0) = 1]| .
Note that Gι and Gι+1 (0 ≤ ι < qT ) differ in only one single test query. According
to the hybrid argument, if A can distinguish between G0 and GqT with non-negligible
probability, then for some 0 ≤ ι < qT it can also distinguish Gι and Gι+1 with non-
negligible probability. We show that if this is the case, then we can construct an
adversary B in the CKS-light model with advantage related to A’s advantage by a
polynomial factor.
The idea. In order to simulate the m-CKS-heavy game for A, B picks ι ← {0, . . . ,
qT − 1}, guessing that A can distinguish games Gι and Gι+1. Then it guesses which
users will be involved in the (ι + 1)-st test query made by A (more precisely, B
guesses that these users will be the I-th and J-th users registered as honest).
Adversary B plays the CKS-light security game with challenger C and acts as a
challenger for A. On input the security parameter 1k, C computes params ←
NIKE.Setup(1k) and gives params to B. The challenger C then takes a bit b and
answers oracle queries for B until B outputs a bit bˆ.
Let qH be a bound on the number of honest users registered by A in the course of its
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attack and let qT be a bound on the number of test queries made by A. Without
loss of generality, we assume that A does not make the same test query more than
once. The CKS-light adversary B chooses an index ι ← {0, . . . , qT − 1} and two
distinct indices I, J ← {1, . . . , qH}. It then gives params to A and answers queries
to A in the following manner:
• register honest user (id):
If id is the I-th or J-th distinct user involved in such a query, B sets id I = id or
idJ = id as appropriate. It adds id I (resp. idJ) to a list ΛT . Adversary B then
makes the same query to C, which obtains (pk , sk)← NIKE.KeyGen(params, id),
records (honest, id , pk , sk), and returns pk to B. B gives pk to A. Otherwise,
if id is not the I-th or J-th distinct user involved in a register honest user
query made by A, then B computes (pk , sk)← NIKE.KeyGen(params, id) and
sends pk to A. B stores (honest , id , pk , sk) in a list Λhon.
• register corrupt user (id , pk):
Here A supplies a public key pk along with an identity id that has not
been subject to a register honest user query. B forwards the register
corrupt user query to C, which will record (corrupt , id , pk ,⊥). B stores
(corrupt , id , pk ,⊥) in a list Λcor.
• extract (id):
If id /∈ ΛT , B finds (honest , id , pk , sk) in Λhon and gives sk to A. Otherwise,
if id ∈ ΛT , B aborts the simulation.
• corrupt reveal (id i, id j):
Here A supplies two identities id i and id j , where either id i or id j is an honest
user. Without loss of generality, let us assume that id j is the honest user.
B checks if id j ∈ Λhon. If id j /∈ Λhon (this means that id j ∈ ΛT ), B makes
the same query to C, obtaining Kidi,idj , the shared key between id i and id j .
B returns this value to A. Now, if id j ∈ Λhon, B finds sk j , then it finds pk i
in Λcor and computes Kidi,idj ← NIKE.SharedKey(id i, pk i, id j , sk j). B then
returns Kidi,idj to A.
• honest reveal (id i, id j):
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Here A supplies two identities id i and id j , both registered as honest users. If
{id i, id j} ⊆ ΛT , B aborts. Otherwise, at least one of the identities must be in
Λhon. Without loss of generality, assume that id i ∈ Λhon. B finds the private
key sk i in Λhon, then computes Kidi,idj ← NIKE.SharedKey(id j , pk j , id i, sk i)
and returns Kidi,idj to A.
• test (id i, id j):
The way B answers test queries depends on the number of such queries issued
by A.
– the first ι test queries, B answers with the actual shared keys associated
with the corresponding users involved in those queries. In order to do
this, B checks if {id i, id j} ⊆ ΛT . If so, it aborts. Otherwise, at least one
of the identities must be in Λhon. Without loss of generality, assume that
id i ∈ Λhon. Now B retrieves the private key sk i from Λhon, then computes
Kidi,idj ← NIKE.SharedKey(id j , pk j , id i, sk i) and returns Kidi,idj to A.
– if this is the (ι+ 1)-st test query, B checks if {id i, id j} ⊆ ΛT . If not, it
aborts. If {id i, id j} ⊆ ΛT , B makes the same test query to C, receiving
a value α. B gives α to A.
– all other test queries B answers to A with random values from SHK.
This completes the description of B’s simulation. Whenever A outputs a bit bˆ,
B outputs the same bit. Now, if α is the actual shared key computed via the
NIKE.SharedKey algorithm and using as inputs the private key of one the users
involved in the (ι + 1)-st test query and the public key of the other user, then A
was playing game Gι+1. Otherwise, if α is a random value, A was playing game Gι.
Let G′0 and G′1 be the CKS-light games played by B when b = 0 and b = 1, respec-
tively. Let F denote the event that B correctly guessed the users involved in the
(ι + 1)-st test query (this would mean that the users are id I and idJ). If F oc-
curs then B simulates the m-CKS-heavy game correctly. Now we assess B’s success
probability. It is easy to see that Pr[F] = 1/
(
qH
2
) ≥ 2/q2H .
Averaging the probability that B outputs 1 over the random choice of ι, we have:
Pr[B(G′1) = 1] =
1
qT
Pr[F]
qT−1∑
ι=0
Pr[A(Gι+1) = 1]
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Model
register register
extract
honest corrupt
test
honest corrupt reveal reveal
HKR CKS-light 2 7 7 7 7 1
HKR CKS X 7 7 7 7 X
HKR CKS-heavy X 7 X X 7 1
HKR m-CKS-heavy X 7 X X 7 X
Table 3.2: Types of queries for different security models in the honest key registration
(HKR) PKI model.
and
Pr[B(G′0) = 1] =
1
qT
Pr[F]
qT−1∑
ι=0
Pr[A(Gι) = 1].
Therefore it follows that
AdvCKS-lightB,NIKE (k, qC , q
′
CR) =
∣∣Pr[B(G′1) = 1]− Pr[B(G′0) = 1]∣∣
≥ (2/qT q2H)
∣∣∣∣∣
qT−1∑
ι=0
Pr[A(Gι+1) = 1]−
qT−1∑
ι=0
Pr[A(Gι) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣
= (2/qT q
2
H) |Pr[A(GqT ) = 1]− Pr[A(G0) = 1]|
= (2/qT q
2
H)Adv
m-CKS-heavy
A,NIKE (k, qH , qC , qE , qHR, qCR, qT ).
This concludes our proof.
Security models in the honest key registration (HKR) setting: For com-
pleteness we also provide NIKE security models in the honest key registration setting
where dishonest key registration queries are disallowed. An overview of the models
is given in Table 3.2. We remark that Theorem 3.1 carries over to the HKR setting
simply by setting qC and qCR to zero in the theorem statement and proof. So all the
security models in the HKR setting are also equivalent to one another. As pointed
out in the introduction, constructing NIKE schemes in the HKR setting is much
easier than in the more realistic DKR setting.
81
3.3 Constructions for NIKE
NIKE.Setup(1k)
PG2 ← G2(1k),where PG2 = (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, p, e, ψ)
(u0, u1, u2, S)← G1, (hk , ck)← Cham.KeyGen(1k)
params ← (PG2, u0, u1, u2, S, hk)
Return params
NIKE.KeyGen(params, id)
x← Zp, r ← RCham, Z ← gx2 , t← ChamHhk (Z||id , r)
Y ← u0ut1u2t
2
, X ← Y x
pk ← (X,Z, r), sk ← x
Return (pk , sk)
NIKE.SharedKey(id1, pk1, id2, sk2)
If id1 = id2 return ⊥
Parse pk1 as (X1, Z1, r1) and sk2 as x2
t1 ← ChamHhk (Z1||id1, r1)
If e(X1, g2) 6= e(u0ut11 u2t1
2
, Z1)
then Kid1,id2 ←⊥
else Kid1,id2 ← e(Sx2 , Z1)
Return Kid1,id2
Figure 3.1: The NIKE scheme NIKEDBDH-2.
3.3 Constructions for NIKE
3.3.1 A Construction in the Standard Model from Pairings
We specify how to build a NIKE scheme, NIKEDBDH-2, that is secure in the CKS-light
security model under the DBDH-2 assumption in the standard model. Our construc-
tion makes use of a tuple PG2 = (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, p, e, ψ), output by a parameter
generator G2, and a chameleon hash function ChamH : {0, 1}∗ ×RCham → Z∗p. This
can be instantiated efficiently using the discrete-log based construction from [102]
(see Section 2.3.1 for further details of chameleon hash functions). The component
algorithms of the scheme NIKEDBDH-2 are defined in Figure 3.1.
The check in the NIKE.SharedKey algorithm for valid public keys can be implemented
by evaluating the bilinear map twice. It is clear that NIKE.SharedKey defined in this
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way satisfies the requirement that entities id1 and id2 are able to compute a common
key. To see this, note that e(Sx2 , Z1) = e(S, g2)
x1,x2 . The identity space for this
construction, ID, is {0, 1}∗, while the space of shared keys is SHK = GT . Public
keys and parameters are compact. For example, at the 128-bit security level, using
BN curves [14] and point compression, public keys consist of 768 bits plus an element
from RCham.
As stated before, we can prove NIKEDBDH-2 to be secure under the DBDH-2 assump-
tion in the sense of the CKS-light security model. Interestingly, our scheme can be
generalised to use any weak (2, poly)-PHF [89] in combination with a chameleon
hash function. That is, Y (in the NIKE.KeyGen algorithm) would be the output of
the weak (2,poly)-PHF on input t, where t is the output of the chameleon hash
function. We have given a specific construction here because suitable weak PHFs
are currently rare. A further generalisation of our scheme could use any randomised
(2,poly)-PHF and avoid the chameleon hash, but no constructions for these are
currently known.
Theorem 3.2. Assume ChamH is a family of chameleon hash functions. Then
the NIKE scheme NIKEDBDH-2 is secure under the DBDH-2 assumption relative to
generator G2. In particular, suppose A is an adversary against NIKEDBDH-2 in the
CKS-light security model. Then there exists a DBDH-2 adversary B with:
AdvDBDH-2B,G2 (k) ≥ AdvCKS-lightA,NIKEDBDH-2(k)− 2 AdvcollACH,ChamH(k).
Proof. We proceed via a sequence of games. Let Sι be the event that A is successful
in Game ι.
Game G0: This is the original attack game as described in the CKS-light security
model. By definition, we have that:
AdvCKS-lightA,NIKEDBDH-2(k) = 2 |Pr[S0]− 1/2|.
Game G1: Eliminate hash collisions. In this game, the challenger changes
its answers to register corrupt user queries as follows: let id∗1 and id
∗
2 be the
identities of the two honest users, and let their public keys be pk∗1 = (X∗1 , Z∗1 , r∗1),
pk∗2 = (X∗2 , Z∗2 , r∗2), respectively. Let id be the identity of a user that is the subject of
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a register corrupt user query with pk = (X,Z, r). If t = ChamHhk (Z||id , r) =
ChamHhk (Z
∗
1 ||id∗1, r∗1) or t = ChamHhk (Z||id , r) = ChamHhk (Z∗2 ||id∗2, r∗2), the chal-
lenger aborts (note that in this case we have a collision in ChamHhk ). Otherwise, it
continues as in the previous game.
Let abortChamH be the event that a collision was found. Games G0 and G1 are
identical unless abortChamH occurs. By the difference lemma [131], we have
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ Pr[abortChamH].
Furthermore,
Pr[abortChamH] ≤ AdvcollACH,ChamH(k).
Game G2: In this game a DBDH-2 adversary B on inputs (PG2, ga2 , gb2, gc1, T )
(with ga2 , g
b
2, g
c
1, T ∈ G22 ×G1 ×GT ), where a, b, c ∈ Zp, runs adversary A against
NIKEDBDH-2 simulating the challenger’s behaviour as in game G1. B’s job is to de-
termine whether T equals e(g1, g2)
abc or a random element from GT , where g2 is a
generator of G2 and g1 = ψ(g2) is a generator of G1.
B runs Cham.KeyGen(1k) to obtain a key pair for a chameleon hash function, (hk , ck)
(here ck is the trapdoor information for the chameleon hash). It then selects
m1,m2 ← {0, 1}∗ and r1, r2 ← RCham, where RCham is the chameleon hash func-
tion’s randomness space. B sets t∗1 := ChamHhk (m1, r1) and t∗2 := ChamHhk (m2, r2).
Let p(t) = p0 + p1t + p2t
2 be a polynomial of degree 2 over Zp such that p(t
∗
1) =
p(t∗2) = 0. Let q(t) = q0 + q1t + q2t2 be a random polynomial of degree 2 over Zp.
Then B sets ui = (gc1)pig1qi (i ∈ {0, 1, 2}) and S = gc1. Since qi ← Zp, we have
ui ← G1. Note that then u0ut1ut
2
2 = (g
c
1)
p(t)g1
q(t). In particular, Y ∗1 = g
q(t∗1)
1 and
Y ∗2 = g
q(t∗2)
1 , where q(t
∗
1) and q(t
∗
2) are known values.
B then gives params = (PG2, u0, u1, u2, S, hk) toA and answers the following queries:
• register honest user: When B receives a register honest user query
for identity id∗1 from adversary A, it uses the trapdoor information ck of the
chameleon hash function to obtain r∗1 ∈ RCham such that ChamHhk (ga2 ||id∗1, r∗1) =
ChamHhk (m1, r1) = t
∗
1. Notice that, according to the definition of chameleon
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hash functions (see Section 2.3.1), r∗1 is uniformly distributed over RCham
and independent from r1. Similarly, when B receives a second register
honest user query for identity id∗2 from A, it obtains r∗2 ∈ RCham such that
ChamHhk (g
b
2||id∗2, r∗2) = ChamHhk (m2, r2) = t∗2. Then r∗2 is also uniformly dis-
tributed over RCham. Now B sets:
pk∗1 = ((ψ(g
a
2)
q(t∗1), ga2 , r
∗
1) and pk
∗
2 = ((ψ(g
b
2)
q(t∗2), gb2, r
∗
2).
These are correct public keys since p(t∗1) = p(t∗2) = 0. Note that implicitly
sk∗1 = a and sk
∗
2 = b.
• register corrupt user: Here, B receives a public key pk and a string id
from A, and registers them. As in the original attack game, B aborts if id
equals one of the honest identities, id∗1 or id
∗
2.
• corrupt reveal: In order to output the shared key between one of the two
honest users, say id∗1, and a corrupt user, say id , B first checks if pk = (X,Z, r)
is a valid public key using the pairing. If not, it rejects the query. This
makes sure that pk is of the form (Y d, gd2 , r) for some d ∈ Zp, where Y =
(gc1)
p(t)g
q(t)
1 , for t = ChamHhk (Z||id , r), and r ∈ RCham. This means that
X = (gcd1 )
p(t)
g
dq(t)
1 . Thus, g
cd
1 can be computed from X and Z = g
d
2 by:
gcd1 = (X/ψ(Z)
q(t))
1/p(t) mod p
,
where we use the property that p(t) 6= 0 mod p, which follows from the facts
that p is a polynomial of degree 2 with roots t∗1, t∗2 and that t 6= t∗1, t∗2 (because
we have eliminated hash collisions already in Game G1).
Now writing pk∗1 = (X∗1 , Z∗1 , r∗1) for the public key of the honest user id
∗
1, the
shared key between id∗1 and id can be correctly computed as:
Kid∗1,id = e(g
cd
1 , Z
∗
1 ).
• test: Return T .
This completes our description of B’s simulation. Note that distinguishing the
real case from the random case for A in Game G2 is equivalent to solving the
DBDH-2 problem. To see this, note that for user id∗1, we have Z∗1 = ga2 and
X∗1 = ψ(Z∗1 )
q(t∗1), while for user id∗2, we have Z∗2 = gb2 and X∗2 = ψ(Z∗2 )
q(t∗2). Hence
Kid∗1,id∗2 = e((g
c
1)
b, Z∗1 ) = e((gc1)
a, Z∗2 ) = e(g1, g2)abc.
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Now, since B’s simulation properly handles all of A’s queries and sets up all values
with the correct distributions, we have: Pr[S2] = Pr[S1]. Let SB be the event
that B is successful in outputting the correct bit in the DBDH-2 experiment of
Definition 2.23. If B outputs the same bit as A, we have that Pr[SB] = Pr[S2].
By collecting the probabilities relating the different games, we have
AdvCKS-lightA,NIKEDBDH-2 = 2 |Pr[S0]− 1/2|
≤ 2 |Pr[S1] + AdvcollACH,ChamH(k)− 1/2|
≤ 2 |Pr[S2] + AdvcollACH,ChamH(k)− 1/2|
= 2 |Pr[SB] + AdvcollACH,ChamH(k)− 1/2|.
Thus,
AdvDBDH-2B,G2 (k) = 2 |Pr[SB]− 1/2| ≥ AdvCKS-lightA,NIKEDBDH-2(k)− 2 AdvcollACH,ChamH(k).
This concludes our proof.
Remark: We note that the map ψ in PG2 is only used in the security proof for
the NIKE scheme NIKEDBDH-2 and not in the scheme itself.
3.3.2 A Construction in the Random Oracle Model from Factoring
Let n(k) be a function and δ a constant with 0 ≤ δ < 1/2. Let RSAgen be an
algorithm with input 1k that generates elements (N,P,Q) such that N = PQ is an
n-bit Blum integer and all prime factors of φ(N)/4 are pairwise distinct and have
at least δn bits. We specify how to build a NIKE scheme, NIKEfac, that is secure
in the CKS-light security model under the factoring assumption relative to RSAgen
in the ROM. Our scheme makes use of a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k which
is modelled as a random oracle in the security proof. We assume that identities id
come from a space with a natural ordering <. The component algorithms of the
scheme NIKEfac are defined in Figure 3.2.
Theorem 3.3. The scheme NIKEfac is secure in the ROM under the factoring as-
sumption relative to RSAgen. In particular, suppose A is an adversary against
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NIKE.Setup(1k)
(N,P,Q)← RSAgen(1k), g ← QR+N , where 〈g〉 = QR+N
params ← (H, N, g)
Return params
NIKE.KeyGen(params, id)
x← ZbN/4c, X ← gx
pk ← X, sk ← x
Return (pk , sk)
NIKE.SharedKey(id1, pk1, id2, sk2)
If (id1 = id2) or pk1 6∈ QR+N or pk2 6∈ QR+N return ⊥
else if
{
id1 < id2 return H(id1, id2, pk1
sk2)
id2 < id1 return H(id2, id1, pk1
sk2)
Figure 3.2: The NIKE scheme NIKEfac.
NIKEfac in the CKS-light security model. Then there exists a factoring adversary
C with:
AdvfacC,RSAgen(k) ≥ AdvCKS-lightA,NIKEfac(k)−O(2−δn(k)).
Proof. Suppose A is an adversary against NIKEfac in the CKS-light security model.
We first show how to construct an adversary B that uses A to solve the Double
Strong Diffie-Hellman (DSDH) problem (see the DSDH assumption in Section 2.1.5)
in the group of Signed Quadratic Residues (QR+N ), where N is generated by RSAgen,
and then use Theorem 2.7 (Breaking DSDH ⇒ Factoring) to construct a factoring
adversary C. B’s input is (N, g,X = gx, Y = gy), where g is a generator of QR+N
and (gx, gy) is an instance of the CDH problem in QR+N . B’s task is to compute
gxy, given access to two decisional oracles DDHg,X(·, ·) and DDHg,Y (·, ·). B acts as
a challenger for A.
B gives A the tuple (H, N, g), where H is a random oracle controlled by B. B
maintains a list L, initially empty, to store random oracle responses or responses to
shared keys. A makes a series of queries which B answers as follows.
• register honest user: When B receives register honest user queries for
identities id∗1 and id
∗
2, B sets pk∗1 = X and pk∗2 = Y .
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• register corrupt user: Here, B receives a public key pk and a string id
from A, and registers them. As in the original attack game, B aborts if id
equals one of the honest identities, id∗1 or id
∗
2.
• corrupt reveal: In order to output the shared key between one of the two
honest users, say id∗1, and a corrupt user, say id , B checks if id∗1 and id already
appears in an entry of the form (id∗1, id , h,R) on the list L, for correct h
(without loss of generality, assume id∗1 < id). If so, then B returns Kid∗1,id = R
in response to A’s query. Otherwise, B replies with R ← {0, 1}k and adds
(id∗1, id ,⊥, R) to L. Notice that by setup sk∗1 = x = dloggX (unknown to B), so
the ‘correct’ key would be Kid∗1,id = H(id
∗
1, id , pk
x
id ). (We assume pk id ∈ QR+N ,
otherwise B returns ⊥.)
• test: At some point during the simulation, A makes a single test query
on the pair of identities (id∗1, id
∗
2). B outputs a randomly generated value
R ∈ {0, 1}k. Notice that the ‘correct’ key Kid∗1,id∗2 that would be computed
by B in responding to this query is equal to H(id∗1, id∗2, gxy) (w.l.o.g. assuming
id∗1 < id
∗
2).
• H queries: On input (id1, id2, h), w.l.o.g. id1, id2 ∈ {0, 1}∗, id1 < id2, and
h ∈ QR+N , B answers A’s H queries as follows. B checks if (id1, id2, h,R) is
already on the list for some R; If so, it outputs R. Otherwise, B checks if
an entry of the form (id1, id2,⊥, R) is on the list for id1 or id2 equals one of
the two honest identities id∗1 or id
∗
2 (say id1 = id
∗
1 (resp. id1 = id
∗
2), that
is, pk1 = X (resp. pk1 = Y )). If so, B checks if h is the ‘correct’ DH value
for (id1, id2) using one of the DDH oracles. (Note that B does not know the
private key x = dloggX (resp. y = dloggY ).) That is, if DDHg,X(pk2, h) = 1
(resp. DDHg,Y (pk2, h) = 1), then h = pk
x
2 (resp. h = pk
y
2) and B updates
the entry (id1, id2,⊥, R) with (id1, id2, h,R) to the list and returns R. Note
that entries of the form (id1, id2,⊥, R) are only added to the list when one
of the strings, id1 or id2, is id
∗
1 or id
∗
2 and the other is registered. Finally, if
no entry of either of the above forms already appears on the list, that is, no
(id1, id2, h,R) and no (id1, id2,⊥, R), then B picks a random value R ∈ {0, 1}k,
returns R and adds (id1, id2, h,R) to L.
This completes our description of B’s simulation. If A queries the random oracle
H with (id∗1, id
∗
2, h) or (id
∗
2, id
∗
1, h) for h = g
xy, then it efficiently solved B’s own
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CDH challenge. This can be noticed by B (with the help of oracle DDHg,X(·, ·)
or DDHg,Y (·, ·)) and B can return gxy to its challenger. Note that if A does not
query H on (id∗1, id
∗
2, g
xy) or (id∗2, id
∗
1, g
xy), then A’s advantage is zero because it
cannot distinguish real from random answers to test queries. Hence, if A has non-
negligible success probability, then this query must be made by A. We then see that
AdvDSDHB,RSAgen(k) ≥ AdvCKS-lightA,NIKEfac(k)−O(2−δn(k)), where the O(2−δn(k)) term accounts
for the statistical difference between the distribution of gx and gy in the real game
(where x, y ∈ ZbN/4c) and the simulation (where x, y ∈ Zφ(N)/4). Combining these
facts with Theorem 2.7, we have that AdvfacC,RSAgen(k) ≥ AdvCKS-lightA,NIKEfac(k)−O(2−δn(k)),
concluding the proof.
3.4 From Non-Interactive Key Exchange to Public Key En-
cryption
In this section we give a conversion that takes a NIKE scheme that is secure in the
CKS-light security model plus a strongly one-time secure signature scheme (strong-
OTS), and produces a KEM that is IND-CCA secure. From such a KEM, it is
easy to construct an IND-CCA secure public key encryption scheme [46]. (We
refer to Secions 2.3.5 and 2.3.6 for formal definitions of an IND-CCA KEM and a
strong-OTS scheme.) Let NIKE = (NIKE.Setup,NIKE.KeyGen,NIKE.SharedKey) be
a NIKE scheme and OTS = (OTS.KG,OTS.Sign,OTS.Vfy) be a signature scheme.
The components of our KEM, KEM(NIKE,OTS), are defined in Figure 3.3.
Notice that the ciphertexts in this scheme consist of a verification key from the
strong-OTS scheme, a public key from the NIKE scheme, and a one-time signature,
while the encapsulated keys are elements of the shared key space, SHK, of the NIKE
scheme.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose the NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in the CKS-light se-
curity model and OTS is a strongly one-time secure signature scheme. Then
KEM(NIKE,OTS) is an IND-CCA secure KEM. More precisely, for any adversary
A against the IND-CCA security of KEM(NIKE,OTS), there exists an adversary
B against NIKE in the CKS-light security model or an adversary C against OTS
having the same advantage as A. Moreover, if A makes qD decapsulation queries,
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KEM.KG(1k)
params ← NIKE.Setup(1k)
id ← ID, (pk , sk)← NIKE.KeyGen(params, id)
pkKEM := (params, id , pk), skKEM := (id , sk)
Return (pkKEM, skKEM)
KEM.Enc(pkKEM)
Parse pkKEM as (params, id , pk)
Repeat: (vk , sigk)← OTS.KG(1k), until vk 6= id
(pk ′, sk ′)← NIKE.KeyGen(params, id ′ = vk)
σ ← OTS.Sign(sigk , pk ′)
K ← NIKE.SharedKey(id , pk , id ′ = vk , sk ′)
Return (K,C = (vk , pk ′, σ))
KEM.Dec(skKEM, C)
Parse C as (vk , pk ′, σ) and skKEM as (id , sk)
V ← OTS.Vfy(vk , pk ′, σ)
If (vk = id) or Y = reject return ⊥, else
Return NIKE.SharedKey(id ′ = vk , pk ′, id , sk)
Figure 3.3: The KEM KEM(NIKE,OTS).
Note. We assume that params contains the security parameter 1k.
then B makes at most qD register corrupt user queries and at most qD corrupt
reveal queries, while B’s running time is roughly the same as that of A.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the IND-CCA security of KEM(NIKE,OTS)
(see Definition 2.33). We build B, an adversary against the NIKE scheme in the
CKS-light security model (or C, an adversary against the strong one-time security
of OTS).
B, on input params, a set of system parameters, picks one identity id1 uniformly
at random from the identity space of NIKE, ID, and runs OTS.KG(1k) to obtain
(vk , sigk). It sets id2 := vk and makes two register honest user queries on id1
and id2 receiving public keys pk1, pk2. B then sets pkKEM := (params, id1, pk1). B
also makes a test query on id1, id2. It receives in reply a value Kˆ, which is either the
real key, K∗ = NIKE.SharedKey(id1, pk1, id2, sk2), or a random key K from SHK. B
sets C∗ := (id2, pk2, σ∗), where σ∗ ← OTS.Sign(sigk , pk2) and gives (pkKEM, Kˆ, C∗)
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to A.
A now makes KEM.Dec queries which B handles as follows. For each such query
with input C, B parses C as (id ′, pk ′, σ′) and checks if id ′ 6= id1 and if σ′ is a
valid signature on pk ′ under the verification key vk ′ = id ′. If the signature is
not valid or id ′ = id1, B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, if id ′ = id2 (i.e. vk = vk ′) and
(pk ′, σ′) 6= (pk2, σ∗), then we can build another adversary C against the strong one-
time security of OTS. (This is done using the same simulation as above with the
difference that sk1 and sk2 are known but vk comes from the OTS experiment. The
signing oracle is used to generate σ∗ for the challenge ciphertext.) If id ′ = id2 and
(pk ′, σ′) = (pk2, σ∗), C is not a valid query. Assuming id
′ 6∈ {id1, id2}, B makes a
register corrupt user query on input (id ′, pk ′). B then makes a corrupt reveal
query on (id1, id
′) and forwards the result to A.
This completes our description of B’s simulation. A’s view is identical when playing
either against B in this simulation or against its real KEM challenger. Note that in
the KEM real game, KEM.Dec(skKEM, C), where C = (vk
′ = id ′, pk ′, σ′), should re-
turn NIKE.SharedKey(id ′, pk ′, id1, sk1) or ⊥ if the signature does not verify or if id ′ =
id1. Note also that in the KEM real game, the challenge query should be answered
with either KEM.Enc(pkKEM) = (K
∗, C∗), whereK∗ = NIKE.SharedKey(id1, pk1, id2,
sk2) and C
∗ = (id2, pk2, σ∗), or a pair (K,C∗), with K chosen at random from SHK.
This is exactly what is done in B’s simulation.
Whenever A outputs a bit bˆ, B outputs the same bit. Then we have that B’s
advantage in breaking the NIKE scheme is the same as A’s advantage in breaking
the KEM. Counting queries made by B in response to A’s queries completes the
proof.
Applying the above construction to the pairing-based NIKE scheme from Section 3.3.1
results in an IND-CCA secure KEM with public keys (id , pk) that consist of an iden-
tity string, two group elements (one in G1 and one in G2), and a random value from
the randomness space of the Chameleon hash function. Ciphertexts are slightly
longer, containing in addition a signature from the one-time signature scheme.4
4Arguably, one might also include the public parameters params when evaluating the public
key size.
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In the next section we explain how a simplified notion for NIKE and its security
lead to a more efficient KEM that is competitive with the BMW scheme from [35],
for example.
3.5 Simplified NIKE and Public Key Encryption
Here we show how simplified versions of the NIKE definition and the CKS-light se-
curity model can be used to build an IND-CCA secure KEM. The essential difference
from our previous definitions is that we eliminate all identities from the algorithms
in a NIKE scheme, and assume that the adversary works only with distinct public
keys, i.e. the adversary is not allowed to register the same public key more than once.
(We stress that this simplified version of the NIKE definition and security model
do not capture well how real CAs typically operate.) Thus we show that a simpler
notion of NIKE than the one we have considered so far suffices for constructing an
IND-CCA PKE.
We begin by giving our simplified NIKE definition and security model, and finally
the simplified conversion itself. We then illustrate the conversion using a simplified
version of the NIKE scheme from Section 3.3.1.
3.5.1 Simplified NIKE and Simplified CKS-light Security Model
We define a simplified NIKE (S-NIKE) scheme, S-NIKE, as a collection of three
algorithms S-NIKE.Setup, S-NIKE.KeyGen and S-NIKE.SharedKey, together with a
shared key space SHK.
• S-NIKE.Setup: As for NIKE.
• S-NIKE.KeyGen: On input params, this probabilistic algorithm outputs a key
pair (pk , sk).
• S-NIKE.SharedKey: On input a public key pk1 and a private key sk2 (with
corresponding public key pk2), this algorithm outputs either a shared key
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K1,2 ∈ SHK, or a failure symbol ⊥. This algorithm is assumed to always
output ⊥ if pk1 = pk2.
For correctness, we require that, for any key pairs (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2), algorithm
S-NIKE.SharedKey satisfies the constraint
S-NIKE.SharedKey(pk1, sk2) = S-NIKE.SharedKey(pk2, sk1).
Our simplified CKS-light (S-CKS-light) security model for S-NIKE is stated in terms
of a game between an adversary A and a challenger C. In this game, C takes as input
the security parameter 1k, runs params ← S-NIKE.Setup(1k) and gives A params.
The challenger takes a random bit b and answers oracle queries for A until A outputs
a bit bˆ. The challenger answers the following types of queries for A:
• register honest user: The challenger C obtains a public/private key pair by
running (pk , sk)← S-NIKE.KeyGen(params) and records the tuple (honest , pk ,
sk). C returns pk to A. A is allowed to make at most 2 such queries; we refer
to the components in the responses as being honest keys.
• register corrupt user: In this type of query, A supplies a public key pk .
The challenger C records the tuple (corrupt , pk ,⊥).
• corrupt reveal: Here A supplies a pair of public keys pk1, pk2, such that one
of the keys was registered as honest and the other as corrupt . The challenger
runs S-NIKE.SharedKey using as input the corrupt public key and the private
key corresponding to the honest public key and returns the result to A.
• test: Here A supplies two honest public keys pk1, pk2. If b = 1, the challenger
runs S-NIKE.SharedKey(pk1, sk2) = S-NIKE.SharedKey(pk2, sk1) and returns
the result to A. If b = 0, the challenger generates a random key from SHK,
records it for later, and returns that to the adversary. A makes a single test
query.
A’s queries may be made adaptively and are arbitrary in number. We demand that
all the public keys involved in the register corrupt user queries made by A are
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distinct from one another and also distinct from any honest public key received by
the time of the register corrupt user query. When the adversary finally outputs
bˆ, it wins the game if bˆ = b. For an adversary A, we define its advantage in this
security game as:
AdvS-CKS-lightA,S-NIKE (k, qC , qCR) = 2 |Pr[bˆ = b]− 1/2|,
where qC , qCR are the numbers of register corrupt user queries and corrupt
reveal queries made by A, respectively. Then we say that an S-NIKE scheme is
(t, , qC , qCR)-secure in the S-CKS-light model for S-NIKE if there is no adversary
with advantage at least  that runs in time t and makes at most qC register
corrupt user queries and at most qCR corrupt reveal queries. Informally, we
say that an S-NIKE scheme is S-CKS-light secure if there is no efficient adversary
having non-negligible advantage in k, where efficient means that the running time
and numbers of queries made by the adversary are bounded by polynomials in k.
For simplicity we may also use AdvS-CKS-lightA,S-NIKE (k) to denote the advantage of A, in
the S-CKS-light model, against a NIKE scheme.
3.5.2 The Conversion from S-NIKE to KEM
We now present our conversion from an S-NIKE scheme to a KEM. Let S-NIKE =
(S-NIKE.Setup, S-NIKE.KeyGen, S-NIKE.SharedKey) be an S-NIKE scheme. The com-
ponents of our KEM, KEM KEM(S-NIKE), are defined in Figure 3.4.
Notice that the ciphertexts in this scheme just consist of public keys from the S-
NIKE scheme, while the encapsulated keys are elements of SHK. As we show in
Theorem 3.5, the resulting KEM is automatically IND-CCA secure if the S-NIKE
scheme is secure in the S-CKS-light security model.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose the S-NIKE scheme S-NIKE is secure in the S-CKS-light se-
curity model. Then KEM(S-NIKE) is an IND-CCA secure KEM. More precisely, for
any adversary A against KEM(S-NIKE), there exists an adversary B against S-NIKE
in the S-CKS-light security model having the same advantage as A. Moreover, if A
makes qD decapsulation queries, then B makes at most qD register corrupt user
queries and at most qD corrupt reveal queries, while B’s running time is roughly
the same as that of A.
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KEM.KG(1k)
params ← S-NIKE.Setup(1k)
(pk , sk)← S-NIKE.KeyGen(params)
Return (pkKEM := pk , skKEM := sk)
KEM.Enc(pkKEM)
(pk ′, sk ′)← S-NIKE.KeyGen(params)
K ← S-NIKE.SharedKey(pkKEM, sk ′)
Return (K,C := pk ′)
KEM.Dec(skKEM, C)
Return S-NIKE.SharedKey(C := pk ′, skKEM)
Figure 3.4: The KEM KEM(S-NIKE).
Proof. Let A be an adversary against KEM(S-NIKE). We build B, an adversary
against S-NIKE in the S-CKS-light security model.
B, on input params, a set of system parameters, makes two register honest user
queries and receives public keys pk1, pk2. B then sets pkKEM := pk1. B also makes
a test query on pk1, pk2. It receives in reply a value Kˆ, which is either the real
key, K∗ = S-NIKE.SharedKey(pk1, sk2) (where sk2 is the private key associated with
pk2), or a random key K from SHK. B sets C∗ := pk2 and gives (pkKEM, Kˆ, C∗) to
A.
A now makes KEM.Dec queries which B handles as follows. For each such query with
input C, B parses C as pk ′. Since C 6= C∗, we have pk ′ 6= pk2. If pk ′ = pk1, then
B outputs ⊥, which is consistent with the output of the decapsulation algorithm
in the scheme KEM(S-NIKE) (S-NIKE.SharedKey(pk ′, skKEM) always outputs ⊥ if
pk ′ = pkKEM) . Otherwise, B makes a register corrupt user query on input pk ′
(here we assume, without loss of generality, that all KEM.Dec queries made by A
are distinct). B then makes a corrupt reveal query on (pk1, pk ′) and returns the
result to A.
This completes our description of B’s simulation. A’s view is identical when playing
either against B in this simulation or against its real KEM challenger. Note that
in the KEM real game KEM.Dec(skKEM, C), where C = pk
′, should return the
output of S-NIKE.SharedKey(pk ′, sk1). Note also that in the KEM real game, the
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S-NIKE.Setup(1k)
PG2 = (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, p, e, ψ)← G2(1k)
(u0, u1, u2, S)← G1,TCRf ← TCR
params ← (PG2, u0, u1, u2, S,TCRf )
Return params
S-NIKE.KeyGen(params)
x← Zp, Z ← gx2 , t← TCRf (Z), Y ← u0ut1u2t
2
, X ← Y x
pk ← (X,Z), sk ← x
Return (pk , sk)
S-NIKE.SharedKey(pk1, sk2)
Parse pk1 as (X1, Z1) and sk2 as x2
t1 ← TCRf (Z1)
If e(X1, g2) 6= e(u0ut11 u2t1
2
, Z1)
then K1,2 ←⊥
else K1,2 ← e(Sx2 , Z1)
Return K1,2
Figure 3.5: The S-NIKE scheme SNIKEDBDH-2.
challenge query should be answered with either KEM.Enc(pkKEM) = (K
∗, C∗), where
K∗ = NIKE.SharedKey(pk1, sk2) and C∗ = pk2, or a pair (K,C∗), with K chosen at
random from SHK. This is exactly what is done in B’s simulation.
Whenever A outputs a bit bˆ, B outputs the same bit. We have that B’s advantage
in breaking the S-NIKE scheme is the same as A’s advantage in breaking the KEM.
Counting queries made by B in response to A’s queries completes the proof.
3.5.3 Applying the Conversion
In Figure 3.5 we consider a simplified version of the NIKE scheme NIKEDBDH-2 of
Section 3.3.1, which we denote by SNIKEDBDH-2. The scheme makes use of a target
collision resistant hash function TCRf : G2 → Zp chosen uniformly from a family
of target collision resistant hash functions TCR (see Section 2.3 for definition of a
TCR), instead of a collision resistant hash function.
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Theorem 3.6. Assume TCR is a family of target collision resistant hash functions.
Then SNIKEDBDH-2 is secure under the DBDH-2 assumption relative to generator G2.
In particular, suppose A is an adversary against SNIKEDBDH-2 in the S-CKS-light
security model. Then there exists a DBDH-2 adversary B with:
AdvDBDH-2B,G2 (k) ≥ AdvS-CKS-lightA,SNIKEDBDH-2(k)− 2 AdvTCRAH,TCR(k).
Proof. We omit the proof as it is similar to that of Theorem 3.2.
When applying our conversion of Figure 3.4 for the S-NIKE scheme SNIKEDBDH-2,
we obtain a KEM that benefits from short public keys and private keys (just the
public keys and private keys of SNIKEDBDH-2) and short ciphertexts (just the public
keys of SNIKEDBDH-2). This KEM is comparable to the one proposed in [35]: both
schemes have the same size of ciphertext, two group elements, and for both, decap-
sulation requires a ciphertext check and the evaluation of a bilinear map twice. The
encapsulation key consists of only one group element. Also, the public keys and
private keys generated by our KEM.KG algorithm are shorter than the ones in the
KEM proposed in [35] (two group elements and one element in Zp, respectively).
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we provided different security models for NIKE and explored the
relationships between them. We then gave constructions for secure NIKE in the
standard model and in the ROM. We also studied the relationship between NIKE
and PKE, showing that a secure NIKE implies an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme.
There are several interesting open problems that arise from our work. One is to
construct pairing-free NIKE schemes in the standard model. A challenge to doing
so is that our pairing-based construction uses the pairing in a fundamental way in
order to provide a publicly computable check on the validity of public keys. The
RSA/factoring setting seems particularly challenging in this respect.
Another open problem is to construct three-user (or even multi-user) NIKE schemes
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based on Joux’s protocol [93]. Currently, there is no security model for such schemes,
and no constructions which can handle adversarially-generated public keys.
Finally, a very interesting problem is to construct ID-based NIKE schemes that are
provably secure in the standard model, moving beyond the ROM schemes analysed
in [57, 112]. We will see how to construct such schemes in the next chapter.
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In this chapter we construct the first identity-based non-interactive key exchange (ID-
NIKE) scheme with security in the standard model. Additionally, we also construct
the first fully secure hierarchical ID-NIKE scheme with security either in the random
oracle model or in the standard model. Our constructions are based on multilinear
maps and use a variant of a PHF, which we call MPHF. Most of the content of
this chapter appears in [64], which is joint work with Dennis Hofheinz, Kenneth G.
Paterson and Christoph Striecks.
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4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we studied non-interactive key exchange in the public key setting,
where, using some common parameters, any user can compute a public/private key
pair on its own. The public key should be registered with a Certification Authority
(CA), who keeps a directory of all registered public keys where users can look up
other users’ public keys. Then any pair of users who know each other’s public keys
can generate a shared key without exchanging any information. In identity-based
non-interactive key exchange (ID-NIKE), an arbitrary string that uniquely identifies
a user (such as an e-mail address or an IP address) can serve as the user’s public
key. We call this string an identity or identifier and denote it by id . In this setting,
the private key corresponding to id cannot be computed by the user itself anymore.
A Trusted Authority (TA), who holds a master public key mpk and a master secret
key msk , is responsible for generating and distributing private keys to the right
users. Now, any pair of users who have each received a private key from the TA and
who know each other’s identities can compute a shared key without exchanging any
information.
ID-NIKE has important applications in managing keys and enabling secure commu-
nications in mobile ad hoc and sensor networks where the energy cost of communi-
cation is at a premium [42, 70, 73]. In the hierarchical setting, H-ID-NIKE allows
the same functionality, but also allows the TA’s operations to be distributed over a
hierarchy, which is well-suited to military and emergency response scenarios. The
advantages of ID-NIKE, in terms of reducing communication costs and latency in a
realistic adversarial environment, are demonstrated in [42].
However, ID-NIKE has proven surprisingly hard to instantiate in the standard
model, even more so in a hierarchical setting. Currently, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is precisely one efficient, secure ID-NIKE scheme with a proof of security
in the random oracle model, namely the SOK scheme [122] (with security models
and analyses in [57, 112]). There are no schemes secure in the standard model.
In the hierarchical setting, Gennaro et al. [73] constructed H-ID-NIKE schemes that
are secure under certain classes of key exposure, but which do not offer full security,
the desirable and natural generalisation of the existing ID-NIKE security notion
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from [112] to the hierarchical setting. Moreover, their schemes do not scale well to
large numbers of levels as the amount of secret information held by the TA grows
exponentially with the depth of the hierarchy. The same criticisms apply to earlier
schemes [29, 115] on which the schemes of Gennaro et al. [73] are based. Indeed, one
of the open problems left in [73] is to construct an H-ID-NIKE scheme with security
against not only compromise of any number of leaves, but also against any number
of nodes at higher levels of the hierarchy.1
4.1.1 Our Contributions
This chapter is aimed at constructing the first ID-NIKE scheme in the literature
with provable security in the standard model and additionally, the first H-ID-NIKE
scheme with full security in either the random oracle model or the standard model.
As a warm-up we start by giving a pairing-based construction towards the first
ID-NIKE scheme with security in the standard model. However, this scheme does
not achieve the desired level of security, as in the security proof the number of
oracle queries that an adversary against the scheme can make is upper bounded
by a constant q. This happens due to the main components of our scheme (apart
from a pairing) being (q, 1)-PHFs for fixed q. Having a (poly, 1)-PHF would give us
the desired level of security for our ID-NIKE construction. Unfortunately, a recent
result [84] shows that no black-box construction of (poly, n)-PHFs, for constant n,
exists.
We circumvent the black-box impossibility result of [84] by slightly adapting the
PHF definition to a setting with multilinear maps to obtain what we call MPHFs.
We construct (poly, n)-MPHFs and show how our (standard model) (poly, 2)-MPHF
can replace the random oracle in the SOK ID-NIKE scheme to obtain a standard
model version of that scheme. Our scheme is the first ID-NIKE scheme with provable
security in the standard model. Our MPHF constructions also allow us to derive
a hierarchical version of the SOK scheme in settings with multilinear maps. Our
H-ID-NIKE scheme is the first such scheme with full security in either the random
oracle model or the standard model. The analyses of our schemes are completely
modular: we prove the security of the MPHF-based schemes solely from generic
1We note that there are other papers claiming to solve this open problem (eg. [81]), but these
can be easily shown to provide insecure schemes.
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MPHF properties. In particular, we can also view (programmable) random oracles
as MPHFs. So we can either instantiate our schemes with random oracles to obtain
reasonably efficient schemes, or with our new MPHFs to obtain (somewhat less effi-
cient) standard-model secure schemes. In this chapter, we also show how multilinear
maps can be used to achieve security in the broader scenario of multiple TAs, and
for shared keys among whole groups of users.
While our constructions are formulated with respect to a generic multilinear map,
we also outline the necessary adaptations required for the recent “noisy” multilinear
map candidate due to Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [72].
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 The GGH Candidate Multilinear Maps
Recently, Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [72] have announced a candidate for a family
of cryptographically interesting multilinear maps, named graded encoding systems.
Their candidate is lattice-based, heavily relies on the notion of noise, and thus does
not provide groups in the usual sense. With the GGH candidate, group elements
have a randomized (and thus non-unique) representation dubbed an “encoding”.
While it is possible to extract a unique “canonical bitstring” from an encoding, it
is not possible to perform further computations with this extracted bitstring. An
encoding can be re-randomized (e.g. to hide the sequence of operations that were
performed), but only at the cost of introducing an artificial “noise” term in the
encoding. Further operations (and re-randomizations) on this group element cause
the noise to grow; once this noise grows beyond a certain bound, encodings can no
longer be worked with.
4.2.2 Our Abstraction of the GGH Candidate
For readability and universality, in this thesis we will generally use the notation from
the abstract notion of multilinear maps described in Section 2.1.4. When instanti-
ated with the GGH candidate, operations are meant to occur on encodings, without
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implicit re-randomizations. In particular, e.g. g now denotes an encoding (not a
group element). Additionally, we will employ the following notation to indicate
necessary re-randomizations, extractions, and comparisons when using encodings
instead of group elements.
• g ← Gi means choosing a random encoding g at level i. (This corresponds to
uniformly choosing a group element from Gi.) We assume that encodings g
chosen in such a way have a low noise level, say, 1.
• g enc= h holds if and only if the encodings g and h match.
• g grp= h holds if and only if the group elements encoded by g and h match,
that is, if and only if the GGH isZero procedure identifies g−1h as the neutral
element.2
• reRandj(g) is the re-randomization of encoding g. This re-randomization in-
creases the noise level to a certain, a-priori fixed bound j. For simplicity, and
abstracting, we only consider noise levels j ∈ N. If g’s noise level is already at
least j (e.g. because g is the output of reRandj), then re-randomization fails.
We note that the distributions reRandj(g) and reRandj(h) are statistically close
for any two encodings g, h with g
grp
= h and noise level less than j.
• ext(g) denotes the canonical bitstring extracted from encoding g. We have
ext(g) = ext(h) for any g, h with g
grp
= h of sufficiently small noise level.
Like [72], we omit parameters (such as noise bounds) to computations; asymptotic
parameters can be derived from the suggestions in [72, Section 4.2].
4.3 (Hierarchical) Identity-based Non-Interactive Key Ex-
change
Hierarchical identity-based non-interactive key exchange (H-ID-NIKE) is the natural
generalisation of ID-NIKE [57, 112, 122] to the hierarchical setting: a root authority
2Technically, the GGH isZero procedure only allows to compare two encodings on the “highest
level” `. To compare two level-i encodings (for i < `), we can first “lift” both to level ` by pairing
them with a nonzero level-(`− i) element.
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calculates and distributes private keys to sub-authorities, who in turn do the same for
sub-sub-authorities, and so on, until leaf nodes are reached. Each node is identified
by a vector of identities, and any pair of nodes in the tree should be able to non-
interactively compute a common key based on their private keys and identities.3 We
recall from the introduction that H-ID-NIKE schemes are rare, and, to the best of
our knowledge, there are not even any ROM constructions that meet all the desirable
criteria (efficiency, scalability, and full security in the sense of resilience to arbitrary
node compromises).
Formally, an H-ID-NIKE scheme H-ID-NIKE consists of three PPT algorithms (see
below), an identity space ID and shared-key space SHK. The users are organized in
a tree of depth L whose root (at level 0) is the trusted authority (TA). The identity
of a user at level d ∈ [L] is represented by a vector id = (id1, . . . , idd) ∈ IDd.
Setup. The setup algorithm Setup(1k, L) is run by the TA. Given the security
parameter 1k and a parameter L ∈ N, it outputs a master public key mpk and
a master secret key msk . We also interpret msk as the user private key usk ε
for the empty identity ε.
Key delegation. The key delegation algorithm Del(mpk , usk id, id
′) can be run by
any user to generate a private key for any of its children. Given the master
public key mpk , the user private key usk id for an identity id = (id1, . . . , idd) ∈
IDd, the algorithm outputs a user private key usk id′ for any of its children
id′ = (id1, . . . , idd, idd+1) ∈ IDd+1 (for 0 ≤ d < L).
Shared key generation. Given the master public key mpk , a user private key
usk id1 for an identity id1 ∈ ID≤L, and an identity id2 ∈ ID≤L,
ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id2) outputs either a shared key Kid1,id2 ∈ SHK or a failure
symbol ⊥. (If id1 is an ancestor of id2 (or vice-versa) the algorithm is assumed
to always output ⊥ 4; here, id is in particular considered to be an ancestor of
itself. Otherwise the output is assumed to be in SHK.)
For correctness, we require that for any k, L ∈ N, for any (mpk ,msk)← Setup(1k, L),
3We remark that sometimes H-ID-NIKE schemes are more restricted and shared keys can only
be computed, for example, between pairs of leaf nodes. This is the case of the schemes of [73].
4If id1 is an ancestor of id2, it can always compute the user private key usk id2 ; a key derived
from usk id2 can be used as a shared key between the two users.
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for any pair of identities (id1, id2) ∈ IDd1 × IDd2 , such that neither is an ancestor
of the other, and corresponding user private keys usk id1 and usk id2 generated by
repeated applications of Del from usk ε = msk , we have ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id2) =
ShK(mpk , usk id2 , id1).
A (non-hierarchical) ID-NIKE scheme is an H-ID-NIKE scheme in which the depth
L of the tree is fixed to L = 1. (Note that in this case, Del gets as input usk ε = msk
and outputs user private keys for identities at level 1. We may thus also speak of
extraction of user private keys.)
4.3.1 Security Definition for (H-)ID-NIKE
We present a security model for H-ID-NIKE that is the natural generalisation of
the PS (Paterson and Srinivasan) model for ID-NIKE from [112] to the hierarchical
setting. The model significantly strengthens the previous model of Gennaro et al.
[73] by being fully adaptive, allowing arbitrary numbers of node corruptions, and
allowing the adversary access to shared keys as well as user private keys of inner
(i.e. non-leaf) nodes.
The model is defined in terms of a game between an adversary A and a challenger C.
C takes as input the security parameter 1k and a depth L, runs algorithm Setup of
the H-ID-NIKE scheme and gives A the master public key mpk . It keeps the master
secret key, msk , to itself. A then makes queries of the following three types:
Extract . A supplies an identity id = (id1, . . . , idd) ∈ IDd (for d ∈ [L]). C uses Del
repeatedly, starting from msk , to derive usk id and hands usk id to A.
Reveal . Here A supplies a pair (id1, id2) ∈ IDd1 × IDd2 . C extracts usk id1 as
above, runs Kid1,id2 ← ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id2), and hands Kid1,id2 to A.
Test . A supplies two challenge identities (id∗1, id∗2) ∈ IDd
∗
1×IDd∗2 such that neither
is an ancestor of the other. C computes Kid∗1,id∗2 as above, and tosses a coin
b ← {0, 1}. If b = 1 then C gives Kid∗1,id∗2 to A; otherwise, if b = 0, then C
gives A a uniform element from SHK.
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Finally, A outputs a guess bˆ for b. In our security model, the adversary is allowed
to make an arbitrary (but polynomial) number of Extract and Reveal queries,
and a single Test query. Furthermore, the adversary is fully adaptive, in the sense
that it can compromise nodes (by making Extract and/or Reveal queries) in any
order. In order to prevent the adversary from trivially winning, we require that the
adversary is not allowed to make any Extract queries on an ancestor of id∗1 or id
∗
2,
and no Reveal query on the pairs (id∗1, id
∗
2) and (id
∗
2, id
∗
1). The advantage of an
adversary A against an H-ID-NIKE scheme H-ID-NIKE is defined as:
AdvIND-SKA,H-ID-NIKE(k) = 2
∣∣∣Pr[bˆ = b]− 1/2∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Pr [bˆ = 1 | b = 1]− Pr [bˆ = 1 | b = 0]∣∣∣ .
We say that a scheme H-ID-NIKE is IND-SK secure if and only if AdvIND-SKA,H-ID-NIKE(k)
is negligible for all PPT adversaries A.
In the non-hierarchical case (i.e. L = 1), we recover the definition and security model
for (non-hierarchical) ID-NIKE from [112]. Note also that versions of these models
in which multiple Test queries are permitted for a single bit b can be shown to
be polynomially equivalent to the versions with a single Test query using standard
hybrid arguments.
4.4 Towards a Secure ID-NIKE Scheme in the Standard
Model
We specify how to obtain an ID-NIKE scheme, TIDNIKEPHF, that is secure in a
variant of the PS security model under the DBDH assumption in the standard
model; we consider a weaker security model where the total number of non-challenge
identities involved in Extract and Reveal queries made by an adversary against
the scheme is limited by a constant q (and the usual restrictions on the adversary to
prevent trivial wins still apply). We will refer to this security model as the q-bounded
PS security model. TIDNIKEPHF is the result of joint work with Dennis Hofheinz.
Our construction is based on the well-known ID-NIKE scheme of Sakai, Ohgishi and
Kasahara (SOK) [122]. It makes use of a tuple PG = (G,GT , g, p, e), output by a
pairing parameter generator G on input a security parameter 1k, and two instances
of a (q + 1, 1)-PHF H = (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval) with input in {0, 1}k and output
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Algorithm Setup(1k)
PG = (G,GT , p, g, e)← G(1k)
x← Zp, κi ← PHF.Gen(1k) (i = 1, 2)
mpk := (PG, κ1, κ2),msk := x
Return (mpk ,msk)
Algorithm Ext(mpk ,msk , id)
Yid ← Hκ1(id)Hκ2(id)
usk id ← Y xid
Return usk id
Algorithm ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id2)
If id1 = id2 return ⊥
Yid2 ← Hκ1(id2)Hκ2(id2)
Kid1,id2 := e(usk id1 , Yid2)
Return Kid1,id2
Figure 4.1: The ID-NIKE scheme TIDNIKEPHF.
in G. The component algorithms of our ID-NIKE scheme TIDNIKEPHF are defined
in Figure 4.1. (For compatibility with existing notation, we present an extraction
algorithm Ext instead of an equivalent delegation algorithm.)
It is clear that our ShK algorithm satisfies the correctness requirement that guaran-
tees that id1 and id2 are able to compute a common key. To see this, note that
e(usk id1 , Yid2) = e(Yid1 , Yid2)
x = e(Yid2 , Yid1)
x = e(usk id2 , Yid1).
Theorem 4.1. Let H be a (q+1, 1, γ, δ)-PHF into G. Then TIDNIKEPHF is secure in
the q-bounded PS security model under the DBDH assumption relative to generator
G. In particular, suppose A is an adversary against TIDNIKEPHF in the q-bounded
PS security model. Then there exists a DBDH adversary B with
AdvDBDHB,G (k) ≥ (AdvIND-SKA,TIDNIKEPHF(k) + 1− 4γ)δ − 1.
Proof. We proceed with a sequence of games. Let Sι be the event that A is successful
in Game Gι.
Game G0. Let G0 be the original attack game as described in the PS security
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model. By definition, we have that
AdvIND-SKA,TIDNIKEPHF(k) = 2 |Pr[S0]− 1/2| .
Game G1. In this game, instead of obtainning κ1, κ2 from the key generation
algorithm PHF.Gen, the challenger runs the trapdoor key generation algorithm twice,
(κ′i, ti)← PHF.TrapGen(1k, h1, h2) (i = 1, 2) for generators h1 and h2 ∈ G, to obtain
a pair of keys and trapdoors (κ′1, t1), (κ′2, t2). Since H is (q+1, 1, γ, δ)-programmable,
we have
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ 2γ.
Game G2. In this game we replace the challenger with a DBDH adversary B.
Assume B gets a tuple PG = (G,GT , p, g, e) and group elements (ga, gb, gc, T ) ∈
G3 ×GT as input, where 〈g〉 = G, |G| = |GT | = p and a, b, c ∈ Zp. B’s job is to
determine whether T equals e(g, g)abc or a random element fromGT . B simulates the
challenger’s behaviour in Game G1. First it runs (κ
′
1, t1)← PHF.TrapGen(1k, gb, g),
(κ′2, t2)← PHF.TrapGen(1k, gc, g), and then it sets mpk := (PG, κ′1, κ′2).
During the simulation, B, based on the (q+1, 1)-programmability of the PHF H, will
hope that for all non-challenge identities id i (1 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ q) involved in A’s Extract
and Reveal queries and for challenge identities id∗1, id
∗
2 subject to A’s Test query,
we have that:
α1,id1 = . . . = α1,idt = 0, α1,id∗2 = 0, α1,id∗1 6= 0
and
α2,id1 = . . . = α2,idt = 0, α2,id∗1 = 0, α2,id∗2 6= 0.
Here, for an identity id , α1,id and α2,id are output by PHF.TrapEval(t1, id) and
PHF.TrapEval(t2, id), respectively. We denote the event that B’s hope is satisfied by
good.
In order to answer an Extract(id) query made by A, B computes (α1,id , β1,id ) ←
PHF.TrapEval(t1, id), (α2,id , β2,id )← PHF.TrapEval(t2, id) and aborts if α1,id 6= 0 or
α2,id 6= 0. Assuming that B did not abort, we should have
Yid = Hκ′1(id)Hκ′2(id) = (g
b)
α1,id
gβ1,id (gc)α2,idgβ2,id = gβ1,id+β2,id .
Using knowledge of ga, B can compute usk id = (ga)β1,id+β2,id = Y aid . B gives usk id
to A. Note that implicitly, B is setting msk := a.
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Additionally, if it is the case that α1,id = α2,id = 0 for all non-challenge identities
id , then B can answer not only all Extract , but also all Reveal queries made by
A. For the latter, B first computes usk id for a non-challenge identity id involved in
the Reveal query, and then computes the shared key.
For the Test(id∗1, id
∗
2) query, if α1,id∗1 , α2,id∗2 6= 0 and α1,id∗2 = α2,id∗1 = 0, we have
that
Yid∗1 = Hκ′1(id
∗
1)Hκ′2(id
∗
1)
= (gb)
α1,id∗1 g
β1,id∗1 (gc)
α2,id∗1 g
β2,id∗1
= g
bα1,id∗1+(β1,id∗1+β2,id∗1 )
= g
bα1,id∗1+βid∗1
and
Yid∗2 = Hκ′1(id
∗
2)Hκ′2(id
∗
2)
= (gb)
α1,id∗2 g
β1,id∗2 (gc)
α2,id∗2 g
β2,id∗2
= g
cα2,id∗2+(β1,id∗2+β2,id∗2 )
= g
cα2,id∗2+βid∗2 .
(To simplify the above equation, for an identity id , we have denoted βid = β1,id +
β2,id .)
Now, with msk = a, the correct shared key between id∗1 and id
∗
2 should be
Kid∗1,id∗2 = e(Yid∗1 , Yid∗2)
a
= e(g
bα1,id∗1+βid∗1 , g
cα2,id∗2+βid∗2 )a
= e(g, g)
a(bα1,id∗1+βid∗1 )(cα2,id∗2+βid∗2 )
= e(g, g)
abc(α1,id∗1α2,id∗2 ) · C,
where C = e(ga, gb)
α1,id∗1βid∗2 e(ga, gc)
α2,id∗2βid∗1 e(ga, g)
βid∗1βid∗2 can be computed by B.
B responds to A’s Test query with Tα1,id∗1α2,id∗2C. When T = e(g, g)abc, this corre-
sponds to the real shared key Kid∗1,id∗2 , while when T is random in GT , B’s response
corresponds to a random value in SHK. Thus B’s response to A’s Test query is
properly distributed in Game G2 (because T = e(g, g)
abc or T is random, each with
probability 1/2).
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B will abort its simulation at any point if it realizes that good did not occur. Let
abortPHF be the event that B aborts during simulation. Due to the programmability
of H we have that
Pr[S2] = Pr[S1 ∧ ¬abortPHF] ≥ δ Pr[S1].
Finally, B outputs the same bit that A outputs. Let SB be the event that B is
successul in outputting the correct bit in the DBDH experiment of Definition 2.22.
It is clear that Pr[SB] = Pr[S2].
By collecting the probabilities relating the different games, we have
AdvIND-SKA,TIDNIKEPHF(k) = 2|Pr[S0]− 1/2|
≤ 2|Pr[S1] + 2γ − 1/2|
≤ 2|Pr[S2]/δ + 2γ − 1/2|
= 2|Pr[SB]/δ + 2γ − 1/2|.
Thus,
AdvDBDHB,G (k) = 2|Pr[SB]− 1/2| ≥ (AdvIND-SKA,TIDNIKEPHF(k) + 1− 4γ)δ − 1.
This concludes our proof.
Remark: While this would seem to be the first ID-NIKE scheme with security
in the standard model, we stress that TIDNIKEPHF is not secure in the sense of a
full security model like the PS security model, but it is only secure in a weaker
version of that model (the q-bounded PS security model) where an adversary has
more limited power. Moreover, another downside of that scheme is the large mpk
needed to describe each instance of the (q+ 1, 1)-PHF; known (q+ 1, 1)-PHFs need
O(q2) group elements [89]. Also, note that our TIDNIKEPHF construction is based on
bilinear maps. In the next sections we will see how to use multilinear maps and the
abstraction of the GGH candidate (see Section 4.2.2) to construct ID-NIKE schemes
with the desired level of security.
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4.5 Programmable Hash Functions in the Multilinear Set-
ting
For our purposes, we will strive to construct efficient (poly, n)-PHFs for constant
n (i.e. group hash functions which are (q(k), n)-PHFs for any polynomial q). How-
ever, there are indications that such PHFs do not exist [84], at least according to
the original definition from [86]. Thus, we will adapt the definition of PHFs to
the multilinear setting, and construct a “multilinear analogue” of a (poly, n)-PHF.
Concretely, an (m,n)-PHF maps to a “target” group G`. Here instead of explaining
H(X) as a product caXhbX for c, h in the target group G` (as the case of PHFs),
we will explain H(X) as a product e(c1, . . . , c`)
aXe(BX , h), for externally given chal-
lenges ci ∈ G1 (which means c = e(c1, . . . , c`) ∈ G`) and controlled h ∈ G1. Note
that the coefficient bX in the usual definition of a PHF now becomes a preimage
BX ∈ G`−1 under a pairing operation.
4.5.1 Definitions
Definition 4.1 (Group hash function). A group hash function H into G consists of
two polynomial-time algorithms: the probabilistic algorithm HGen(1k) outputs a key
hk, and HEval(hk , X) (for a key hk and X ∈ {0, 1}k) deterministically outputs an
image Hhk (X) ∈ G.
Definition 4.2 (MPHF). Assume an `′-group system MPG`′ = {{Gi}i∈[`′], p,
{ei,j}i,j≥1,i+j≤`′} as generated by a multilinear maps parameter generator MG`′(1k)
(see Section 2.1.4). Let H = (HGen,HEval) be a group hash function into G` (` ≤ `′),
and let m,n ∈ N. We say that H is an (m,n)-programmable hash function in the
multilinear setting ((m,n)-MPHF) if there are polynomial-time algorithms TGen and
TEval as follows.
• TGen(1k, c1, . . . , c`, h) (for ci, h ∈ G1 and h
grp
6= 1) outputs a key hk and a
trapdoor td. We require that for all ci, h, the distribution of hk is statistically
close to the output of HGen.5
5There is a subtlety here: in case of encoded group elements, the output of TGen may consist
of group elements whose noise level depends on the noise level of the ci or h. Hence, we will assume
a known a-priori bound on the noise level of the ci and h.
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• TEval(td , X) (for a trapdoor td and X ∈ {0, 1}k) deterministically outputs
aX ∈ Z and BX ∈ G`−1 with Hhk (X) grp= e(c1, . . . , c`)aX · e(BX , h). We require
that there is a polynomial p(k) such that for all hk and X1, . . . , Xm, Z1, . . . , Zn ∈
{0, 1}k with {Xi}i ∩ {Zj}j = ∅,
Phk ,{Xi},{Zj} := Pr [aX1 = · · · = aXm = 0 ∧ aZ1 , . . . , aZn 6= 0] ≥ 1/p(k), (4.1)
where the probability is over possible trapdoors td output by TGen along with
the given hk. Furthermore, we require that Phk ,{Xi},{Zj} is close to being sta-
tistically independent of hk. (Formally, |Phk ,{Xi},{Zj} − Phk ′,{Xi},{Zj}| ≤ ν(k)
for all hk , hk ′ in the range of TGen, all {Xi}, {Zj}, and negligible ν(k).)
We say that H is a (poly, n)-MPHF if it is a (q(k), n)-MPHF for every polynomial
q(k), analogously for (m, poly)-MPHFs.
Note that the TEval algorithm of an MPHF into G1 yields BX ∈ G0, i.e. exponents
BX . In fact, in this case, the MPHF definition coincides with the original PHF
definition from [86].
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the construction of MPHFs.
4.5.2 Programmable Random Oracles as (M)PHFs
A programmable random oracle H with images in G` can be interpreted as a group
hash function in the obvious way. (By “programmable”, we mean that during a
security proof, we can freely and adaptively determine images of H, even depending
on the inputs of TGen. The only restriction of this programming is that images
should appear uniformly and independently distributed to an adversary who sees
only public information.) However, note for this modeling to make sense in the first
place, we should require that we can hash into G`.
Theorem 4.2 (PROs as (poly, n)-(M)PHFs). A programmable random oracle H (in
the above sense) with images in G` can be programmed to act as a (poly, n)-(M)PHF
for any constant n.
Proof. Fix a polynomial q = q(k). We show that H is a (q, n)-(M)PHF (with empty
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hk). For each new preimage X, we program H(X) := e(c1, . . . , c`)
aXe(BX , h) for
the inputs c1, . . . , c` and h to TGen, and uniformly chosen BX ∈ G`−1. We choose
aX 6= 0 with probability 1/2q, and aX = 0 otherwise. TEval outputs these aX , BX ,
assigning them as necessary for previously unqueried inputs X. For any pairwise
different X1, . . . , Xq, Z1, . . . , Zn, we thus have
Pr
[∀i : aXi = 0 ∧ ∀j : aZj 6= 0] = (1− 12q
)q
·
(
1
2q
)n
≥ 1
2
·
(
1
2q
)n
,
which is significant for polynomial q and constant n.
4.5.3 Ingredient: Efficient Admissible Hash Functions
At the heart of our construction for MPHFs lies a primitive dubbed “admissible hash
function” (AHF) [31]. Unfortunately, the AHFs from Boneh and Boyen [31] are not
very efficient (and in fact only achieve a weaker AHF definition, see [41]). However,
an earlier work by Lysyanskaya [104] already contains an implicit and much more
efficient AHF.
Intuitively, an AHF can be thought of as a combinatorial counterpart of a (poly, 1)-
(M)PHF. An AHF input X is mapped to an image AHF(X) in such a way that
in a security proof, X can fall in the set of controlled, CO, inputs (meaning that
we know a trapdoor that allows to answer adversarial queries for that input) or
uncontrolled, UN, inputs (meaning that we do not know any trapdoor but hope
to embed a challenge element). Unlike with (M)PHFs, however, this is a purely
combinatorial property. An AHF guarantees that for any distinct X1, . . . , Xq, Z,
with significant probability, all Xi are controlled, and Z is uncontrolled.
We now give a definition that is a somewhat simpler variant of the AHF definitions
from [2, 41], and then show a result implicit in [104].
Definition 4.3 (AHF). Let R be a finite set and ` = `(k) a polynomial in k.
Let AHF = {AHF : {0, 1}k → R`} be a family of functions. For AHF ∈ AHF ,
K ∈ (R ∪ {⊥})`, define the function FK : {0, 1}k → {CO, UN} through
FK(X) =
{
UN ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ [`] : Ki = AHF(X)i ∨Ki = ⊥
CO ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ [`] : Ki 6= AHF(X)i ∧Ki 6= ⊥,
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where AHF(X)i and Ki denote the i-th component of AHF(X) and K, respectively.
We say that AHF is q-admissible if for every AHF ∈ AHF , there exists a PPT
algorithm KGen and a polynomial p(k), such that for all X1, . . . , Xq, Z ∈ {0, 1}k
with Z 6∈ {Xi},
Pr [FK(X1) = · · · = FK(Xq) = CO ∧ FK(Z) = UN] ≥ 1/p(k), (4.2)
where the probability is over K ← KGen(1k). We say that AHF is a family of
admissible hash functions if AHF is q-admissible for all polynomials q = q(k).
Next, we consider a family of codes over a finite alphabet R as a family of admissible
hash functions. A code over R is simply a mapping C : Rk
′ → R`, where k′ is the
message length and ` is the code length. The rate of a code is defined as k′/`. For a
message X, a vector C(X) is called a codeword. The minimum distance of a code,
dmin, is the minimum number of positions in which any two codewords differ. This
distance always satisfies dmin ≤ `− k′+ 1, the Singleton bound, and codes that meet
this bound are called Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes. We let a code C
be represented by its parameters (`, k′, dmin)|R|. For more details on codes we refer
to [23].
Theorem 4.3 ([104]). Assume a family of codes {Ck} with Ck : Rk/ log2|R| → R`
(also interpreted as Ck : {0, 1}k → R`) denoting both the code and its encoding
function. Suppose that Ck has minimum distance at least c · ` for a fixed constant
c > 0. (That is, X1 6= X2 implies that the vectors Ck(X1) and Ck(X2) differ in at
least c · ` positions.) Then {Ck} is a family of AHFs.
Proof. Let q = q(k) be a polynomial. We need to devise a PPT algorithm KGen
such that (4.2) holds. KGen(1k) sets d :=
⌈
ln (1/2q)
ln (1−c)
⌉
(so d is the smallest integer such
that (1− c)d ≤ 1/2q), and picks K uniformly among all elements from (R ∪ {⊥})`
with exactly d non-⊥ components. Hence, the set I := {i | Ki 6= ⊥} is of size d.
Now fix X1, . . . , Xq, Z ∈ {0, 1}k with Z 6∈ {Xi}. Our choice of K implies that
Pr [FK(Z) = UN] = |R|−d. (Notice that K has d non-⊥ elements and so this is
the probability that Ki = AHF(Z)i for d positions.) For any fixed i, we want
to upper bound the probability Pr [FK(Xi) = UN | FK(Z) = UN]. (This step loosely
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corresponds to [104, Lemma 4].) Hence, assume FK(Z) = UN. Now Ck(Xi) and
Ck(Z) differ in a set ∆ ⊆ [`] of positions with |∆| ≥ c · `. Hence, FK(Xi) = UN is
equivalent to I ∩ ∆ = ∅. (Note that in this case AHF(Z)j and AHF(Xi)j do not
differ for j ∈ I.) Thus,
Pr [FK(Xi) = UN | FK(Z) = UN] = Pr [I ∩∆ = ∅ | FK(Z) = UN]
≤ (1− c)d ≤ 1
2q
.
A union bound over i gives Pr [∀i : FK(Xi) = UN | FK(Z) = UN] ≤ 1/2, so that
Pr [FK(Z) = UN ∧ ∀i : FK(Xi) = CO] ≥ 1
2
· |R|−d ≥ 1
2
·
(
1
2q
) −1
log|R|(1−c)
= 1/p(k),
(4.3)
for p(k) = 2 · (2q)
−1
log|R|(1−c) . Note that 1/p(k) grows with c. Therefore, the larger
the minimum distance of the code Ck the better.
4.5.4 Construction: MPHFs from Multilinear Maps
Our main result in this section is a simple construction of a (poly, n)-MPHF from
an AHF.
Construction 4.1 (MM). Let AHF : {0, 1}k → R` be an admissible hash function
and assume an `′-group system MPG`′. The group hash function MM from {0, 1}k
into G` (` ≤ `′) is given by the following algorithms:
• HGen(1k) picks h˜i,j ← G1 \ {1} (for (i, j) ∈ [`]×R), sets hi,j := reRand2(h˜i,j),
and outputs hk := {hi,j}i∈[`],j∈R.6
• HEval(hk , X) computes (t1, . . . , t`) := AHF(X) and outputs MMhk (X) := e(h1,t1 ,
. . . , h`,t`).
Theorem 4.4. The group hash function MM above is a (poly, 1)-MPHF.
Proof. Fix a polynomial q = q(k). We need to exhibit TGen and TEval algorithms
as in Definition 4.2. TGen(1k, c1, . . . , c`, h) invokes K ← KGen(1k) (see Definition
6The additional re-randomization step guarantees that the noise levels in scheme and simulation
are the same. The concrete noise level of re-randomized elements depends on the maximal noise
considered in the arguments of TGen.
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4.3 for KGen) and, for all (i, j) ∈ [`]×R and uniform exponents ri,j 6= 0, it sets:
hi,j :=
{
reRand2(h
ri,j ) if Ki 6= j and Ki 6= ⊥,
reRand2(c
ri,j
i ) if Ki = j or Ki = ⊥.
(4.4)
For now, assume ci
grp
6= 1 for all i, so our set up yields a perfectly distributed key hk :=
{hi,j}i,j that is in fact independent of K.7 The trapdoor is td := ((ci), h,K, (ri,j)).
TEval(td , X) computes (t1, . . . , t`) := AHF(X) and distinguishes two cases:
• Case FK(X) = CO, i.e. there is at least an i∗ with Ki∗ 6= ti∗ and Ki∗ 6= ⊥. If
we set aX = 0 and
BX := e(h1,t1 , . . . , hi∗−1,ti∗−1 , hi∗+1,ti∗+1 , . . . , h`,t`)
ri∗,ti∗ ,
for any chosen i∗, we can decompose MMhk (X)
grp
= e(c1, . . . , c`)
aXe(BX , h).
• Case FK(X) = UN, i.e.Ki = ti orKi = ⊥ for all i. This means that hi,ti
grp
= c
ri,ti
i
for all i, so MMhk (X)
grp
= e(c1, . . . , c`)
aXe(BX , h) for aX =
∏
i ri,ti and BX := 1.
The AHF property (4.2) implies (4.1), for the same p(k). (Note that Phk ,{Xi},{Z}
only depends on K but not on hk .)
Finally, in case ci
grp
= 1 for some i, we have e(c1, . . . , c`)
grp
= 1. If we replace all
ci in (4.4) with h, we can explain any image MMhk (X)
grp
= e(h, . . . , h)
∏
i ri,ti as
MMhk
grp
= e(c1, . . . , c`)
aXe(BX , h) with arbitrary aX . Adjusting the probability for
aX 6= 0 in the order of 1/2q (as in the proof of Theorem 4.2) allow us to prove (4.1)
for p(k) = 4q.
Remark: The parameters of our MPHFs depend on the size of the alphabet R.
If we use binary codes, that is R = {0, 1}, with large minimum distance, we get the
AHF implicit in [104]. We can obtain MPHFs that use ` = O(k) groups Gi and
have keys consisting of 2` group elements. For security parameter k = 128, consider
for example, the binary BCH code (255, 128, 65)2.
Larger R give new AHFs that yield MPHFs that use fewer groups, which means
7In case of randomized encodings, the distribution of hk in the simulation may (e.g. with the
GGH candidate) only be statistically close to the one in the scheme.
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slightly less pairing-intensive constructions of MPHFs. On the other hand, larger R
also implies larger keys. If we consider the AHF construction of Theorem 4.3 with
MDS codes over R, we have dmin = `− k/ log2 |R|+ 1 which means our MPHFs use
` = O(k/log2 |R|) groups Gi and keys of ` · |R| = O(k · |R|/log2 |R|) group elements.
Also, note that large dmin = c · ` implies 1/p(k) is significant (see (4.3)). Our
constructions can then be instantiated with, for example, Reed-Solomon (RS) codes.
For security parameter k ≈ 128, consider for example the RS code (31, 25, 7)32. (We
note that for RS codes, in general, the size of the alphabet, |R|, grows with the size
of the code length `.) For details about about RS and BCH codes we refer to [23].
Theorem 4.5. Let n be a constant, q = q(k) be a polynomial, and let H = (HGen,
HEval) be a (q + n − 1, 1)-MPHF into G`. Then the group hash function H′ =
(HGen′,HEval′) with
• HGen′(1k) that outputs hk ′ = (hkν)ν∈[n] for hkν ← HGen(1k), and
• HEval′(hk ′, X) that outputs H′
hk ′(X) :=
∏
ν∈[n] Hhkν (X)
is a (q, n)-MPHF into G`.
Combining Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 yields a (poly, n)-MPHF for any constant n.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. We construct suitable TGen′ and TEval′ algorithms from the
respective TGen and TEval algorithms for H:
• TGen′(1k, c1, . . . , c`, h) runs (hkν , tdν) ← TGen(1k, c1, . . . , c`, h) for ν ∈ [n],
and outputs hk ′ := (hkν)ν∈[n] and td ′ := (tdν)ν∈[n].
• TEval′(hk ′, X) invokes (aν,X , Bν,X) ← TEval(tdν , X) for ν ∈ [n] and outputs
aX :=
∑
ν∈[n] aν,X and BX :=
∏
ν∈[n]Bν,X . This output can be justified with
H′hk ′(X)
grp
=
∏
ν∈[n]
Hhkν (X)
grp
=
∏
ν∈[n]
e(c1, . . . , c`)
aν,Xe(Bν,X , h)
grp
= e(c1, . . . , c`)
aXe(BX , h).
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Now fix X1, . . . , Xq, Z1, . . . , Zn with {Xi} ∩ {Zj} = ∅. For each ν, we hope for
the following event: aν,Xi = 0 for all i, and aν,Zj = 0 exactly for j 6= ν. For
fixed ν, due to the (q + n − 1, 1) programmability of the MPHF H, this event
happens with probability at least 1/p(k) (over tdν) for some polynomial p(k). Since
aX =
∑
ν aν,X , we get that with probability at least (1/p(k))
n, we have aXi = 0 for
all i and aZj = aj,Zj 6= 0 for all j (remember that for j 6= ν, aν,Zj = 0), which gives
us a (poly, n)-MPHF with p′(k) = p(k)n.
4.6 Fully-Secure ID-NIKE Scheme from MPHFs
In this section we revisit the ID-NIKE scheme of Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara
(SOK) [122]. We effectively replace the random oracles with (poly, 2)-MPHFs in
their scheme and prove the security of the generalized scheme. Using our standard-
model MPHFs, this yields the first standard-model ID-NIKE scheme.8 We then
consider a hierarchical generalisation.
We assume a 2`-group system MPG2` = {{Gi}i∈[2`], p, {ei,j}i,j≥1,i+j≤2`}, gener-
ated by a multilinear maps parameter generator MG2`(1k), and a (poly, 2)-MPHF
H = (HGen,HEval) with input length in {0, 1}k and output in G`. The component
algorithms of our ID-NIKE scheme IDNIKEMPHF are defined in Figure 4.2. (Again,
for compatibility with existing notation, we present an extraction algorithm Ext in-
stead of an equivalent delegation algorithm.) Correctness of the scheme is easy to
verify.9 We now prove security.
Theorem 4.6 (Security of the MPHF-based ID-NIKE scheme). Assume H is a
(poly, 2)-MPHF into G`. Then IDNIKEMPHF is IND-SK secure under the (2` + 1)-
power assumption relative to generator MG2`.
Proof. Assume an IND-SK adversary A against IDNIKEMPHF. We construct a
8If we instantiate the MPHFs again with random oracles (using Theorem 4.2), we retrieve the
original SOK scheme in pairing-friendly groups, along with a security proof. However, we note that
our security proof uses a different, seemingly stronger computational assumption.
9When instantiated with the GGH candidate, the pairing e is just a multiplication. We can
think of usk id1 = reRand3(Hhk (id1)
x) as usk id1 = xA + δ1 and usk id2 = reRand3(Hhk (id2)
x) as
usk id2 = xB + δ2, for small noise values δ1 and δ2. We see that id1 and id2 are able to compute
the same key: Kid1,id2 := ext((xA+ δ1)B) = xAB = ext((xB + δ2)A) =: Kid2,id1 .
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Algorithm Setup(1k)
MPG2` ←MG2`(1k)
x← Zp, hk ← HGen(1k)
mpk := (MPG2`, hk),msk := x
Return (mpk ,msk)
Algorithm Ext(mpk ,msk , id)
usk id ← reRand3(Hhk (id)msk )
Return usk id
Algorithm ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id2)
Kid1,id2 := ext(e(usk id1 ,Hhk (id2)))
Return Kid1,id2
Figure 4.2: The ID-NIKE scheme IDNIKEMPHF.
(2` + 1)-power distinguisher B that, given a 2`-group system MPG2`, and group
elements g, gx ∈ G1 and S ∈ G2`, distinguishes between S grp= e(g, . . . , g)x2`+1 (i.e. S
is real), and random S.
Concretely, B will internally simulate A, together with the IND-SK experiment.
Let id∗1, id
∗
2 be the identities from A’s Test query (which are not known to B yet).
Furthermore, let q = q(k) be a polynomial upper bound on the total number of
identities id i 6∈ {id∗1, id∗2} that appear in A’s Extract and Reveal queries.10 In
the following, we will use the (q, 2)-MPHF property of H (and the corresponding
algorithms TGen and TEval). B first runs (hk , td) ← TGen(1k, gx, . . . , gx︸ ︷︷ ︸
` times
, g) and
sets mpk := (MPG2`, hk). Implicitly, we will have msk := x.
We will first describe how B answers an Extract(id) query of A. If aid = 0 (for
(aid , Bid ) := TEval(td , id)), then B can compute usk id ← reRand3(e(Bid , gx)) grp=
Hhk (id)
msk . Otherwise, B aborts with output 0. We will hope for the event that
aidi = 0 for all q identities id i 6∈ {id∗1, id∗2} from B’s Extract and Reveal queries.
In that case, B can answer not only all Extract queries from A, but also all Reveal
queries (by first computing the user private key usk id of one of the two involved
identities, and then using usk id to compute the shared key).
10Note that B does not need to know q in advance in order to set up its simulation.
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We will additionally hope for aid∗1 , aid∗2 6= 0; in this case, B can embed its own
challenge into the reply K∗ to A’s Test query as
K∗ := ext(Said∗1aid∗2 · e(Bid∗1 , Bid∗2 , g, gx)
· e(Bid∗1 , gx, . . . , gx︸ ︷︷ ︸
`+1 times
)
aid∗2 · e(Bid∗2 , gx, . . . , gx︸ ︷︷ ︸
`+1 times
)
aid∗1 ). (4.5)
By using Hhk (id
∗
i )
grp
= e(
` times︷ ︸︸ ︷
gx, . . . , gx)
aid∗
i e(Bid∗i , g), we see that K
∗ = ext(e(Hhk (id∗1)x,
Hhk (id
∗
2))) = Kid∗1,id∗2 whenever S
grp
= e(gx, . . . , gx︸ ︷︷ ︸
2` times
)x. Conversely, if S is random,
then so is K∗. (If aid∗i = 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then B aborts with output 0.)
Finally, B outputs bˆ (i.e. A’s guess for the bit b in the IND-SK experiment). If the
event that B aborts is independent of the queried identities id i and id∗i (as is the
case for the RO-based MPHF from Theorem 4.2), we have
|Pr [B = 1 | S real]− Pr [B = 1 | S random]| = Pr [¬abort] ·AdvIND-SKA,IDNIKEMPHF(k).
Hence, B breaks the (2`+ 1)-power assumption if and only if A breaks the IND-SK
security of IDNIKEMPHF.
However, in the general case, abort might not be independent of the id i and id
∗
i .
This is because Pr [abort] is upper bounded by 1− 1/p(k) (for the polynomial p(k)
from (4.2)) and this means that different sets of identities id i, id
∗
i may cause the
simulator to abort with different probabilities (smaller than 1 − 1/p(k) of course).
Hence, in order to make Pr [abort] independent of the adversary’s queries, we will
have to resort to an “artificial abort” strategy as in [138]. The artificial abort step
consists of, at the end of a successful simulation a) estimating the probability that the
queries made by A cause B to abort, and then b) if necessary “artificially aborting”
so that B aborts with maximum probability, 1−1/p(k). That is, even if aidi = 0 and
aid∗i 6= 0 for all i, B will “artificially” abort with probability 1− 1/(P(idi),(id∗i ) · p(k))
for P(idi),(id∗i ) := Pr [¬abort | (id i), (id∗i )]. This keeps the (new) abort probability
at 1 − 1/p(k), independently of the id i and id∗i , and enables an analysis as above.
Unfortunately, in the general case, we can only approximate P(idi),(id∗i ) (up to an
inverse polynomial error, by running TEval with freshly generated keys sufficiently
often), which introduces an additional error term in the analysis. We refer to [138]
for details on the artificial abort technique.
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A variant secure under a weaker assumption. We can also construct an ID-
NIKE scheme in the standard model using two instances (with keys hk1, hk2) of a
(poly, 1)-MPHF instead of a single instance of a (poly, 2)-MPHF. Shared keys are
computed as K := ext(e(Hhk1(id1)
msk ,Hhk2(id2))); user private keys are of the form
usk id = (reRand3(Hhk1(id)
msk ), reRand3(Hhk2(id)
msk )). The benefit of this variant
is that it is possible to prove security under the 2`-MDDH assumption (as opposed
to the potentially stronger (2` + 1)-power assumption we use above). The proof
is similar to the one above; however, we will hope that a1,idi = a2,idi = 0 for all
non-challenge queries id i, and that a1,id∗1 , a2,id∗2 6= 0 and a1,id∗2 = a2,id∗1 = 0, where
(aj,id , Bj,id ) = TEval(td j , id) (j ∈ {1, 2}).
4.6.1 Extension to Hierarchical ID-NIKE (H-ID-NIKE)
We can extend our ID-NIKE scheme to an H-ID-NIKE scheme of constant depth
L. To this end, we work in a 2`L-group system MPG2`L, and use L instances of a
(poly, 2)-MPHF H into G`.
The resulting H-ID-NIKE scheme, denoted by HIDNIKEMPHF, is given in Figure 4.3.
In that description, and in the following, we write iddi := (id1, . . . , id i) for an identity
id = (id1, . . . , idd) and i ≤ d. We assume that all involved identities (including
“shortened identities” iddi) can be uniquely encoded as k-bit strings. (If this is not
the case, we can always first apply a collision-resistant hash function.) In general,
for identities id, idj we let d, dj denote their depth in the hierarchy, respectively.
Theorem 4.7 (Security of the MPHF-based H-ID-NIKE scheme). Let H be a
(poly, 2)-MPHF into G`. For fixed depth L ∈ N, HIDNIKEMPHF is secure under
the (2`L+ 1)-power assumption relative to generator MG2`L.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 4.6; we focus on the
necessary adaptations. We construct a (2`L + 1)-power distinguisher B from an
IND-SK adversary A. Assume B gets a 2`L-group system MPG2`L and group ele-
ments g, gx ∈ G1 and S ∈ G2`L as input, and is supposed to distinguish the cases
S
grp
= e(gx, . . . , gx)x and random S.
B simulates the IND-SK experiment for A. First, B runs (hk i, td i) ← TGen(1k,
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Algorithm Setup(1k, L)
MPG2`L ←MG2`L(1k)
x← Zp, u˜← G`, u← reRand2(u˜), hk i ← HGen(1k) (i ∈ [L])
mpk := (MPG2`L, {hk i}i∈[L], u),msk := x
Return (mpk ,msk)
Algorithm Del(mpk , usk id, id
′)
Parse id′ =: (id1, . . . , idd+1)
If id 6= (id1, . . . , idd) return ⊥
usk id′ ← reRandd+3(e(usk id,Hhkd+1(id′)))
Return usk id′
Algorithm ShK(mpk , usk id1 , id2)
Yid2 := e(Hhk1(id2,d1), . . . ,Hhkd2 (id2,dd2)), u := u, . . . , u︸ ︷︷ ︸
2L−d1−d2 timesKid1,id2 := ext(e(usk id1 , Yid2 ,u))
Return Kid1,id2
Figure 4.3: The H-ID-NIKE scheme HIDNIKEMPHF.
Note. msk = usk ε = x ∈ Zp = G0, so Del can be used to derive level-1 user
private keys from msk . (Recall that our definition of e is consistent with the implicit
exponent group G0 = Zp; e.g. e(x, g) = g
x for x ∈ G0.)
gx, . . . , gx︸ ︷︷ ︸
` times
, g) (i ∈ [L]) and then for u ← reRand2(e(gx, . . . , gx︸ ︷︷ ︸
` times
)), it sets mpk :=
(MPG2`L, {hk i}i∈[L], u). Implicitly we will have msk := x. To answer an Extract
query for identity id = (id1, . . . , idd), B will hope for aid :=
∏
i∈[d] ai,iddi = 0, where
(ai,iddi , Bi,iddi) := TEval(td i, iddi). In that case, we must have ai∗,iddi∗ = 0 for some
i∗, and thus B can compute usk id using
usk id ← reRandd+2(e(Hhk1(idd1), . . . ,Hhk i∗−1(iddi∗−1), e(Bi∗,iddi∗ , gx),
Hhk i∗+1(iddi∗+1), . . . ,Hhkd(iddd)))
grp
= e(Hhk1(idd1), . . . ,Hhkd(iddd))
msk .
Conversely, B can embed its own challenge S into the challenge key K∗ whenever
the challenge identities id∗1 = (id
∗
1,1, . . . , id
∗
1,d∗1
) and id∗2 = (id
∗
2,1, . . . , id
∗
2,d∗2
) satisfy
aid∗1 , aid∗2 6= 0. Namely, in that case, the group element
e(Hhk1(id
∗
1,d1), . . . ,Hhkd∗1 (id
∗
1,dd∗1),Hhk1(id
∗
2,d1), . . . ,Hhkd∗2 (id
∗
2,dd∗2),
u, . . . , u︸ ︷︷ ︸
2L−d∗1−d∗2 times
)msk , (4.6)
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from which the shared key is computed, contains a factor of the form e(
2`L times︷ ︸︸ ︷
gx, . . . , gx)x,
which can be replaced by B’s own challenge S; the remaining 2d
∗
1+d
∗
2 − 1 factors of
(4.6) can be computed as in (4.5).
Hence, B’s simulation requires that aid = 0 for all non-challenge queried identities
id, and aid∗1 , aid∗2 6= 0 for challenge identities id∗1, id∗2. It will be sufficient to hope for
aid∗j,di 6= 0 (j ∈ {1, 2}) for all prefixes of the challenge identities, and aiddi = 0 for all
other involved prefixes. (Since no prefixes of the challenge identities will need to be
extracted, these requirements are not contradictory.) These requirements translate
to requirements on the L individual MPHF instances. Hence, with probability at
least (1/p(k))L (for the polynomial p(k) from (4.1)), the simulation will not abort.
The remaining analysis (including a necessary artificial abort step) can be performed
as in the proof of Theorem 4.6.
A more efficient variant in the random oracle model. We can replace the
2`L-group system with a 2L-group system and the L different MPHFs with a random
oracle hashing into G1 in the above scheme HIDNIKEMPHF to obtain a second H-
ID-NIKE scheme which can be proven secure in the random oracle model. In this
case, the 2L-group system can be instantiated with smaller parameters than the
2`L-group system required in our standard model scheme.
4.7 Final Notes
In this chapter, we focused on the construction of ID-NIKE schemes. We started
our contributions in the area by giving a construction towards the first ID-NIKE
scheme with security proof in the standard model. Our construction, TIDNIKEPHF,
is very simple: it only uses a pairing and two instantiations of a (q + 1, 1)-PHF.
However, the security of TIDNIKEPHF relies on the assumption that an adversary
uses at most q non-challenge identities in its oracle queries. (Achieving full security
using a (q + 1, 1)-PHF was not possible due to the inexistence of (poly, 1)-PHFs
[84].)
123
4.7 Final Notes
Then, we adapted the definition of a PHF, working in a setting where multilin-
ear maps are available, and constructed analogues of (poly, n)-PHFs, which we
called (poly, n)-MPHFs. Using our (poly, n)-MPHFs we were then able to con-
struct the first fully secure ID-NIKE scheme with security in the standard model,
IDNIKEMPHF. Additionally, we were able to construct the first fully secure hierar-
chical ID-NIKE with security either in the standard model or in the random oracle
model, HIDNIKEMPHF.
As future work, it would be very interesting to formally extend our constructions to
the more general setting of multiple and independent trusted authorities as well as
to the setting where shared keys can be computed by groups of users instead of just
pairs of users. In the next subsection we expand more on these ideas.
4.7.1 (H-)ID-NIKE with Multiple TAs and Group (H-)ID-NIKE
Consider a scenario where we have multiple, independent TAs (sharing some common
system parameters) each issuing private keys to users, and we wish to enable any
pair of users with private keys issued by possibly different TAs to be able to compute
a shared key. Our Setup algorithm from Section 4.3 would now be divided into two
algorithms: one that generates a set of common parameters params, and is run by
a large organization which then makes these parameters public; and another, run
independently by any TA, that on input params outputs a master public key mpk
and a master secret key msk . Note that ID-NIKE with multiple TAs is different
from H-ID-NIKE. In the latter a single root TA generates the public parameters
and a master secret key from which the private keys (master secret keys) of the
sub-TAs are obtained. In the scenario of ID-NIKE with multiple independent TAs,
there is no root TA and each TA independently generates its pair of master public
key and master secret key. This scenario would also be possible in the hierarchical
setting, H-ID-NIKE, which would involve multiple independent root TAs.
Going further, we may wish to enable groups of users (rather than just pairs of
users) in the “forest” of hierarchies to compute shared keys. All of this is enabled in
the multilinear setting by generalisation of our ID-NIKE and H-ID-NIKE schemes.
For simplicity, we sketch just one such scheme here, leaving detailed development of
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these ideas to future work.
Suppose we have a 3-group system and let H be a random oracle with outputs in
G1. Then we can instantiate our ID-NIKE scheme with the MPHF being replaced
by H and with private keys of the form usk id ,i ← reRand3(H(id)msk i) ∈ G1. Now
assume we have two trusted authorities TA1, TA2 with master secrets msk1, msk2.
We augment mpk i to include the element hi = reRand2(g
msk i). Consider the chain
of equalities:
e(usk id1,1,H(id2), h2)
grp
= e(H(id1)
msk1 ,H(id2), g
msk2)
grp
= . . .
grp
= e(usk id2,2,H(id1), h1).
The first computation in the chain can be carried out by user id1 using its private key
issued by TA1, while the last can be done by id2 using its private key issued by TA2;
thus the output can be used as the basis of a shared key (by applying ext in the usual
way). Hence two users with private keys issued by different and possibly independent
TAs can still compute a shared key non-interactively. We leave the generalization
of this simple scheme a) to the standard model, b) to greater numbers of users and
TAs, and c) to the hierarchical setting, to future work.
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Hierarchical key assignment schemes can be used to enforce access control policies
by cryptographic means. In this chapter, we present new enhanced security models
for such schemes. We also give simple, efficient, and strongly-secure constructions
for hierarchical key assignment schemes for arbitrary hierarchies using PRFs and
FS-PRGs. We compare instantiations of our constructions with state-of-the-art hi-
erarchical key assignment schemes, demonstrating that our new schemes possess an
attractive trade-off between storage requirements and efficiency of key derivation.
Most of the content of this chapter appears in [65], which is joint work with Ken-
neth G. Paterson and Bertram Poettering. Some of the results generalize part of
[62], which is joint work with Kenneth G. Paterson.
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5.1 Introduction
A hierarchical key assignment scheme (HKAS) is a method for implementing access
control policies by assigning encryption keys and private information to each class in
a hierarchy in such a way that the private information assigned to a class, along with
some public information, can be used to derive encryption keys to all classes lower
down in the hierarchy. Formally, the hierarchy is modelled as a partially ordered set
(poset), each data item is labelled by a class u in the hierarchy, and is encrypted
using the encryption key κu corresponding to that class. Now a user, given access
to the private information Su, can derive the relevant encryption key κv for any
descendant class v, and hence gain access to the data of class v.
Such hierarchical key assignment schemes can be used in many applications where
it is desirable to provide differentiated access to data according to an access control
policy. As an illustration, consider the management of a database containing sensi-
tive information, such as medical records in a hospital; doctors, depending on their
seniority, are assigned access permission to a set of files in a patient’s medical record,
while nurses, being at a lower level in the hierarchy, have more restricted access to
that information. Other application domains include government communication,
protection of industrial secrets, and broadcast services such as cable TV.
The use of cryptographic techniques to solve the problem of key management in
hierarchical structures was first proposed in 1983, by Akl and Taylor [5], who put
forward the concept of a hierarchical key assignment scheme. Since then, a large
number of different schemes have been proposed, offering different trade-offs in terms
of the amount of public and private storage required and the complexity of key
derivation – see for example [8–11, 45, 48, 50, 85, 105, 123, 127, 134, 137, 141, 142].
Many additional issues are addressed in these works: time-dependent constraints,
dynamic addition and removal of classes, and revocation, for example. A recent
survey of this area by Crampton et al. [47] provides a detailed classification and
analyses of many of the schemes proposed in the last decades.
Many of the early hierarchical key assignment schemes lacked any formal security
analysis, but this shortcoming has been gradually addressed beginning with the work
of Atallah et al. [8], who proposed two different security notions: security against key
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recovery attacks (KR-security) and security with respect to key indistinguishability
(KI-security). Informally, KR-security captures the notion that an adversary should
not be able to compute a key to which it should not have access; whereas in the
notion of KI-security, the adversary should not even be able to distinguish between
the real key and a random string of the same length. The stronger KI-security
notion is important in enabling secure composability for hierarchical key assignment
schemes, that is, in achieving the property that any secure key assignment scheme
can be safely used alongside any suitably secure encryption scheme.
5.1.1 Our Contributions
We argue that the security notions for hierarchical key assignment schemes intro-
duced in [8] need to be strengthened in order to capture the widest possible range
of realistic attacks. In particular, the KR and KI security notions by Atallah et al.
do not allow an adversary to gain access to encryption keys κv for classes above
the target class u, even though these encryption keys might leak through usage and
their compromise need not directly lead to a compromise of the private information
Su or encryption key κu for the target class. Thus, as an initial contribution in
the area, we first define strengthened security models that provide this additional
compromise capability to the adversary, and show that our new models are strictly
stronger than the corresponding KR and KI security notions. Section 5.2.1 contains
the details.
We next propose two very simple and efficient hierarchical key assignment schemes
for arbitrary posets, and prove them to be secure in the sense of our strengthened
KI-security notion. Both of our schemes exploit the chain partition idea recently
introduced by Crampton et al. [48]. This gives a method of constructing an HKAS
for an arbitrary access structure, modelled as a poset P , from an HKAS for a simple
chain C (i.e. an HKAS for a totally ordered set). This is done by partitioning the
poset into chains and building the keys for the more complex scheme in a particular
way from the keys of the simpler chains. This interesting approach was proposed
without any formal security analysis in [48]. We provide in Section 5.3 a generic
security analysis of the chain partition construction, showing that the security of the
resulting scheme for a poset P in our strengthened KI security model is equivalent
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to the security (also in our strengthened KI security model) of the scheme for a
single chain. (It will be evident that our security analysis can be slightly modified
to also show the equivalence of security of the two schemes in other security models.)
It is worth noting that this construction can support different levels of security or
efficiency of key derivation for different subgroups in a hierarchy, by using different
schemes in each chain.
The chain partition construction enables us to focus on constructing efficient HKAS
for totally ordered sets in our strengthened KI security model. Our first construction,
presented in Section 5.4.1, is based only on pseudorandom functions (PRFs), which
can be efficiently implemented using, for example, HMAC [20] built using only a
cryptographic hash function. Our second construction, presented in Section 5.4.2, is
based on any forward-secure pseudorandom generator (FS-PRG). The instantiation
of our latter construction with the BBS FS-PRG from Construction 2.1 yields an
HKAS with security under the factoring assumption. We note that an FS-PRG can
also be obtained cheaply and generically from any PRG using the constructions of
Bellare and Yee [19].
In Section 5.5 we provide a comparison of instantations of our new constructions
with a variety of proven-secure HKASs from the literature.
5.2 Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes
A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair (V,) where V is a finite set of pairwise
disjoint classes, called security classes, and ‘’ is a partial order on V , i.e. is a re-
flexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation. A security class can represent
a person, a department, or a user group in an organisation. The relation  is defined
in accordance with authority for each class in V : for any two classes u, v ∈ V we
write v  u or u  v to indicate that users in class u can access the data of users in
class v. We say that u covers v, denoted vl u or um v, if v ≺ u and there does not
exist c ∈ V such that v ≺ c ≺ u. (V,) is a totally ordered set (or chain) if for all
u, v ∈ V , either v ≺ u or u ≺ v or u = v. We say that A ⊆ V is an antichain in V
if for all u, v ∈ A, u 6= v, we have v  u and v  u. Any poset (V,) can be repre-
sented by a specific directed acyclic graph G = (V,E), called the access graph, where
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the vertices coincide with the security classes and there is an edge from class u to
class v if and only if u  v. A partition of a set V is a collection of sets {V1, . . . , Vs}
such that (i) Vi ⊆ V ∀i, (ii) V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vs = V , and (iii) i 6= j ⇒ Vi ∩ Vj = ∅.
The problem of key management for such posets consists of assigning private infor-
mation and encryption keys (e.g. to be used in a symmetric encryption scheme) to
each class in the poset in such a way that the encryption keys can be used to protect
or access data, whereas the private information can be used to efficiently derive the
keys for any descendant class in the poset. The cryptographic primitive that solves
this challenge is called a hierarchical key assignment scheme [5], and is defined as
follows.
Definition 5.1 (Hierarchical Key Assignment Scheme). Let Γ denote a set of ac-
cess graphs, i.e. of graphs that correspond to posets. A hierarchical key assignment
scheme (HKAS) for Γ is a pair of algorithms (Gen,Der) satisfying the following
conditions:
• Gen(1k, G) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a
security parameter 1k and a graph G = (V,E) ∈ Γ and outputs
– for all classes u ∈ V : private information Su and key κu ∈ {0, 1}p(k), for
a fixed polynomial p;
– public information pub.
We denote by (S, κ, pub) the output of Gen(1k, G), where S = (Su)u∈V and
κ = (κu)u∈V are the vectors of private information and keys, respectively.
• Der(G, u, v, Su, pub) is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as
input a graph G, classes u, v ∈ V such that v  u, private information Su, and
public information pub, and outputs a key κv ∈ {0, 1}p(k) assigned to class v.
For correctness we require that for all k ∈ N, all G ∈ Γ, all (S, κ, pub) output by
Gen(1k, G), and all u, v ∈ V, v  u, we have Der(G, u, v, Su, pub) = κv.
Remark: Observe that hierarchical key assignment schemes are essentially sym-
metric in nature, i.e. a separation of entities holding secret keys and entities holding
131
5.2 Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes
public keys is not assumed. As a consequence, Gen’s output pub does not have to be
public in the classical sense, but could also be folded into the private information Su,
for all u ∈ V . We point out that we left pub in Definition 5.1 to keep it consistent
with prior work. However, the schemes that we propose in this thesis will not make
use of pub, i.e. they will assign an empty value to it.
5.2.1 Definitions of Security for HKAS
As mentioned earlier, formal security modelling for hierarchical key assignment
schemes began with [8]. However, as we will argue, these models are inadequate
for practical application in the most challenging of security environments. In the
following, we describe our new, strengthened models, and then discuss the differences
with respect to the established ones.
We consider strengthened versions of the key indistinguishability (KI) and key re-
covery (KR) security goals proposed by Atallah et al. [8], which we name strong key
indistinguishability (S-KI) and strong key recovery (S-KR) respectively. For each
security notion we consider both static and dynamic adversaries. It will shortly be-
come clear, however, that security against static adversaries is polynomially equiva-
lent to security against dynamic adversaries. We begin with informal statements of
our security models, and then give formal models in terms of security experiments
involving an adversary.
Strong key indistinguishability. We consider two types of adversaries:
• Static adversaries: A static adversary Astat , given an access graph G =
(V,E), first chooses a security class u ∈ V to attack. Using algorithm
Gen on graph G, the experiment generates (S, κ, pub). The adversary is
then provided with private information Sv assigned to all classes v ∈ V
such that v  u (i.e. the adversary is given all private information Sv
that should not enable the computation of key κu) along with the set of
all keys κv associated with classes v ∈ V such that v  u, and the public
information pub. Precisely, the adversary gets pub and the two sets:
CorruptG,S,u = {Sv ∈ S | v  u} and KeysG,u = {κv | v  u} .
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Notice that, given CorruptG,S,u, the adversary can compute for itself
all keys κv for classes v ∈ V such that v  u. So, from the obtained
information, the adversary can gain access to κv for any v ∈ V \ {u}. As
a challenge, the adversary additionally gets either key κu or a random
string of the same length, and it has to distinguish these two cases. We
refer to Definition 5.2 for the formal specification of this experiment.
• Dynamic adversaries: In contrast to a static adversary, a dynamic (also
called adaptive) adversary Adyn first gets access to all public information
pub and then may request keys κv and private information Sv in an
adaptive manner before eventually committing to a security class u ∈ V
that it wants to attack. After receiving a challenge based on key κu,
it continues to request keys and private information until terminating
and outputting a bit. The adversary wins the security experiment if it
successfully distinguishes the key κu from random, under the restriction
that (i) u  v for all classes v for which the adversary requested private
information, and (ii) key κu has not been requested.
Strong key recovery. Again, we consider two types of adversaries:
• Static adversaries: The difference between security in the sense of strong
key recovery with respect to static adversaries (S-KR-ST) and strong key
indistinguishability with respect to static adversaries (S-KI-ST) is that
in the former the adversary receives no challenge key, and the adversary
is required to recover the key κu corresponding to the attacked class u
rather than to distinguish it from a random key. We refer to Definition 5.3
for the formal specification of this experiment.
• Dynamic adversaries: Same as above; here the adversary never receives
a challenge key. Instead, the adversary is required to recover the key κu
corresponding to the chosen class to attack, u.
It is not difficult to see that, both in the S-KI notion and in the S-KR notion,
security against static adversaries is actually polynomially equivalent to security
against dynamic adversaries. Indeed, in the corresponding reduction, the static
adversary simply guesses which class will be the subject of the dynamic adversary’s
query, and aborts if the guess turns out to be incorrect; this reduction succeeds
with probability 1/|V |. A similar proof was used in [10] (and implicitly in [8]).
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So schemes proven secure against static adversaries are automatically also secure
against dynamic adversaries (albeit with a less tight overall security reduction). In
the remainder of this chapter, we focus on the static case.
We next give our definitions for security in the sense of strong key indistinguishability
with respect to static adversaries (S-KI-ST-security) and strong key recovery with
respect to static adversaries (S-KR-ST-security), formalising the above discussion.
Definition 5.2 (S-KI-ST). Let Γ be a set of access graphs and let (Gen,Der) be a
hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ. Consider the following experiment asso-
ciated with adversary A:
Experiment ExpS-KI-ST, dA,Γ (1
k) :
u← A(1k, G)
(S, κ, pub)← Gen(1k, G)
If d = 1 then T ← κu else T ← {0, 1}p(k)
d′ ← A(pub,CorruptG,S,u,KeysG,u, T )
Return d′
For any G ∈ Γ, the advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
AdvS-KI-STA,Γ (k) = 2
∣∣∣Pr [ExpS-KI-ST, dA,Γ (1k) = d : d← {0, 1}]− 1/2∣∣∣ ,
which can also be written as
AdvS-KI-STA,Γ (k) =
∣∣∣Pr[ExpS-KI-ST,1A,Γ (1k) = 1]− Pr[ExpS-KI-ST,0A,Γ (1k) = 1]∣∣∣ .
The key assignment scheme is said to be secure in the sense of strong key indistin-
guishability with respect to static adversaries (S-KI-ST-secure) if AdvS-KI-STA,Γ (k) is
negligible for every polynomial-time adversary A and any graph G ∈ Γ.
Definition 5.3 (S-KR-ST). Let Γ be a set of access graphs and let (Gen,Der) be a
hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ. Consider the following experiment asso-
ciated with adversary A:
Experiment ExpS-KR-STA,Γ (1k) :
u← A(1k, G)
(S, κ, pub)← Gen(1k, G)
κ′u ← A(pub,CorruptG,S,u,KeysG,u)
If κ′u = κu return 1 else return 0
For any G ∈ Γ, the advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
AdvS-KR-STA,Γ (k) =
∣∣∣Pr [ExpS-KR-STA,Γ (1k) = 1]∣∣∣ .
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The key assignment scheme is said to be secure in the sense of strong key recovery
with respect to static adversaries (S-KR-ST-secure) if AdvS-KR-STA,Γ (k) is negligible
for every polynomial-time adversary A and any graph G ∈ Γ.
We now explain why our security models are stronger than the ones introduced by
Atallah et al. [8]. While an adversary in our S-KI-ST or S-KR-ST security model
receives both the set CorruptG,S,u ⊆ S of private information and the set KeysG,u ⊆
{0, 1}p(k) of (symmetric) keys, in the KI-ST and KR-ST security models from [8] the
adversary receives only the former set when performing its attack. In our dynamic
settings, the strong adversary has access to keys κv for which v  u, where u is the
challenge security class, whereas in the dynamic models of [8], the adversary has no
access to such keys. Now in a real deployment of a scheme, some of the cryptographic
keys κv used in the scheme may leak, perhaps through cryptanalysis or misuse. In
this case, we would like our selected security model to provide the strongest possible
guarantees about the security of other keys that have not been leaked. But note
that the previous security models from [8] provide no such guarantees, whereas our
models provide the strongest possible guarantee, in that all keys κv with v  u are
given to the adversary. Indeed, as the next example makes clear, it is quite feasible
that leakage of a key κv for which v  u can damage the security of the key κu.
A separating example: Consider a graph G = (V,E) having linear structure,
i.e. V = {u0, . . . , un−1} with ui+1 l ui for all i. Let H be a one-way function, which
we model as a random oracle. We select Su0 at random from the domain of H and
set κui = Sui and Sui+1 = H(Sui) for all i. It is clear how the Gen and Der algorithms
should be defined, and that the resulting scheme satisfies the correctness property.
It is also easy to see that the scheme is KR-ST-secure in the random oracle model,
in the sense of [8]. However, it is also clear that with knowledge of key κu0 = Su0 , all
keys in the hierarchy can be efficiently determined (including the challenge key κu)
and hence the scheme is insecure in the S-KR-ST model.
We note that this separation is for key recovery security notions. It is an open prob-
lem to construct a separating example for the corresponding key indistinguishability
notions.
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(a) A poset (V,)
u00
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C3
(b) A partition of V into chains
Figure 5.1: Example of a Chain Partition.
5.3 The Chain Partition Construction: A Security Analysis
We begin by reviewing the Chain Partition Construction for key assignment schemes
from [48]. Given a partially ordered set (V,), represented by the directed acyclic
graph P = (V,E), we select a particular partition of V into chains {C0, . . . , Cw−1}.
(Dilworth’s Theorem [54] asserts that every partially ordered set (V,) can be par-
titioned into w chains, where w is the width of V , that is, the cardinality of the
largest antichain in V .) The partition need not be unique. The length of Ci is
denoted by li, for 0 ≤ i ≤ w− 1. We let lmax denote maxi{li}. The maximum class
of Ci is regarded as the first class in Ci and the minimum class as the last class.
Since {C0, . . . , Cw−1} is a partition of V , each u ∈ V belongs to precisely one chain.
Let C = u0m. . .mul−1 be any chain in V . Then any chain of the form ujm. . .mul−1,
0 < j ≤ l − 1 is said to be a suffix of C. Now, for any u ∈ V , the set ↓ u := {v ∈
V : v  u} has non-empty intersection with one or more chains C0, . . . , Cw−1. It is
proved in [48] that the intersection of ↓ u and the chain Ci is a suffix of Ci or the
empty set. Following [48], this will enable us to define the private information that
should be given to a user in class u.
Since {C0, . . . , Cw−1} is a partition of V into chains, {↓ u ∩ C0, . . . , ↓ u ∩ Cw−1}
is a disjoint collection of chain suffixes. Additionally, the private information for
each class in V should be chosen so that the private information for the j-th class
of a chain can be used to compute keys for all lower classes in that chain. Hence,
we can see that a user in class u should be given the private information for the
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maximal classes in the non-empty suffixes ↓ u ∩ C0, . . . , ↓ u ∩ Cw−1. Given u ∈ V ,
let uˆ0, . . . , uˆw−1 denote these maximal classes, with the convention that uˆi =⊥ if
↓ u ∩ Ci = ∅. Let uij denote the j-th class in the chain Ci, where 0 ≤ j ≤ li − 1.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a poset (V,) and a possible partition of V into four chains:
C0, C1, C2, C3. Note that after the poset is partitioned into chains, each u ∈ V in
Figure 5.1(a) is relabelled with uij in Figure 5.1(b), depending on which chain the
class is located and on the position of the class in the chain.
The Chain Partition Construction: Let (V,) be a poset, P = (V,E) the cor-
responding directed acyclic graph, and k a security parameter. Select a chain par-
tition of V into w chains C0, . . . , Cw−1, so that Ci contains classes ui0, ui1, . . . , uili−1,
with uij+1 l uij , 0 ≤ j < li − 1. Let lmax denote maxi{li}. Additionally, let
HKASchain = (Genchain,Derchain) be an HKAS for single chains of length exactly
lmax. Then the chain partition scheme HKASposet(HKASchain) = (Genposet,Derposet)
(relative to the particular partition selected) is defined as follows.
Algorithm Genposet(1
k, P ):
1. For 0 ≤ i ≤ w−1, run Genchain on inputs 1k and a chain of length lmax to obtain
(T i, κi, pubi). Discard the last lmax − li elements of T i and κi to obtain the
private information and keys for a chain of length li. Note that this chain has
the same Der algorithm as the starting chain. For ease of notation, we continue
to denote the reduced sets by T i and κi, and we write T i = {Tui0 , . . . , Tuili−1}
and κi = {κui0 , . . . , κuili−1}.
2. For each u ∈ V , define the private information Su to be {Tuˆi : uˆi 6=⊥, 0 ≤ i ≤
w − 1} and the encryption key κu to be κu = κuij , where we assume that u is
the j-th class of chain Ci, that is, u = u
i
j .
3. Let S and κ be the sets of private information and keys, respectively, in the
above construction, and let pubposet = (pub
0, . . . , pubw−1).
4. Output (S, κ, pubposet).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the assignment of private information and encryption keys
for an arbitrary poset (V,). Figure 5.2(a) shows a class e and its descendants
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a
c
g
j
d
h
k
b
e
i
f
(a) Class e and its descendants
u00
u01
u02
u03
u10
u11
u12
u20
u21
u30
u31
C0
C1
C2
C3
(b) Se = Tu03 , Tu11 , Tu21 , Tu30 and κe = κu21
Figure 5.2: The Chain Partition Construction – Assignment of Private Keys and
Encryption Keys.
inside a dashed shape. In Figure 5.2(b) we can see that after the poset (V,) is
partitioned into chains, class e is represented by class u21. The highlighted classes
u03, u
1
1, u
2
1, u
3
0 correspond, respectively, to the maximal classes uˆ0, uˆ1, uˆ2, uˆ3 in the
suffixes ↓ e ∩ C0, . . . , ↓ e ∩ C3. This gives us Se = Tu03 , Tu11 , Tu21 , Tu30 and κe = κu21 .
Algorithm Derposet(P, u, v, Su, pubposet):
1. Assume that after the chain partition, classes u and v are identified, respec-
tively, as classes uij and u
g
h. For u  v, find uˆg, the maximal class in ↓ u∩Cg.
This class is in chain Cg and we denote it by u
g
r , where 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Note that,
by construction, Tugr ∈ Su.
2. Set κv = κugh
← Derchain(Cg, ugr , ugh, Tugr , pubg).
3. Output κv.
To illustrate the key derivation process, consider Figure 5.2(b) and suppose we have
Se = Su21 and wish to derive the encryption key κk for class k, labelled as u
1
2 after the
chain partition. As u12 is in chain C1, we need to find the maximal class in ↓ e∩C1,
which is uˆ1 = u
1
1. Now as u
1
1 is an ascendant class of u
1
2, which is also in chain C1,
and as Tu11 ∈ Su21 we can use Derchain on input Tu11 to obtain κk = κu12 .
Theorem 5.1 (Security of the Chain Partition Construction). Let Γ be a set of di-
rected acyclic graphs P = (V,E) and lmax be the maximum length of the chains in a
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chain partition of V . Let HKASchain be an S-KI-ST-secure scheme for single chains of
length lmax. Then the scheme HKASposet(HKASchain) = (Genposet,Derposet) for Γ ob-
tained from the above chain partition construction is also S-KI-ST-secure. More pre-
cisely, for every S-KI-ST adversary Aposet that breaks HKASposet(HKASchain) with ad-
vantage AdvS-KI-STAposet,Γ (k), there exists an S-KI-ST adversary Achain that breaks HKASchain
with the same advantage. Moreover, the two adversaries run in roughly the same
time.
Proof. Assume Aposet attacks a class uij of graph P ∈ Γ. If Aposet is able to distin-
guish between the real key κuij
associated with class uij , and a random string having
the same length, we show that we can construct an S-KI-ST adversary Achain against
the scheme HKASchain that, using Aposet as a black box, is able to distinguish be-
tween real or random keys. Algorithm Achain plays the S-KI-ST security experiment
described in Definition 5.2, receiving as initial input a security parameter 1k and
a chain with lmax classes. Adversary Achain simulates the environment of Aposet in
such a way that Aposet’s view is indistinguishable from its view when playing the
S-KI-ST security experiment.
Algorithm Achain:
1. Receive from the S-KI-ST experiment a chain C with lmax classes v0, . . . ,
vlmax−1.
2. Pick P = (V,E) ∈ Γ and run Aposet with input (1k, P ) to get Aposet’s choice
of target class u.
3. Generate a chain partition of P containing chains C0, . . . , Cw−1. In this parti-
tion, class u is identified as some class uij in some chain Ci of length li ≤ lmax.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ w − 1, t 6= i, run Genchain on inputs 1k and a chain of length lmax
to obtain (St, κt, pubt), the set of private information, the set of keys and the
public information for that chain. Note that, as in the chain partition con-
struction, these sets can be truncated to obtain the set of private information,
the set of keys and the public information for a chain of length exactly lt. We
abuse notation and continue to use (St, κt, pubt) to denote this data.
4. Output vj in chain C as Achain’s choice of target class. Achain now receives
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as input the public information, pub, output by Genchain, along with private
information Svt for all classes vt ≺ vj in C, and all keys κvt in C such that
vt  vj . Achain also receives as input a value T which is either the real key κvj
or a random key of the same length. In what follows, Achain will identify the
first li classes in C with the chain Ci in the chain partition construction.
5. Set pubposet = (pub
0, . . . , pubi−1, pub, pubi+1, . . . , pubw−1). Use the private
information Svt for classes vt ≺ vj in C together with the private information
in the sets St for 0 ≤ t ≤ w − 1, t 6= i, to build the set CorruptP,S,u. Use
keys κvt in C such that vt  vj and the keys from the sets κt to build the set
KeysP,u.
6. Run Aposet with inputs (pubposet,CorruptP,S,u,KeysP,u, T ). It is easy to see
that Achain has the information required to properly construct the two sets
CorruptP,S,u and KeysP,u in such a way that Aposet’s input here is valid in
Aposet’s experiment against the scheme HKASposet(HKASchain), and such that
T is the real key (resp. the random key) in Aposet’s experiment if and only if
T is the real key (resp. the random key) in Achain’s experiment.
7. When Aposet outputs a bit, output the same bit.
Now as Achain’s simulation is perfect, we see that the advantage of Achain in winning
its S-KI-ST indistinguishability game for the chain C of length lmax is the same
as the advantage of Aposet in playing the S-KI-ST indistinguishability game against
HKASposet(HKASchain). The theorem now follows.
Note that, in the above theorem, HKASchain need only be an S-KI-ST-secure scheme
for chains of length exactly lmax. Because of the truncation trick, this is equivalent
to HKASchain being an S-KI-ST-secure scheme for the set of graphs consisting of
chains of lengths up to lmax.
Remark: We stress that Theorem 5.1 and its security proof can be slightly modi-
fied for different HKAS security notions, such as S-KR-ST-security, KI-security and
KR-security.
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5.4 Srongly KI-Secure Constructions
In this section we construct two very simple and efficient S-KI-ST-secure key assign-
ment schemes for totally ordered hierarchical access structures (chains) of arbitrary
depth. The first construction, shown in Section 5.4.1, uses a pseudorandom func-
tion, while the second, shown in Section 5.4.2, uses a forward-secure pseudorandom
generator. General key assignment schemes for arbitrary posets can be obtained by
combining our constructions with the result of Section 5.3.
5.4.1 A PRF-based HKAS for Totally Ordered Hierarchies
Here we use PRFs to construct an S-KI-ST-secure hierarchical key assignment
scheme for totally ordered hierarchies, HKASPRF = (GenPRF,DerPRF).
Let Γ be the family of graphs corresponding to totally ordered hierarchies, and let
G = (V,E) ∈ Γ be a graph, where V = {u0, . . . , un−1} for some n, and ui+1l ui for
all i. For better exposition, we abuse notation writing Si and κi (instead of Sui and
κui) for the private information and key assigned to each security class ui ∈ V . (We
can do this because we are in the chain setting.)
Let k be a security parameter and let F : {0, 1}k × D → {0, 1}k be a PRF (see
Section 2.3.3). Let c0 and c1 be two different elements in D. The GenPRF and
DerPRF algorithms are defined in Figure 5.3. Observe that computing key κj from
secret information Si requires exactly j − i+ 1 evaluations of the underlying PRF.
Note that we use special PRFs where K = R and D is any set.1 For concrete-
ness, we propose to deploy the (hash-based) HMAC primitive [20] as a PRF (see
also analysis in [55]). In addition, it might be possible to find suitable construc-
tions based on number-theoretic assumptions, e.g. derived from the PRF obtained
by converting the BBS PRG [26] into a PRF via the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali
(GGM) construction [76].
1We remark that this special restriction applies not only to our PRF-based HKAS, but also to
other PRF-based key assignment schemes; Attallah et al. [8], for example, provide some PRF-based
constructions which also require similar restrictions on the keyspace and range of the PRFs.
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Algorithm GenPRF(1
k, G)
S0 ← {0, 1}k, κ0 ← FS0(c1)
For each class ui ∈ V (i > 0), set Si ← FSi−1(c0), κi ← FSi(c1)
S ← (S0, . . . , Sn−1), κ← (κ0, . . . , κn−1), pub ← ∅
Output (S, κ, pub)
Algorithm DerPRF(G, ui, uj , Si, pub) (note that we may assume j ≥ i)
If i = j, return κj = FSi(c1)
For h = i+ 1 to j
Sh ← FSh−1(c0)
Return κj = FSj (c1)
Figure 5.3: The Hierarchical Key Assignment Scheme HKASPRF.
Theorem 5.2 (Security of the PRF-based HKAS). Assume F is a PRF and Γ is
a family of graphs corresponding to totally ordered hierarchies. Then HKASPRF is
S-KI-ST-secure for any graph G ∈ Γ.
Proof. Fix any totally ordered graph G = (V,E) ∈ Γ. Proving the theorem amounts
to showing that the only way to break the S-KI-ST-security of HKASPRF is by break-
ing the pseudorandom function F. To this end, we need to show how to turn an
S-KI-ST adversary A attacking HKASPRF into an adversary AF attacking F. Assume
A attacks a class ui ∈ V . We define a sequence of computationally indistinguishable
games G0, G1, . . . , Gi+1. We start with G0, defined to be the original experiment
ExpS-KI-ST, dA,Γ (1
k) as described in Definition 5.2. Then we make successive transitions
until we reach Gi+1, for which A’s probability of success in outputting the correct
bit d′ = d, for d← {0, 1}, is only 1/2.
Let Succι be the event that A is successful in Game Gι.
Game G0. Let G0 be the original experiment Exp
S-KI-ST, d
A,Γ (1
k) as described in
Definition 5.2.
Game Gι (1 ≤ ι ≤ i+ 1). This game is identical to Gι−1, except that here the as-
signment of private information and keys is modified in such a way that key κι−1 and
private information Sι are substituted with values randomly selected from {0, 1}k.
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This modification amounts to substituting the occurrences of FSι−1 in Gι−1 with a
truly random function, which is warranted by the security of the PRF, as we will
see in Lemma 5.1. Hence,
|Pr[Succι]− Pr[Succι−1]| ≤ PRF(k) ,
where PRF(k) is a bound on the advantage Adv
PRF
AF,F(k) for any polynomial-time
adversary AF.
Now, we see that in Gi+1 the adversary’s view is independent of bit d; in both cases
it gets as challenge a random value in {0, 1}k. Thus,
Pr[Succi+1] = 1/2 .
Therefore, we have
AdvS-KI-STA,Γ (k) = 2 |Pr[Succ0]− 1/2| ≤ 2(i+ 1)PRF(k) .
By assumption PRF(k) is negligible, concluding the proof.
Lemma 5.1. |Pr[Succι]− Pr[Succι−1]| ≤ PRF(k).
Proof. Assume we have an S-KI-ST adversary A against HKASPRF that attacks a
class ui and is able to distinguish between games Gι−1 and Gι. We describe below
how to construct an algorithm AF that, using A as a black-box, is able to distinguish
between pseudorandom and truly random functions.
Algorithm AF plays the PRF experiment described in Definition 2.28 and is thus
given access to a function fβ that is either an instance of a pseudorandom function
Fκ : D → {0, 1}k, keyed with a random key κ← {0, 1}k (if β = 1), or a truly random
function into {0, 1}k (if β = 0). In order to use algorithm A, AF simulates the
environment of A in such a way that interpolates between games Gι−1 and Gι. This
means that if AF is interacting with a pseudorandom function, then the simulation
proceeds as in Gι−1. Otherwise, if AF is interacting with a random function, then
the simulation proceeds as in Gι. More formally, algorithm AF works as follows.
Algorithm AF:
1. Run A with input (1k, G) to get A’s choice of target class ui.
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2. Set up the access hierarchy for graph G by running GenPRF(1
k, G) with the
following modifications:
(a) Private information Sι and key κι−1 are computed via oracle fβ as follows:
Sι ← fβ(c0), κι−1 ← fβ(c1).
(b) For all ι′ < ι, set Sι′ ← {0, 1}k.
(c) For all ι′ < ι− 1, set κι′ ← {0, 1}k.
So far, this is almost equivalent to the actions of Gι−1 when β = 1 and equiv-
alent to Gι when β = 0. The only difference is that, in case β = 1 (i.e. AF has
oracle acess to a PRF Fκ for unknown κ ← {0, 1}k), the private information
Sι−1 is not equal to κ. This is completely indistinguishable from A’s view
since both Sι−1 and κ are uniformly chosen from {0, 1}k and A is not allowed
to ask for private information Si′ , i
′ < i+ 1. Note that as ι ≤ i+ 1, A is not
allowed to ask for Sι′ , ι
′ < ι.
3. Pick a random bit d. If d = 1, AF sets A’s challenge, denoted here by T , to
be the real key κi. If d = 0, AF sets T to be a random key of the same length
as κi.
4. Run A with inputs (pub,CorruptG,S,ui ,KeysG,ui , T ), where CorruptG,S,ui =
{Si+1, . . . , Sn−1} and KeysG,ui = {κ0, . . . , κi−1}, to obtain a bit d′. (Note
that according to AF’s set-up of the access hierarchy, it can compute all this
information.) Here d′ is A’s guess as to whether it was given the real key
associated with class ui or a random string having the same length.
5. If d′ = d, output β′ = 1, guessing for a pseudorandom function; otherwise,
output β′ = 0, guessing for a truly random function.
Now we have
PRF(k) ≥ AdvPRFAF,F(k)
=
∣∣∣Pr[ExpPRF,1AF,F (1k) = 1]− Pr[ExpPRF,0AF,F (1k) = 1]∣∣∣
= |Pr[1← AF | β = 1]− Pr[1← AF | β = 0]|
=
∣∣Pr[d′ = d | β = 1]− Pr[d′ = d | β = 0]∣∣
= |Pr[Succι−1]− Pr[Succι]| .
144
5.4 Srongly KI-Secure Constructions
Algorithm GenFS-PRG(1
k, G)
params ← GFS.Setup(1k), S0 ← GFS.Key(params)
For all 0 ≤ i < n, compute (Si+1, κi)← GFS.Next(Si)
S ← (S0, . . . , Sn−1), κ← (κ0, . . . , κn−1), pub ← ∅
Output (S, κ, pub)
Algorithm DerFS-PRG(G, ui, uj , Si, pub) (note that we may assume j ≥ i)
For h = i to j
(Sh+1, κh)← GFS.Next(Sh)
Return κj
Figure 5.4: The Hierarchical Key Assignment Scheme HKASFS-PRG.
5.4.2 An FS-PRG-based HKAS for Totally Ordered Hierarchies
Here, building on generic FS-PRGs, we construct an S-KI-ST secure hierarchical key
assignment scheme for totally ordered access graphs, HKASFS-PRG = (GenFS-PRG,
DerFS-PRG). When combined with the result from Section 5.3, our construction
widely generalizes our construction for arbitrary posets from [62], which implicitly
exploits the property of forward security of the BBS pseudorandom generator (see
Construction 2.1 in Section 2.3.4). As our construction generically builds on FS-
PRGs, it is amenable to the efficiency gain obtained by replacing the BBS-based
FS-PRG by, for instance, an HMAC-based one. In the following we describe our
scheme for totally ordered hierarchies HKASFS-PRG.
Let Γ be the family of graphs corresponding to totally ordered hierarchies, and let
G = (V,E) ∈ Γ be a graph, where V = {u0, . . . , un−1} for some n, and ui+1l ui for
all i. As in Section 5.4.1, we write Si for private information Sui , and κi for key κui .
Let k be a security parameter, and let GFS = (GFS.Setup,GFS.Key,GFS.Next) be an
FS-PRG with output blocks of length p(k) (see Definition 2.31). The GenFS-PRG and
DerFS-PRG algorithms are defined in Figure 5.4. Note that we identify the FS-PRG’s
state Sti with the private information Si stored for class ui, while key κi is set to
the FS-PRG’s output Outi+1.
Theorem 5.3 (Security of the FS-PRG-based HKAS). Assume GFS is an FS-PRG
and Γ is a family of graphs corresponding to totally ordered hierarchies. Then
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HKASFS-PRG is S-KI-ST-secure for any graph G ∈ Γ.
Proof. Fix any totally ordered graph G = (V,E) ∈ Γ. This proof amounts to
showing that for every S-KI-ST adversary A that breaks our FS-PRG-based scheme
HKASFS-PRG with advantage Adv
S-KI-ST
A,Γ (k), there exists an algorithm D that breaks
the forward-security of GFS with advantage Adv
FS-PRG
D,GFS (k) ≥ AdvS-KI-STA,Γ (k)/2. More-
over, D has roughly the same running time as A. Assume we have an S-KI-ST
adversary A that attacks a class ui and is able to distinguish between the real key κi
assigned to that class, and a random string of the same length. Then, we can con-
struct an algorithm D that, using A as a black box, is able to tell apart output
blocks generated by GFS, up to some iteration t, from a sequence of purely random
blocks.
Algorithm D initially outputs an iteration number, say t. Then it is given access to a
sequence of t output blocks Out = Out1, . . . , Outt, and the current state, Stt, of the
FS-PRG. D has to distinguish if Out is a sequence of the first t output blocks of GFS
or a sequence of random blocks each of length p(k). (See the security experiment of
Definition 2.31.) Given all that information, D simulates the environment of A in a
way thatA’s view is indistinguishable from the S-KI-ST experiment of Definition 5.2.
We want to prove that
AdvS-KI-STA,Γ (k) =
∣∣∣Pr[ExpS-KI-ST,1A,Γ (1k) = 1]− Pr[ExpS-KI-ST,0A,Γ (1k) = 1]∣∣∣
≤ 2 FS−PRG(k),
where FS−PRG is an upper bound on the advantage AdvFS-PRGD,GFS (k) for any polynomial-
time distinguisher D. We define a sequence of games and analyse it.
Game G0. Define Game G0 to be identical to Exp
S-KI-ST,d
A,Γ (1
k) for d = 0. In
particular, the challenge key T is chosen to be random in {0, 1}p(k).
Game G1. This game is like Game G0, except that all elements in KeysG,u are
replaced by random strings of length p(k). Challenge key T remains as before, that
is, it is a random value in {0, 1}p(k).
Game G2. This game is identical to Exp
S-KI-ST,d
A,Γ (1
k) for d = 1. In particular, the
challenge key T is the real key κi assigned to class ui, as computed via GenFS-PRG.
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In the analysis, let A(Gι) denote adversary A playing game Gι. First we show
that |Pr[A(G0) = 1]− Pr[A(G1) = 1]| ≤ FS−PRG(k). Consider the following distin-
guisher D against the FS-PRG GFS.
D runs A with input (1k, G) to get ui, the class that A is aiming to attack.
D chooses an integer t = i and sends it to its own challenger. It receives Sti
and Out = Out1, . . . , Outi, where the latter is either the first i output blocks
generated by GFS.Next, or a collection of random strings in {0, 1}p(k). D sets
KeysG,ui = Out1, . . . , Outi and uses Sti to compute the private information col-
lected in CorruptG,S,ui . Then D sets CorruptG,S,ui = {Sti+1, . . . , Stn−1}, pub ← ∅,
T ← {0, 1}p(k) and, finally runs A on input (pub,KeysG,ui ,CorruptG,S,ui , T ). When-
ever D receives a bit d′ from A, D forwards the same bit to its own challenger. We
see that if Out is the sequence of first i output blocks generated by GFS.Next, then
A’s view is exactly as in game G0. On the other hand, if the values are random
strings, then A’s view is exactly as in game G1. Now we have
FS−PRG(k) ≥ AdvFS-PRGD,GFS (k)
=
∣∣∣Pr [ExpFS-PRG,1D,GFS (1k) = 1]− Pr [ExpFS-PRG,0D,GFS (1k) = 1]∣∣∣
= |Pr[A(G0) = 1]− Pr[A(G1) = 1]| .
Next we bound |Pr[A(G1) = 1]− Pr[A(G2) = 1]|. The reduction is similar to the one
above, the difference is that this time the FS-PRG distinguisher D specifies t = i+1
instead of t = i, and assigns κj ← Outj+1 for all 0 ≤ j ≤ i. This means that
not only the keys in KeysG,ui are taken from Out, but also the ‘challenge key’ κi.
Notice that here, D has access to the value Sti+1 and thus is able to compute the
set of private information CorruptG,S,ui = {Sti+1, . . . , Stn−1}. Similarly to above,
this establishes |Pr[A(G1) = 1]− Pr[A(G2) = 1]| ≤ FS−PRG(k).
All in all, this proves that
AdvS-KI-STA,Γ (k) =
∣∣∣Pr[ExpS-KI-ST,1A,Γ (1k) = 1]− Pr[ExpS-KI-ST,0A,Γ (1k) = 1]∣∣∣
= |Pr[A(G2) = 1]− Pr[A(G0) = 1]|
≤ 2 FS−PRG(k).
The theorem now follows.
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5.5 Comparison with Previous Schemes
In this section, we compare instantiations of our constructions with other provably
secure schemes from the literature. Note that all these previous schemes have proofs
only in weaker security models than our strong security models. (However, in some
cases, these schemes can also be proven secure in our strong security models.)
In [8, 9], Atallah et al. proposed a first construction based on pseudorandom func-
tions, which they prove to be KR-secure; and a second construction which they prove
to be KI-secure, but which requires the additional use of a symmetric encryption
scheme secure under chosen plaintext attack (SE-CPA). In both constructions the
private information of a class consists of a single symmetric key associated with that
class. In the first construction, the amount of public information grows with the
number of edges in the directed acyclic graph (each edge has an associated PRF
output). In the second construction, the amount of public information grows with
the number of classes (each class has an associated ciphertext). In both construc-
tions, key derivation uses only symmetric operations and its cost grows linearly with
the number of levels between the classes.
De Santis et al. [123] proposed a construction which is based on symmetric encryp-
tion schemes only, achieves KI-security and is simpler than the KI-secure scheme
proposed in [8]. The construction uses only a chosen plaintext secure symmetric
encryption scheme and the required private key storage is small at one key per class.
The amount of public storage needed grows linearly with the number of classes and
the number of edges in the graph. Key derivation requires roughly h symmetric
decryptions, where h is the number of levels between the classes.
Ateniese et al. [10, 11] proposed two different constructions for time-bound key
assignment schemes, which achieve KI-security. Their first construction is based
on symmetric encryption schemes and the second makes use of bilinear maps. The
security of the latter construction is based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(DBDH) assumption. The advantage of these constructions is that they provide very
efficient procedures for key derivation, requiring only one decryption or one pairing
evaluation, no matter the number of levels between the classes. However, the public
information for a scheme obtained from the first construction can be very large since
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it depends not only on the number of classes, but also on the number of time periods.
The downside of the second construction is that the private information could be
as large as the number of time periods (and the public information is already very
large). These constructions are not directly comparable to normal (i.e. non-time-
bound) schemes, but we include them in the comparison to get an idea of their
efficiency compared to normal schemes.
D’Arco et al. [50] proposed a generic construction yielding a key assignment scheme
offering KI-security, using as components a KR-secure scheme and the Goldreich-
Levin hard-core bit (GL bit) [74]. They instantiated their construction with an Akl-
Taylor scheme [5], which they proved to be KR-secure under the RSA assumption,
therefore achieving KI-security under the same assumption. Their construction can
also be instantiated, for example, with the KR-secure scheme from Atallah et al. [8],
yielding a KI-secure scheme based on PRFs. However, their construction involves a
significant “blow up” when going from KR-security to KI-security, since it requires
the use of a KR-secure scheme for a poset having ` classes for each class in the poset
for the final KI-secure scheme, where ` is the length of keys. Typically, we would
desire ` = 128 bits in applications. Their construction also consumes a large amount
of public storage, requiring roughly ` times as many public values as in the starting
KR-secure scheme. Key derivation also involves an increase by a factor of ` relative
to the starting scheme.
Our constructions provide stronger security guarantees (i.e. key indistinguishability
in our strengthened model) than all the above schemes and indeed all other hierar-
chical key assignment schemes in the literature. Our constructions provide schemes
having a trade-off between storage of private information and efficiency of key deriva-
tion, depending on how the poset is partitioned into chains. The overall efficiency
of key derivation is bounded by the length of the longest chain in the partition, and
the amount of private information depends on w, the poset width (which is equal to
the number of chains in the partition). Moreover, due to the cryptographic compo-
nents used in our constructions (PRFs and FS-PRGs), key derivation is relatively
efficient, growing linearly in h, the number of levels between classes. In addition,
our constructions require no public storage.
Table 5.1 gives us a comparison of our schemes and other provably secure schemes
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Scheme
Private Public
Key derivation
Type of Security
storage storage security based on
Atallah et al. [8, 9]
k k(|E|+ |V |) (cH + cXOR)h KR PRF
k k1(2|E|+ |V |) cH(h+ 1) + cDh KI PRF+SE-CPA
De Santis et al. [123] k k1(|E|+ |V |) cD(h+ 1) KI SE-CPA
Ateniese et al. [10, 11]
k k1O(|V |2 · |T |3) cD KI SE-CPA
k4O(|T |) k3O(|V |2) cP KI DBDH
D’Arco et al. [50] (+[5]) k2 k2(|V |(1 + `) + 2) cE · ` KI Random exp. RSA
Ours (PRF-based) w · k 0 cPRF(h+ 1) S-KI PRF
Ours (FS-PRG-based) w · k2 0 cFS-PRG(h+ 1) S-KI FS-PRG
Table 5.1: Comparison with previous schemes.
in the literature. Private storage is measured per class in the access graph, public
storage is measured for the entire hierarchy, and key derivation shows the maximum
amount of computation that is needed to traverse h levels down in the hierarchy. We
also include the type of security that the scheme achieves, key recovery (KR), key
indistinguishability (KI) or our strengthened version, S-KI, and the basic compo-
nents of the scheme. In the table, k is a security parameter that corresponds to the
size of the keys for a PRF or for a symmetric encryption scheme E ; k1 represents the
size of ciphertexts for a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme; k2 is a
security parameter for a pseudorandom generator; k3 represents the size of pairing-
friendly group elements (which is typically a little larger than twice the security
parameter, e.g. 171 bits at the 80-bit security level); k4 is the size of the order q of a
pairing-friendly group (which can usually be taken as twice the security parameter);
cH denotes the computation required to compute the output of a hash function; cD
is the computation needed for a symmetric key decryption; cP is the computation
needed for one pairing evaluation; cE is the cost of exponentiation modulo an inte-
ger N of size k2; cPRF is the computation needed to compute the output of a PRF;
cFS-PRG is the computation needed to compute the output of an FS-PRG; ` is the
bit-size of the scheme’s keys; and w is the width of a poset. Finally, |T | represents
the number of distinct time periods in the time-bound schemes of [10, 11].
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we highlight the contributions of this thesis to the area of cryptogra-
phy and discuss a number of possible research directions.
In this thesis we have addressed two distinct topics. In Part I we exploited the non-
interactive key exchange (NIKE) primitive in two settings. First we systematically
studied NIKE in the public key setting. We argued that NIKE has received scant
attention since the 1976 paper by Diffie and Hellman [53] – prior to our work, the
only existing formal security model for NIKE was the one by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup
(CKS) [40], who analysed the Diffie-Hellman NIKE scheme, as well as a variant of
it, in the random oracle model. We therefore provided different security models
for NIKE and explored the relationships between them and also the CKS security
model; we focused on the challenging scenario where an adversary can register arbi-
trary public keys into the system, what we call the dishonest key registration (DKR)
model. Having proven that those models are all polynomially equivalent, we were
then able to construct and analyse NIKE schemes in the simplest security model,
which we called the CKS-light model. We constructed a pairing-based scheme with
security in the standard model, and a variant of the Diffie-Hellman scheme with
security in the random oracle model, under the factoring assumption. Furthermore,
we also showed that a secure NIKE scheme can be converted into an IND-CCA PKE
scheme, thus illustrating the fundamental nature of NIKE in public key cryptogra-
phy.
We then considered NIKE in the identity-based setting (ID-NIKE). Using multilinear
maps, we constructed the first ever ID-NIKE scheme with security in the standard
model. Not only that, we also constructed the first ever fully-secure hierarchical ID-
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NIKE (H-ID-NIKE) scheme with security either in the random oracle model or in
the standard model. Although not very efficient, our constructions demonstrate that
it is possible to construct (H-)ID-NIKE schemes which are secure in the standard
model, moving away from the ROM-secure SOK scheme [122].
In Part II of this thesis, we first proposed enhanced security notions for hier-
archical key assignment schemes (HKASs). Our notions, which we call strong
key-indistinguishability (S-KI) and strong key recovery (S-KR), are, respectively,
strengthened versions of the KI and KR security notions of Atallah et al. [8]. They
provide the adversary against an HKAS with the additional capability of obtaining
keys for classes above the target class. We then provided a general security analysis
for the chain partition construction of Crampton et al. [48]; we proved that the se-
curity of an HKAS for arbitrary posets, built using the chain partition construction
along with an HKAS for chains, is equivalent to the security of the HKAS for chains.
We gave simple and efficient constructions for HKASs and proved them to be secure
in our S-KI security notion. Our constructions offer an attractive trade-off between
storage requirements and efficiency of key derivation.
6.1 Directions for Future Research
The work presented in this thesis has identified several research directions. We
discuss these and a few additional ones below.
1. Factoring-based NIKE scheme in the standard model. In Chapter 3,
we provided a pairing-based NIKE scheme and proved it to be secure in the
standard model, in the DKR setting, under the DBDH-2 assumption. An
apparently difficult open problem is to construct a NIKE scheme which is
secure under the factoring assumption in the standard model, in the DKR
setting; as far as we are aware, the only NIKE schemes with security under
the factoring assumption in the DKR setting use the random oracle model.
The main obstacle for us to solve this goal is to be able to non-interactively
check the validity of arbitrary public keys registered by the adversary.
2. Multi-user NIKE. In 2000 Joux [93] proposed a 3-user NIKE scheme which
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unfortunately suffers from the same security issue as the original Diffie-Hellman
NIKE scheme (as discussed in Chapter 1); its hashed version, however, is secure
in the random oracle model. For the case of n ≥ 3, Boneh and Silverberg [33]
showed how to generalize Joux’s protocol to an n-user NIKE scheme if multilin-
ear maps existed. Garg, Gentry and Halevi [72] in turn, using their candidate
multilinear maps, adapted the construction of [33], providing an instantiation
of an n-user NIKE scheme. However, like Joux’s protocol, the constructions
of [33] and [72] are not secure in the setting where the adversary is allowed
to arbitrarily register public keys against users of its choice, i.e. they are not
secure in our DKR setting. An interesting open problem is to construct an
n-user NIKE scheme (for any constant n ≥ 3) which is secure in the standard
model, in the DKR setting. However, a requirement, as a first step towards
this goal, would be to extend our security models for (2-user) NIKE to the
n-user setting.
3. Multi-user (H-)ID-NIKE. As we mentioned in Chapter 4, it would be very
interesting to formally extend our work on (H-)ID-NIKE to the setting where
shared keys can be computed by groups of users instead of only two users.
Research in this direction would yield the first secure multi-user (H-)ID-NIKE
schemes in the literature.
4. Multi-TA (H-)ID-NIKE. Again, as we discussed in Chapter 4, our work
on (H-)ID-NIKE can be extended to the setting with multiple independent
TAs. This is a more practical scenario since, for example, a pair of users
who obtained keys from independent TAs may still want to compute a shared
key between themselves. It would also be very interesting to go further and
construct a multi-TA, multi-user (H-)ID-NIKE scheme.
5. Multilinear map-free (H-)ID-NIKE in the standard model. As men-
tioned earlier, due to the use of multilinear maps, our (H-)ID-NIKE construc-
tions are not very efficient. In order for (H-)ID-NIKE schemes to be of more
practical use, we encourage the search for such constructions which are secure
in our security models, but do not require the use of multilinear maps.
6. Construction of other cryptographic primitives from NIKE or ID-
NIKE. In this thesis we demonstrated that the NIKE primitive is so funda-
mental that it can even be used to construct IND-CCA PKE schemes. Also,
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in [112], Paterson and Srinivasan showed that certain ID-NIKE schemes can
be converted into IBE schemes. We propose to further investigate the rela-
tionships between (ID-)NIKE schemes and other cryptographic primitives.
7. “Tree” partition construction for HKAS. The chain partition construc-
tion of Crampton et al. [48] that we analysed in Chapter 5 provides an attrac-
tive trade-off between storage requirement and efficiency of key derivation. It
would be interesting to formally introduce and analyse a construction in which
instead of partitioning the access graph into a collection of chains, we partition
it into a collection of trees. This construction would benefit from smaller stor-
age requirement and more efficient key derivation. As an example, one could
use PRFs to efficiently build schemes for trees and then use the tree partition
construction to generalize these schemes to arbitrary hierarchies.
8. Separating example for HKAS key indistinguishability security no-
tions. In Chapter 5 we illustrated an HKAS which is secure in the KR model
but insecure in the S-KR model. It is an open problem to either find an HKAS
which is secure in the KI model but insecure in the S-KI model, or to show
that the KI and S-KI notions are (polynomially) equivalent.
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